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ABSTRACT
EVER ENLARGING EUROPE; ENLARGEMENT 
OF THE EU, 1990S AND TURKEY
Ege Erko^ak
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor; Asst. Prof. Dr. A. GiilgunTuna
September 2000
In this thesis, in the light of the integration theories, the enlargement of the 
European Union is described with a historical perspective comprising the 
enlargement process in the 1990s. A special focus is given to EU -  Turkey relations 
continuing over four decades through the perspective of the EU enlargement. The EU 
has been inclined to enlarge ever since it was founded. Actually, enlargement has 
been both a cause and an effect of the many different policies of the Union. Although 
enlargement became an agreed fact of the Union by more than doubling its size 
through four different enlargements, it has always initiated some debates within the 
Union whenever it has become palpable. With the changing international as well as 
continental conditions of the 1990s, Europe has witnessed the EU’s growing role as 
the core organisation for conducting the Central and East European Countries’ 
‘return’ to Europe. These circumstances have forced the EU to change its ‘classical’ 
method of enlargement to a more ‘adaptive’ method by challenging the structures of 
the EU, and forcing the Union to adapt its system accordingly. These conditions also 
encouraged Turkey in its quest for membership to the EU. Although the integration 
theories prove insufficient to explain the complete dynamics of the enlargement 
process, enlargement is an agreed and continuous policy which will prevail the 
agenda of the Union in the near future. It is concluded that the EU is predicted to 
start its fifth enlargement by the year 2003.
Keywords; integration theories, enlargement, EU-Turkey relations, 1990s.
ÖZET
SÜREKLİ GENİŞLEYEN AVRUPA: AVRUPA BİRLİĞİNİN 
GENİŞLEME SÜRECİ, 1990LI YILLAR VE TÜRKİYE
Ege Erkoçak
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Gülgün Tuna
Eylül 2000
Bu tezde, Avrupa Birliğinin genişlemesi, bütünleşme teorilerinin de 
yardımıyla tarihsel bir bakış açısından 1990’lı yıllardaki genişleme sürecini de 
kapsayacak şekilde İncelenmektedir. Kırk yılı aşan tarihiyle AB- Türkiye ilişkileri 
genişleme süreci çerçevesine oturtularak özellikle incelenmiştir. AB kuruluşundan bu 
yana genişlemeye eğilimli bir kuruluş olmuştur. Hatta, genel olarak genişlemenin 
AB’nin bir çok politikasımn gelişiminde sebep-sonuç ilişkileri çerçevesinde etkili 
olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. AB’nde genişlemenin etkisi, dört farklı genişlemeyle 
topluluğun üye sayısının kuruluşundan bu yana iki katından fazla artması da göz 
önünde bulundurulursa topluluğun gelişiminde çok önemli bir yere sahiptir. Buna 
rağmen genişleme olasılığı her gündeme geldiğinde AB içerisinde tartışmalı bir 
ortama neden olmuştur. 1990Tı yıllarda değişen uluslararası koşullar sonrasında 
Avrupa kıtası, Orta ve Doğu Avrupa ülkelerinin Avrupa’ya “geri dönüşlerini” 
yöneten AB’nin kıtanın en önemli kuruluşu olarak öne çıkmasına tanık oldu. Bu 
koşullar AB’ni, yeni üyelerin AB’ne uyum sağlamasım öngören ‘klasik’ genişleme 
metodunu, AB’nin bu koşullara kendisininde uyum sağlamasına yardımcı olan 
‘adaptif- değişken’ bir metoda dönüştürmesi doğrultusunda zorladı. Bu ortam, 
Türkiye’ye de tam üyelik çalışmalanmn hızlandıniması için cesaret verdi. Genişleme 
Sürecinin tüm dinamikleri, bütünleşme teorileri tarafından tam olarak açıklanamasa 
bile, AB genişlemesi, üzerinde uzlaşılmış ve aralıksız devam eden bir süreç olarak 
yakın bir gelecekte de AB’nin gündemini belirlemeyi sürdürecektir. Topluluğun bu 
süreç içerisindeki ilk üye kabulünü 2003 yılı itibanyia yapması beklenmektedir.
Anahtar Sözcükler: Bütünleşme (entegrasyon) teorileri, genişleme, AB-Türkiye 
ilişkileri, 1990’lı yıllar.
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INTRODUCTION
This study will analyse and discuss the enlargement process of the European 
Union in a historical perspective with specific focus on the 1990s and Turkey’s 
position in this process. The European Community has been the centre of attraction for 
non-member states since its origins and, as a result, the enlargement of this 
organisation has occupied a significant place within its evolution.
The political structure of Europe has dramatically changed after 1989. The 
Communist rule has collapsed freeing the Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEECs) from Soviet influence. Once the popular revolutions have been concluded, 
these countries expressed their determination to ‘return to Europe’ by which they 
meant full integration into the economic, political, and security structures of the West. 
The ‘return to Europe’ policy, of course, included European Union membership. This 
brought the 1991 and 1992 association agreements based on article 238 of the I'reaty 
of Rome with the main objective of trade liberalisation and free movement of people, 
services and capital. These agreements are now referred to as Europe agreements.
These recent developments starting in the early 1990s have continued 
throughout the decade ending up with membership applications of the CEECs. The EU 
has now taken the lead-role to integrate the CEECs into the New World Order after the 
collapse of the bi-polar system.
Of course all these rather unprecedented events have changed the course of the 
enlargement talks creating an opportunity to re-evaluate Turkey’s membership 
application. Turkey’s will for being a member of the EU is an ongoing quest for almost 
40 years. In fact Turkey’s Europeanisation efforts can be traced back to the Ottoman 
period of the first half of the lO“** century. Turkey’s efforts in the long path to become a 
member of the EU and its prospective chances to achieve this objective within the 
perspective of the enlargement policy of the European Union will be the focus of this 
study. Turkey has a long-standing relationship with the EU starting with the 1963 
Ankara Association agreement. This agreement foresaw a step-by-step approach 
drafting a three-phased transitional period that ended up with negotiations for full 
membership after a 22-year period after the signing of the 1973 Additional Protocol, at 
most ending in 1995. Yet this incremental approach lagged behind schedule and 
Turkey’s membership could not be realised by 1995. Accordingly, Turkey applied in 
1987 for full membership. Yet, even its recognition as a candidate country was on 
December 11‘^ of 1999 in the Helsinki European Council. Indeed, this recognition is a 
result of the recent developments in Europe in the previous decade, rather than the 
long-standing 1963 Ankara Association agreement that led to the establishment of the 
Customs Union between Turkey and EU that has gone into effect on January 1996.
From the perspective of the European Union, enlargement has always been a 
factual policy of the Union since its foundation in 1957 by Rome Treaties. The Union 
kept enlarging throughout its development. The first enlargement was in 1973 
including the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland; the second enlargement was in 
1981 with only Greece entering; the third enlargement was in 1986 with Portugal and 
Spain; and the last and fourth enlargement was in 1995 introducing Austria, Sweden
and Finland as new members. Norway has rejected membership twice by referendum 
after successful negotiations in 1973 and 1995.
According to article 237 of the Treaty of Rome and Article O of the Maastricht 
Treaty: ‘any European state may apply to become a member’. Although the term 
European is rather vague, a combination of historical, geographical and cultural 
elements may contribute to the explanation of this term. The ‘Europe and the 
Challenge of Enlargement’ report from the Commission of the European Communities 
to the European Council in June 1992 outlines the EU strategy towards applicants and 
future applicants. This report referred to Article F of the Maastricht Treaty’ and 
concluded that a successful candidate for Union membership must satisfy the criteria 
of democratic status and respect for human rights as well as a functioning and 
competitive market economy and an adequate legal framework. Also the commission 
report implies the acceptance of the rights and obligations, actual and potential, of the 
Community system and its institutional framework, the Community’s acquis, as it is 
known. Therefore the widening of the EU is a fact accepted and supported by the EU 
itself
The 1990’s saw an increase in the number of applicants, therefore the 
enlargement issue has always been considered at the top of the Union agenda. The 
inclusion of the CEECs became a major goal for Europe with the decisions taken at the
‘ Article F o f the Maastricht Treaty: 1. The Union shall respect the national identities o f  its Member 
States, whose systems o f  government are founded on the principles o f  democracy, 2. The Union shall 
respect fundamental rights as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection o f  Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on November 1950 and as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles o f  Community law, 
3.The Union shall provide with the means necessary to attain its objectives and carry through its 
policies.
Copenhagen European Council in June 1993 where the Council agreed on a 
multilateral framework known as the structured dialogue between the EU and the 
partner countries. This framework was endorsed at the Essen European Council in 
December 1994. The Copenhagen Criteria agreed in June 1993, became the major 
criteria to evaluate the development of the applicant countries in the route to 
membership. Therefore the prospective members have an illuminating list of 
guidelines in their quest for membership.
This new environment created better chances for Turkey in this enlargement 
wave. Although the decade has been a period of ups and downs for Turkey-EU 
relations, the end of the decade marked with the Helsinki European Council (10-11 
December 1999) was a new start in the route towards Turkey’s membership. 
According to the Presidency Conclusions of the Helsinki Summit paragraph 12: 
‘Turkey is a candidate state destined to join the Union on the basis of same criteria as 
applied to other candidate states’.
While analysing all these developments concerning EU’s enlargement and 
Turkey’s place in this process in the 1990s, the theories of regional integration will be 
utilised. The integration theories have grown hand-in hand with the European 
integration process. Although the latest developments cannot find an explanation in the 
traditional spillover mechanism from economic integration to political integration, 
other theories concerning supranational institutionalism or institutionalised 
intergovemmentalism also remain far from explaining the whole process. All these 
theories may be utilised together in order to draw a clear perspective for understanding 
European Union enlargement. It is a fact that most theories have developed as a
response to the developments on regional integration and do not offer presumptions for 
integration to occur and enlarge. In the 1990s Europe has witnessed unforeseen 
developments of political nature, therefore a need for revising the old theories and 
formulating new ones exists in order to explain the recent and future developments.
The study will start with an analysis and a review of the regional integration 
theories. Rather than picking up a single theory, a combination of theories vsdll be 
referred to understand and explain the process of integration in this first chapter. A 
critique of these theories will also be included. Chapter 2 will be exploring the history 
of the enlargement comprising all previous enlargements of the EU since its inception. 
This will help depict the process of enlargement. Chapter 3 will discuss the 
Enlargement process of the 1990s, and the changing conditions that affected the 
enlargement policy of the EU. From the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria to the 1999 
Helsinki European Council Presidency conclusions, the pattern of change will be 
analysed. The fourth chapter will focus on Turkey. It will analyse the Turkish-EU 
relations with a historical view bringing it up to the 1990s. It will also include a review 
of the different approaches for and against Turkey’s membership in the EU and how 
these views affect Turkey in the enlargement process. Turkey’s will and ability to cope 
with the EU’s acquis communautaire shall be elaborated upon. The study also includes 
a conclusion that comprises future prospects of candidate countries within the 
enlargement process.
CHAPTER 1
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN THE LIGHT OF THE 
INTEGRATION THEORIES
Over the past fifty years, the pace of European integration has often accelerated, 
retarded or reversed itself in response to external and domestic political and economic 
factors, endorsing or refuting the validity of various theoretical hypotheses and 
predictions. It is important, therefore, not to look at this phenomenon in isolation, but 
within the realm of international relations and to consider the European Union as part of 
a wider system, "a segment of international society".’ Conceptualising European 
integration cannot be seen exclusively as the application of detached and abstruse 
notions relevant only to Western Europe, but in a much broader sense, as an important 
component of the literature on world politics with its roots entrenched deep in the 
history of political thought.^
Studying through all of International Relations and European integration 
theories can be a lengthy and tough challenge. The following chapter intends to outline 
briefly the major theoretical assumptions relevant to European integration. In order to 
further highlight their relevance to this thesis, an attempt is also made to identify their 
positions and presumptions over the issue of enlargement. Finally these theories’ failure
‘ Paul Taylor, The European Union in the 1990s. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p.90.
 ^Robert O. Keohane, Stanley Hoffmann, “Conclusion: Structure, Strategy, and Institutional Roles”, in 
After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1993, pp.381-404.
or success over explaining the enlargement process will be taken as criteria in 
evaluating and criticising them.
Defining the European Political Integration Studies is rather a vain effort since 
the area is shaped by the broad range of approaches shifting between the empirical and 
normative interpretations and between the scientific and ideological approaches. As it 
was the case prior to the formation of the Community after the second World War 
normative discourse reappeared from time to time whenever the enlargement issue 
became a fashionable subject; suggestions appeared on the new institutional structure on 
a future enlarged Europe, especially after the end of Cold War period. The revival of 
formal integration in Western Europe and the collapse of communism raise substantial 
theoretical challenges for the analysis of integration.
Yet, there are various theories on European political integration as well as 
regional political integration, since scientific explanations and new academic 
formulations were deemed necessary in order to explain this prevailing phenomenon of 
the second half of the twentieth century. The issue of regional integration moved 
towards the centre of the political debate from its more peripheral and isolated stands in 
the study of the World Politics. Opinion in Europe after 1945 was open to some degree 
of closer regional integration. Yet, there was not a consensus over the structure, timing 
and scope of such developments. There has been an on-going debate over these issues 
both in political and academic realms as the European integration process has been 
launched. It has also followed the conventional pattern of academic discourse, by giving 
rise to distinctive schools of political thought or ‘paradigms . There are two main
' Michael O’Neill, The Politics o f  European Integration: A Reader. London. Routledge, 1996, p.6.
paradigms. Supranational and State-centric in this area and another one that formulates 
these two main ones that can be called as the syncretic paradigm/ There has been a 
constant shift of paradigms through the years related to the dynamic course of European 
integration. A short review may explain this changing nature of the integration process.
1.1 A Brief history of the development of the EU
After the Second World War, Europe has altered strikingly and an economic 
regeneration was accompanied by a great scale of economic integration among West 
European countries. Meanwhile, new political structures have been constructed to 
conduct European security, regulate economic development, advance democratic 
values, and reinforce social cohesion throughout the Continent.^ The European 
Community, as one of the important pillars of this restructuring efforts, was established 
vrith the general objective “ to establish the foundations of an ever closer union among 
the European peoples.” ^
There had been a fast and an effective economic recovery after the end of the 
Second World War and the 1950s had witnessed the origins of a long and controlled 
increase in investment and consumption. In this period, production was globalised and 
needed international circulation of capital and labour. The urge for foreign market 
access of the national economies also pointed out the need for transnational schemes in
'' Syncretist is a term used to cover a wide variety o f contributions to the debate by Micheál O’Neill Ibid 
p.82.
For a detailed account o f the European History after 1945 see: Derek W. Urwin, The Comm unity 
Europe: A History o f  European Integration Since 1945. Essex: Longman, 1993.
“Preamble to the Treaties o f  Rome” in Brent F. Nelsen, Alexander C.G. Stubb, The European Union 
Readings on the Theory and Practice o f European Integration. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994, pp, 13-16
production and sales. Therefore, the rise of a new European framework offered one 
response to the needs of private capital in Europe. In addition, the economic weakness 
of individual European states on the world stage necessitated the co-operation in Europe 
later leading to interdependence.^
Despite that the Treaty of Rome signed on 25 March 1957 is a lengthy and a 
diverse document with far-reaching ambitions, its immediate objectives were formation 
of a customs union, a common external tariff and a common market tor capital and 
labour. Furthermore, the creation of common policies for industry, agriculture and 
transport within the Community were other significant objectives of the Treaty. 
Although started with great ambitions, the earlier acquisitions were achieved with a 
slower rate of development. For example, the successful achievements on the customs 
union were delayed till the late 1960s. In the beginning of the post-war period, the 
global conjuncture of the political and economic relations was advantageous for the EC 
to benefit from the developments of the economic integration. New approaches and 
arrangements on trade interactions among countries and the enhancement of the market 
opportunities in international arena proved to be beneficial for the EC which tried to 
attain economic integration. Also, other trade interactions, especially between the 
European Community and the United States made a positive effect as compared to other 
countries in the similar situation of reconstruction of their economies.
The EC became wealthier during the 1950s and 1960s and the original post-war 
trade deficit with the United States had deviated into a European surplus by the late 
1950s. This fact assisted the EC to turn the 1960s a decade into an era of convincing
 ^For an account of co-operation in Europe see Brigid Laffan, Integration and Co-operation in F.nrr>p<> 
New York; Routledge, 1992, and, Martin Holland, European Community Integration , New York; St.’
accomplishments. The Customs Union was completed in 1968 and the frameworks of 
major policies such as Common Agricultural Policy and the Social Fund were 
established having account of the successful economic integration. At the 1969 The 
Hague Summit*, the member countries agreed on the necessity of greater economic and 
monetary integration as well as political unification by the end of the decade marking 
the preliminary step for moving towards an economic, monetary and political union. 
However, the 1974 and 1979 oil crises affected the global economic policies, which 
caused a general recession in the world during the early 1980s. Also, the successful 
economic development of the EC gave way to decline of the American hegemony in 
time leading a shift to flexible exchange rates in 1973.  ^ In this unsettled economic 
situation, the Community lost much of its confident dynamism and started to experience 
hesitation and political insufficiency to formulate internal policies within the 
Community. The Cold War and the political partition of the continent were other 
obstacles to economic development in the Europe of the 1970s. In the 1980s, therefore, 
the European Community was challenged by two main crises; first, the loss of global 
economic competitiveness and second, the stagnation of political and economic 
integration. The EC reached the peak of its crisis by the mid-19 8 0 sw h e n  the 
community faced institutional weaknesses because of unstable political and economic 
conditions.
After this era of pessimism, a progressive phase replaced the stagnation period 
as a result of the implementation of the studies of the Commission, the White Paper that 
was drawn up by the European Commission in 1985, chaired by Jacques Delors.
Martin’s Press, 1993, pp. 22-59.
 ^This can be considered as the relaunch o f  the Community. Martin Holland, op.cit. pp.38-39.
For the details o f  the Global Political Economy o f these periods see: Robert Gilpin, The Political 
Economy o f  International Relations Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987.
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Accordingly the Community set itself the task of creating a single market by 
January 1993. The Single European Act", signed in February 1986 and came into force 
on 1 July 1987, confirmed this goal and presented new procedures for adopting 
associated legislation. The collapse of the Berlin Wall, followed by German 
Unification on October 3 1990, reconstructed the political structure of Europe.
The Member States were strongly determined to strengthen their ties and 
negotiated a new treaty, the main features of which were agreed at the Maastricht 
European Council on 9 and 10 December 1991." The new political structure of the 
1990s has significant impact as well as the economic issues on the formation of the new 
Treaty. As the EC transforming itself into the European Union, political matters gained 
much more importance in the agenda of the Union. The European Political Cooperation 
(EPC) became Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as one of the main pillars 
of the Union and Western European Union was revitalised as a prospective defence 
initiative of the Union. These developments, hence, aftectcd the nature of the 
enlargements, raising the importance of political issues and political integration to the 
same extent with economic integration. Also the threat of instability leading to war as it 
did in Yugoslavia and the attempts of the CEECs to cope with the free market economy 
increased the magnetism of the EU towards the non-EU countries. The EU’s will to 
reincorporate CEECs into Europe increased the debates over enlargement in the 1990’s.
10 It is called the period o f ‘Eurosclerosis’ by many authors.
The SEA differs significantly from its predecessors as it is seen in its preamble. Gone is the vision o f  a 
united Europe important primarily as an alternative to war. In its place is a vision o f  an evolving 
‘European Union’ ready to act in the world as a single entity to protect the common interests o f  its 
members, promote democracy and human rights, contribute to the ‘preservation o f  international 
peace’and ‘improve the economic and social situation in Europe’ Nelsen and Stubb, op. cit. p.43.
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1.2 Development of theories
This dynamic process of integration in Europe led to the development of many 
theories within each paradigm and led to many paradigm shifts over the course of 
events. Also, the development of these theories continued hand-in-hand with the 
development of European integration. Therefore many theories may well be suitable for 
explaining a certain component of the integration process but they fail to explain the 
process as a whole.
Another problem of the theories was that they fail to incorporate the first 
theories of integration. Such as, Wallace refers to the absence of agreed concepts or 
frames of reference.'^ Keohane and Hoffman suggest that many accounts of integration 
have discarded older theories without putting anything theoretical in their place. This 
led to an inflation of theories that more or less say the same things with different 
wordings. There is a growing recognition that new approaches to the study of 
integration are required and there is general agreement that an adequate understanding 
of the driving forces of integration must evolve from an application of the insights 
offered by various disciplines.'^
The Supranational paradigm covers the federalist, functionalist and neo­
functionalist approaches while the state-centric paradigm comprises 
intergovernmental ist such as confederalism. The third paradigm tries to cover both
Pascal Fontaine, Europe in Ten Points. Luxembourg ; Office for Official Publications o f the European 
Communities, 1995.
William Wallace, The Dynamics o f European Integration. London; Pinter, 1990, p. 3.
Robert O. Keohane, Stanley Hoffman, The New European Community. Boulder: Westview, 1991, p. 9. 
William Wallace, Theory and Practice in European Inteuation; Economic and Political Integration in 
Europe . Oxford: Blackwell, 1994, pp. 272-278.
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approaches since the course of integration cannot be explained by either one of the 
paradigms as the face of the old continent changed dramatically during the 1990s.
1.2.1 Supranational Paradigm
The Supranational paradigm encompasses those theories that take the foundation 
of institutions ruling above the nation-state level as the core and the fundamental goal of 
the integration process. These theories differ about the limits and structures of such 
institutions, yet they all formulate the integration beyond nation-state whether they 
assume this from a security perspective, an economic perspective or a utopian 
perspective.
1.2.1.1 Federalism
Innumerable interpretations encompass the concept of federalism, as reflected 
in its various theoretical explanations as well as in the political branches of federalist 
thinking. The moderate and more pragmatic branch falls perfectly within the rationalist 
school of thought in International Relations Theory for the emphasis on international 
and institutionalised association. The radical and idealistic branch points out the 
characteristics of the revolutionist/universalist heritage of Althusius'^ and Rousseau'^
For a good interpretation o f Johannes Althusius and his Política Metódica Digesta and its applicability 
for the European Federalism in the context o f  European Union See: Daniel J. Elazaar, “Federal-Type 
Solutions and European Integration”, in Federal-tvpe solutions and European Integration r  Lloyd 
Brown-John, (ed.). Maryland: University Press o f  America, 1995, pp. 439-59.
For more detailed information see: Stanley Hoffman and David Fidler, Rousseau on Intematinnai 
Relations, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1991. Also see, Kenneth Waltz, “Explaining War”. New
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with its intention of surpassing the conventional nation-state and its ambition of altering 
international structures by going well beyond the formation of a society of states. In 
this utopian branch of federalism, the main premise is the encouragement of an original 
formation of the collective political culture may ultimately lead to the creation of a 
world society and goveniment.^^ Integration is seen as a dramatic, revolutionary process 
as 'the time becomes ripe for change’. T h i s  assumption is further restated with 
strength by Denis de Rougemont who asserts that to form this model of federation is
'the primary, long overdue and decisive task, the real leap, the revolutionary and
? 21
creative action without which we shall not leave the present plane of impossibilities’.
However, federalism agrees with the realist premise of the birth of Leviathan of 
the Hobbesian notion, a supreme ruler entrusted with the authority to maintain order and 
peace by the people in order to escape from the dangers of the anarchic ‘state of 
nature’.·^  Some authors, such as Murray Forsyth, focus on federalism as a type of 
government founded upon a foedus or treaty between states. It is regarded as a course in 
which a number of individual states agree to raise themselves by contract to the 
threshold of being one state.^  ^Therefore, the nation state is seen as a basic political unit 
that needs to be accommodated rather than abolished. By contrast, for others such as 
Heraud the nation state is nothing but a ‘historic accident’ which will eventually 
disappear as the federal forms of government start to prevail. He foresees a Europe des
York: Columbia University Press, 1959, reprinted in P. R. Viotti, M. V. Kauppi, International Relation?; 
Theory; Realism. Pluralism. Globalism. New York: Macmillan, 1993 pp. 123-42.
Although Rousseau can be regarded as the father of Nationalism and nation-state, his wntings on 
International Relations prescribe a federal formula in order to demolish war.
Reginald J. Harrison, Europe in Question: Theories of Regional Integration. New York: New York 
University Press, 1974, p. 45.
Paul Taylor, “The Politics o f the European Communities: The Confederal Phase”, in World Politics  ^
Vol. 27 (3), 1975, p. 12.
Denis de Rougemont, The Idea o f Europe. New York: MacMillan, 1967, p. 348.
C. Pentland, International Theory and European Integration. London: Faber & Faber, 1973, p. 147.2 2
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eihnies made up of collectivities naturally united by language and other cultural 
traditions and much more equal and controllable elements than the nation states which 
can act irrational at any given situation.^^ This view is based on the Kantian tradition of 
International Relations^^ which stresses moral imperatives guiding not merely 
cooperation among states but rather the deposition of the system based on the states as 
main elements, and replacing this system by a cosmopolitan society where the European 
federation is a level as well as a required catalyst?^ Federal Europe can be created on 
the widespread destruction and disillusionment brought about by the war by providing 
an attractive alternative to the rebuilding of the nation-state system v^th its inherent 
rivalries’/^ And yet, while representing the first and most well known approach of 
European integration, federalism has been often denied recognition as a real theory in 
the traditional sense, for its explicit normative content and for privileging the 
description of the final goal over the scientific analysis of method and procedure. The 
final condition of integration presents an alternative to 'national atavism and insularity’ 
by proposing the creation of a federal union among previously sovereign powers.^
29
While confirming the goal of European integration as their chief principle, 
federalists disagreed on the ways to be followed to attain a fully-fledged federation. ITie 
maximalists, among whom was Altiero Spinelli,^^ author of the 1941 federalist
M. Forsyth, The Theory and Practice o f Confederation. Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1981, p.
2 .
Harrison, op. cit. p.45.
For a good explanation o f this tradition, see: Viotti, Kauppi, op.cit. pp. 273-78, pp. 533-534.
Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society. New York: Macmillan, Columbia University Press, 1977, 1995, 
p. 25.
 ^Denis de Rougemont, 1965, cited in Hodges, M. “Integration Theory”, in T. Taylor, (ed.), Approache.s 
and Theory in International Relations. London: Longman, 1978. p .  241.
David Mutimer, 1994, p. 8, cited in, Donatella M. Viola. “International Relations and the European 
Integration Theory”, in Jean Monnet Working Papers, University o f Catania, No. 26.00, 2000.
M. O’Neill, op. cit. p. 23.
For more information on Altiero Spinelii see: Micheál Burgess. “Altiero Spinelli, Federalism and the 
EUT”, in Juliet Lodge, (ed.). European Union: The European Community in Search o f  a Future I r^ nHnrv 
Macmillan, 1986.
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Ventotene M anifesto  and founder o f  the M ouvement l'édéraliste  Européen  (M F E ),
believed that European integration was a process to be achieved through political 
means?' More specifically, maximalists planned to raise an international campaign 
aimed at persuading public opinion and mobilising all of the major political forces 
which would be idealised by the setting up of a Constituent Assembly, elected by 
universal suffrage. This assembly would sketch a federal constitution authorising 
powers to the central government concerning budgetary matters, foreign policy and 
defence, including provisions for safeguarding fundamental and minority rights. This 
text would be finally submitted either to national parliaments for ratification or directly 
to European citizens by means of popular referenda. Minimalists gathered under the 
Action Européen Fédéraliste (AUF), to which eventually Spinelli converted, adopted a 
more pragmatic theory that the federal goal was to be achieved by gradual steps through 
the founding of organisations such as the ECSC, EURATOM and EEC.^  ^ 'fhis 
dichotomy inherent to federalism makes it rather difficult to place this approach within 
the mainstream of IR theory.
The principal value of federalism is its ability to attune the integration process 
with the essentiality of protecting diversity, an element which represents a precondition 
of any kind of integration in Europe and of the duties of the any Pan- European 
institution established to govern the integration process. By dividing political power 
between central and local powers, the federal model represents a very attractive strategy 
for uniting groups of states possessing diverse interests and satisfies the often mutually 
exclusive criteria of efficiency and democracy. Within a federal union, not only 
national, but also regional and local interests are duly represented. This emphasis on
31 Harrison, op. cit. p. 49. 
Ibid. p.50
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model privileges decentralisation and, therefore, conforms to the logic of subsidiarity, a 
principle which Britain has promoted and which is now enshrined in the Treaty on 
European Union.^'’ The essence of federalism lies in the decentralisation of power and 
not, as is usually misinterpreted as a form of government in which central government 
continuously takes the power of national governments away, shaping them as 
subordinate entities to the central power. According to Juliet Lodge, the hostility of 
certain politicians to the idea of a federal evolution of the European Union may often
35arise from ignorance and misunderstanding of its main principles.
Although it is a very idealistic approach, a federal Europe is what was envisaged 
while creating the European Communities during the 1950s. The changing conditions 
that led to the widening of the EU have at the same time pushed for deepening of the 
integration as the new century begins. If the EU enlarges with a renewed and stronger 
structural and institutional formation, the federalism may once again prevail among the 
integration theories.
1.2.1.2 Functionalism
Functionalism is one of the traditional and principal approaches of international 
integration which is generally associated with the rational school of thought for its 
attribute of surrendering ideology to ‘enlightened self-interest’ under the influential 
pressures of economic growth, for its reasonable and pragmatic character of adapting to
M. Hodges, op. cit. p.241.
D. Mutimer, op. cit. p. 18.
Juliet Lodge, “Integration Theory, Decision-Making and Institutions”, in Juliet Lodge (ed.) The 
European Community: Bibliographical Excursions. London: Pinter, 1983, p. 9.
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changes, for its problem-solving approach and for presuming the primacy of economics 
in international relations as an antidote to the application of traditional power politics 
based on security co-operation/^ Yet, it can also be considered revolutionary for its 
universalist pursuit envisaging the creation of a world society as the ultimate phase, for 
its aspiration of bypassing the national governments and incremental eradication of the 
nation states and for invigorating the idea of ‘historical determinism’ as theorised in the 
works of Comte and Marx. Yet, as Charles Pentland states, not all functionalists agree 
with this determinist view and, in particular with Lemaignen's belief that European 
integration represents a subsequent phase of the ‘irreversible’ phenomenon of nation 
absorbing province absorbing tribe.^^
A functionalist reading of integration is neither based on traditional national 
units nor aimed at the rise of a wider and influential regional state, as it would not 
soothe the present displeasure by many sceptics of integration, but only preserve and 
amplify critical political cleavages at a higher level.^* The telos is, rather, that of 
establishing technical and depoliticized units specializing in specific functions, which 
might lead to the creation of a world federation.^^ This necessitates the gradual decease 
and consequently substitution of the state-system by an executive integrated system that 
satisfies the needs of the arising global community. Functionalists, in the long term, are 
engaged in elimination of the state-system, and in the process of building a welfare- 
oriented global society driven by economic needs whilst confirming that along with
See, Wallace and Smith, 1995, 140, Paul Taylor, “Regionalism and Functionalism Reconsidered”, in, 
AJ.R. Groom, and P. Taylor, (eds.), Frameworks for International Co-operation. London: Pinter, 1990,
234-54. Also see, Harrison, op. cit. pp. 28-29, p. 66. 
R. Lemaignen, L'Europe au Berceau. Paris, 1964, pp.
C. Pentland, op.cit. pp. 75-76, p. 149.
D. Mutimer, op. cit. p. 29.
209-210, cited in Pentland, op. cit. p. 65.
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international organisations, nation states remain basic units in the international society 
although their powers will be diminished.
Utilising Charles Pentland's metaphor, the functionalist reasoning views the state 
in the context of international cooperation as ‘the insect in a carnivorous plant’ which 
while ‘attracted ever inward by the benefits, it finds that behind it the avenues of retreat 
are progressively blocked’ Modem society produces a number of technical problems 
that can only be resolved by experts as opposed to politicians. As Mitrany points out:
“The number of problems which take on a world character is growing 
apace, partly because we have a better understanding of them...but also 
because of their technical peculiarities....These new contacts which 
crowd upon us from all directions can be as much a source of conflict or 
cooperation....” '^
A successful cooperation in one particular technical domain or functional area 
would lead to cooperation in other related fields by means of the spillover mechanism. 
Governments acknowledge the common benefits to be gained by such cooperative 
endeavours and allow for their further expansion.“'^  This can also allow for cooperative 
distribution mechanisms to balance out some of the disparities within society, whilst 
recognising, however, the impossibility of realising a ‘perfect world’.
Functionalists do not disregard the ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics dichotomy, which is 
also reflected in the distinction between Community and CFSP pillars.^^ They also *
C. Pentland, op. cit. p. 82.
42 Mitrany, A Working Peace System Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966, pp. 92-93.
Viotti, Kauppi, op. cit. p. 241.
P. Taylor, “Consociationalism and Federalism as Approaches to International Integration”, in A.J.R. 
Groom. And P. Taylor, (eds.). Frameworks for International Co-operation. London: Pinter, 1990 nn 172- 
84. See, p. 179. ’
** D. Mutimer, op. cit. p. 26.
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express their preference for concentrating on non-political aspects within the realm of
multilateral cooperation arenas ‘where the nations shed their conflicts at the door and 
busy themselves only with the cooperative use of the tools of mutual interests’.“*^ Yet
this approach may be easily hindered as many issues are increasingly becomes the 
subject matter of global politics. According to David Mitrany, ‘sovereignty is not
effectively transferred by diplomatic formula, but via a function’. The gathering of 
limited transfers of tasks from one section to another leads inevitably to ‘a translation of 
the true seat of authority’ and to the accomplishment of a world society.“*^
Mitrany’s approach to international organisation and regional integration have 
led several contemporary theorists to formulate effective and useful insights to the study 
of integration. Functionalism may be useful in explaining the progress made during the 
pre-accession phase of enlargement process; yet, it still falls short of explaining the 
motives behind the attracted surrounding states around the Eli. It is a useful approach 
when dealing with the internal dynamics of integration within the EU. The economic 
motives may well be understood by utilisation of functionalism, but it is hard to assert 
that the candidate states pursue a form of regional or global society in which their 
sovereignty is very limited. Even the main pillars of the post-Maastricht Union such as 
the formulation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and adapting 
common mechanisms to regulate Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) may create major 
impediments for these states, especially considering that most of them have gained their 
independence very recently. Only if the EU draws the limits of integration or reiterates 
that a single regional entity overriding the nation-state system is its ultimate goal, then
45
Claude, Inis. Swords into Plowshores: The Problems and Progress o f International Organiyationc „„ 
350-353 cited in O ’Neill, op. cit. p.31.
David Mitrany. A Working Peace System. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966, reprinted in, Brent F 
Nelsen & Alexander C-G. Stubb, op. cit. pp. 94-97.
20
the candidate states may thoroughly re-evaluate the course of integration and their 
motives accordingly. Yet, at the moment, this seems impossible since such deliberation 
is deemed to be eccentric, on the premise that all countries are preoccupied with 
economic integration and the spillover mechanism is at work diffusing integration into 
political areas without really being an issue of debate in most of the countries. Yet, the 
consequences of this may result in impeding the further deepening of integration within 
the EU.
1.2.1.3 Neofunctionalism
Placed between the rationalist and revolutionist traditions of international 
relations, neofunctionalism, sometimes referred as ‘federal functionalism’, incorporates 
components from both functional and federal theories. Integration is formulated as a 
process for the creation of a ‘political community’ which resembles the ‘supranational 
state’ proposed by federalists.“*^ Along with federalists, neofunctionalists disregard the 
Tonnian“** model of society, the Gemeinschaft,^'^ which embodies a community whose 
aim is the attainment of the general welfare and whose roots are based on common 
loyalties and feeling of duty. They replace it with the Gesellschaft^ model, a pluralist 
type of society where conflicting interests coexist and where cooperation and 
integration can be reached through a convergence of interests.^* In the eyes of many 
neofimctionalists, the objective of integration is still unclear but may lead to the
C. Pentland, op. cit. pp. 100- 101.
Ferdinand Tönnies, known as the founder o f  German Sociology. His most famous work is titled the 
Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft. For a recent study on Tönnies, see; Ferdinand Tönnies. 1988.
Community and Society; Gemeinschaft und Ge.sellschaft. With a new introduction bv John SamplAo New  
Jersey; Transaction Inc.
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establishment of a federation where national sub-systems give away, function by 
function, their authority to a central federal body.^'
The first prominent articulation of neo-functionalism is the study of Ernst Haas, 
The Uniting o f Europe, which dwelled upon the political dynamics of the European 
Coal and Steel Community. In this study, Haas defines integration as:
“ ...the process whereby political actors in several distinct national 
settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political 
activities towards a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand 
jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. The end result of a 
process of political integration is a new political community, 
superimposed over the pre-existing ones.”^^
Although visualising a supranational state as the outcome of integration, 
neofunctionalists do not eliminate non-federal models of political system and direct 
their focus towards the methodology and process rather than the object. As this process 
advances, the nation state is no longer the basic unit of analysis and transnational 
interactions beyond the management and control of national governments become 
increasingly more frequent. '^^ Unlike the functionalist universal doctrine, 
neofunctionalism focuses on the establishment of a regional integration.^^ However, 
both theories place great emphasis on the concept of spillover, George introduces a 
distinction between ‘functional’ and ‘political spillover’,^  ^ while Tranholm-Mikkelsen
Society.
Paul Taylor, The Limits o f  European Integration. London: Groom Helm, 1983, pp. 3-5.
D. R. Cameron, “The 1992 Initiative; Causes and Consequences”, in A. M. Sbragia (ed.), Euro-PolitioR· 
Institutions and Policymaking in the ‘N ew  European Community. Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution. 1992, p. 28.
E. B. Haas, The Uniting o f Europe. Stanford; Stanford University Press, 1958, p. 16.
Robert O. Keohane, “Sovereignty, Interdependence and International Institutions”, in Linda B. Miller, 
Micheál Joseph Smith, (eds.). Ideas and Ideals: Essays on Politics in Honour o f  Stanley Hoffmann 
Boulder; Westview, 1993, p. 386.
D. Mutimer, op. cit. p. 27.
S. George, Comparative European Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, pp. 21-24.
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identifies three kinds of spillover: ‘functional’, ‘political’ and ‘cultivated’^ .^ Leon 
Lindberg describes ‘spillover’ as a situation in which a given action, related to a specific 
goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further 
actions, which in turn create a further condition and a need for more action, and so 
forth. Neofunctionalists have emphasised incremental political development in the 
system through spillover or forward linkage. In general, most theorists of this school 
agreed that ‘spillover will most likely occur in an international system with a strong 
system-wide political and bureaucratic elite, with complex interdependent socio­
economic structures, with a stable ideological and cultural consensus, and with some 
commitment on the part of its members to common long-term goals
The original goal of economic integration may be achieved by furthering the 
transfer of competence in other policy areas from member states to European 
Community level. Ernst Haas applied the concept of spillover to the ECSC which, by 
creating a common market in the sector of coal and steel production, raised the 
necessity for integrating the entire energy resources of the Community, such as nuclear 
energy covered by the Euratom Treaty in 1957, and gas and oil covered by the EC 
Treaty, and eventually led to the establishment of a common market for all goods and 
services. By the late 1960s, earlier predictions of progress in the field of political 
integration failed to occur, obscuring the general validity of this theory. Haas himself 
had to admit that a spillover from economic to political sectors and a shift of authority 
and legitimacy from national to supranational level were no longer automatic, but only
57
J. Tranholm-Mikkelsen. “Neofunctionalism : Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light o f the 
New Dynamism o f the EC”, in Millenium 1991. pp. 4-6.
Leon N. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics o f  European Integration. Stanford: Stanford University 
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probable.^ Despite its flaws, particular scholars, such as Andrew Moravcsik and Jeppe 
Tranholm-Mikkelsen, consider that ‘neofunctionalism' is by no means obsolete’, '^ in 
fact it ‘remains the sole attempt to fashion a coherent and comprehensive theory of 
European integration’.^ "
It is observed that neofunctionalism rests on proposing the spillover rationale for 
the integration to occur. The revitalising of the integration efforts with the SEA during 
the late 1980s also enlivened this approach as it better explains the transmissive nature 
of the regional integration with less stress on Universalist ambitions. The 
neofunctionalist approach is often adopted when analysing the development of co­
operation within the framework of the EU.^  ^Neofunctionalism is functional, as its name 
implies, in explaining the recent process directed towards further deepening of the intra­
community integration and maybe the most relevant theoiy in accomplishing this task, 
yet, it lacks the explanation of external effects of this process. As the enlargement 
process is not considered as a major component of the course of integration, it is not 
dwelled upon by neofunctionalism, and the analysis of the Community is made upon the 
actual facts without emphasis on future widening.
60 E. B. Haas. “International Integration: The European and the Universal Process , in International 
Political Communities: An Anthology. New York: Doubleday, 1966. Cited in Sandholtz and Sweet, op. 
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1.2.2 State-centric Paradigm
The above approaches to integration is placed within the Supranational 
paradigm, whereas there are state-centric approaches in theorising integration which 
took the nation state as the focus and identified the crude realities of nationhood as the 
driving force behind the European integration process. Those theories that take nation­
state as the focus of conceptualising the EU can be grouped in the State-centric 
paradigm. These approaches can be defined as intergovemmentalism in general. The 
first three above-mentioned approaches though different in the process of reaching the 
end, seem to idealise a United States o f Europe. Such s political entity, however, is not 
on the agenda of many theorists as well as politicians. The issues of national sovereignty 
and the role of national governments in the process of integration have been the main 
focus of disagreement between neo-functionalists and intergovemmentalists.
Endless nuance and distinction exist within each approach, but in the end most 
theorising on integration endorses either the following statement or its opposite: the 
distribution of preferences and the conduct of bargaining among the governments of the 
member-states broadly explain the nature, pace, scope of integration, and neither 
supranational organisation nor transnational actors generate political processes or 
outcomes of seminal importance.®'  ^ Intergovemmentalists consider the making of the 
European Union as a subset of international relations as a means to achieve interstate 
cooperation through an international regime with the support of the complimentary
63
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interdependence theory, which stressed the need for cooperation and collaboration 
between states.
The main intergovernmental theorists included Hofiman^^, whose model 
stressed the important role of the nation state and the power of national leaders and 
stressed the importance of links between the national and the Community policy­
making process; and Moravcsik whose theory of intergovernmental institutionalism 
recognises the importance of supranational institutions, but also affirms that the primary 
source of integration lies in the interests of the states themselves and the relative power 
each brings to B russels.M oravscik developed his theory further as ‘liberal 
intergovemmentalism’ and he explains the European integration as ‘a series of 
celebrated intergovernmental bargains, each of which set the agenda for an intervening 
period of consolidation.From  this intergovernmentalist perspective the EC is 
essentially a forum for interstate bargaining. Member-state governments remain the 
only important actors at the European level. Societal actors exert influence only through 
the domestic political structures of member-states.^^ State-centrists may argue that state 
executives prefer to delegate these powers to achieve state-oriented collective goods, 
such as control over potential distortion of competition or a stronger bargaining position *
“International Regimes are intermediate factors between the power structure o f  an international system  
and the political and economic bargaining that takes place within it.” Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, 
Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Boston: Little, Brown, 1977. p. 21.
^  See Stanley Hoffman, “Reflections on the Nation-State in Western Europe Today , in Journal o f  
Common Market Studies. Vol.21 (1), 1982, cited in O’Neill, op. cit. p. 64.
See A. Moravscik, op. cit. 1991, p. 56.
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in international trade^°, but, one result of integration is that state executives have lost
control in a range of policy areas. 71
The intergovemmentalist approach seem to underestimate the general and 
institutional effects of the spillover mechanism to issues of ‘high politics’, concentrating 
on interstate bargaining. It is true that the EU structures and their operating methods 
depend on interstate bargaining and an on-going process of endless negotiations in 
which the Governments seem to be the main actors as they represent the other societal 
levels. But as the integration deepens at the institutional levels of the EU, the impact of 
governments on policy-making in the Union decreases. If enlargement process had 
exclusively been a matter of intracommunity bargaining, then intergovernmental 
approach would provide explanations for this process. But as the question of 
enlargement brings together many different dimensions such as motives of the 
candidates, responses of the Union at the political, cultural, social and economic levels 
to these candidate countries requires a more detailed analysis other than 
intergovemmentalism that does not have concrete explanations on how integration of 
the Community affects and attracts the peripheral states.
1.2.3 Syncretic Paradigm
The periodic shift in theorising integration has continued in order to bring about 
a new paradigm which Michael O’Neill considers as the syncretic paradigm. Instead of 
the certainties of both process and outcome that tend to characterise the classical
™ Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe and Kermit Blank, “European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. 
Multi-Level Governance”, in Journal o f  Common Market Studies. Vol. 34 (3), 1996, pp. 341-378.
’’ For example they no longer control competition within their border; they cannot aid national firms as 
they deem fit; they cannot autonomously conduct trade negotiations.
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72paradigms, it prefers the language of ambiguity and replaces certitude with paradox 
European integration is seen as hybrid of international and domestic factors, blended 
with several motives within different directions and speeds. It should come as no 
surprise here that the fluid metaphors of variable geometry or multi-speed change have 
been employed to challenge the old certitudes of the established paradigms.
This new paradigm offers a less prescriptive and predictive account of the 
regional process. The syncretism '^^ is the process by which elements of one belief are 
assimilated into another resulting in a change in the fundamental tenets or nature of 
those belief systems. It is the union of two or more confronting beliefs, so that the 
synthesised form is a new thing. It is not always a total fusion, but may be a 
combination of separate segments that remain identifiable compartments. Therefore this 
new paradigm incorporates assumptions about the nature of the European project from 
both sides of the classic debate.^^
As an example to this new breed of syncretic theory making, consociationalism 
can be mentioned. The term consociation refers to processes of co-operative joint 
decision-making at the Union level.^ ® While explaining this rather new trend of 
consociationalism, Dimitris Chryssochoou implies:
“Almost half a century since its original inception, the integrative project 
represents neither a ‘complete’ Gemeinschaft based on a unity constituted
M. O’Neill, op. cit. p.81 
B. LafFan, op. cit. pp. 13-15
74 The term is generally used in the studies o f  religion. Originally a political term, "syncretism" was used 
to describe the joining together o f  rival Greek forces on the Isle o f  Crete in opposition to a common 
enemy. Compiled from http://mb-soft.com/believe/txc/syncreti.htm 
’’ M. O’Neill, op.cit. p.82.
Paul Taylor, 1990, op. cit. pp. 172-184. “Consociationalism and Federalism as Approaches to 
International Integration”. In A.J.R. Groom. And P. Taylor, (eds.), Frameworks for International T q- 
operation. London; Pinter, 1990, pp. 172-84.
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by a European demos, nor an ‘unmanaged’ Geselhschaft on the road to 
disintegration, nor even an unspecified ‘half-way house’ between the two. 
Rather, at this particular stage of its evolution, the Union approximates to a 
unique ensemble confederal consociation. And although a strong federal 
analogy exists -  itself a product of the dynamics of inverse federalism -  it 
is one capable of adapting to the requirements of the day, making the 
union, to borrow a phrase, ‘enjoy an enviable reputation in the pantheon of 
political experiments.”^^
Another approach that can be considered syncretic is ‘cooperative federalism’. It 
implies that integration is a process with its own intrinsic logic; that it is by no means an 
interim stage or halfway house between the minimal expressions of integration and its 
maximalist fully fledged outcome, as suggested by the supranational paradigm’s 
assumption of a cumulative momentum building towards a certain functionalist and 
federalist end state. Neither does it suggests that integration amounts to 
intergovemmentalism and little else, as the new realists tend to suggest. It defines the 
regional process as a mixture of tensions over policy issues abiding the integration 
directed by the international change rather than a certain eventual outcome.^* In this 
sense, it seems to explain the process of the 1990s, yet it does not include an 
interpretation of enlargement of the Community.
Interdependence is yet another important school of thought commended by the 
theorists of the syncretic model. According to the interdependence thesis, European 
integration was a response to the new global arrangements that affected the other states 
of the world as well; therefore, it could not be considered as a unique case. According to 
Keohane and Nye, regional integration theory should not then be defined ‘as a separate 
and arcane set of notions applicable only to Europe and perhaps a few other areas, but as
77
Dimitris s. Chryssochoou, “New Challenges to the Study o f  European Integration . Implications for 
Theory-Building”, in Journal o f  Common Market Studies Vol; 35 (4), 1997, pp 523-542 
M. O’Neill, op. cit. ^l09^ >
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a highly important part of the literature on world politics’/^ Yet this approach may be 
evaluated as basing the grounds of integration at a global level, therefore, it may lead the 
theorists to miss the unique nature of the history of the European continent and its 
integration process.
The syncretic paradigm interpolates the notion of hybrid theories into the studies 
on regional integration. Therefore, the regional integration is seen as a process of 
ambiguity and certain dimensions of this process contain different elements, either 
supranational or intergovernmental, but generally a hybrid of them. In theorising 
enlargement, syncretic paradigm may offer a more spacious area, but there is not a 
theory that take enlargement in detail with reference to the syncretic paradigm.
1.3 Overall Evaluation of Integration Theories with Reference to the Enlargement 
Process
As Europe goes through a systemic change, there is now much less exclusivism 
and theoretical insularity surrounding the debate.^® The European process is now widely 
perceived as a hybrid of contrasting tendencies as a response to the increased pace of 
changes in the Community’s affairs starting in 1980s. As Pedersen observed this 
uncertainty of the theoretical domain, he mentioned that:
“Europe is changing complexion almost overnight. Though as political 
scientists our natural inclination is to look for precedents and theoretical
R.O. Keohane, J. S. Nye Jr. “International Interdependence and Integration”. In Greenstein and Polsby 
Handbook o f  Political Science Vol.8. Reading, 1975, pp. 363-414. Quoted in Ibid. pp. 89-90.
M. O ’Neill, op.cit. p.l41.
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constraints, most analysts would probably agree that what is happening has 
a strong flavour of uniqueness about it. We are all reaching for intellectual 
lifeboats to take us safely through the rough sea of systemic change. No 
one really knows what new European patterns of cooperation will emerge
once the smoke has cleared. 7,81
All of the theories mentioned before prove insufficient to explain the process of 
enlargement of the 1990s or even enlargement in general. It is true that they are not 
prescriptions as such to explain how it occurs, yet, they do not provide for clues for why 
different countries decides to join the integration process with different reasoning. One 
of the basic premises of functionalism and federalism is the significance of 
institutionalisation as an important dynamic enhancing cooperation. But neither 
functionalism nor federalism takes external factors into account*  ^ although, in a way, 
they pursue to further carry integration to a more universal plane. Also, the spill-over 
mechanism as the main tenet of neo-functionalist interpretation of European Integration 
has proven inadequate as the development of the EU altered depending on the 
international environment during different periods, although it obviously explains the 
internal dynamics of the EU in certain fields.
Within Europe, a wide range of policies classically seen as domestic can no 
longer be understood without acknowledging the EC’s role within a highly fragmented 
but increasingly integrated polity.®^  While it is hard to expect a coherent integration 
within a federal structure deriving from a Union constantly enlarging, the second and 
third ‘pillars’ of the EU, the formulation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) and common conduct of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), allow less room for
T. Pedersen, “Problems o f Enlargement; Political Integration in a Pan-European EC”, in Journal o f  
Cooperation and Conflict. Vol.25, 1990, pp.85-6. Quoted in O’Neill. 1996. op. cit. p .l4 l.
Giilnur Aybet, The Dynamics o f European Security Cooperation. 1945-91. London: Macmillan, 1997 
p. 130.
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national governments and force them to pool most of their sovereign authorities over to 
supranational institutions. Therefore, although the motives behind enlargement can be 
purely economic*^  ^or psychological*^ these fall short in explaining these countries will 
to give away some of their national authorities. It may easily be thought that the 
enlargement will avail the nourishing of state-centric forms of integration, yet as 
mentioned before CFSP and JHA are certainly barriers in front of such an inclination.
There are many theories that try to explain how this recent enlargement process 
came into being and how the Central and East European Countries or any other group of 
countries will be incorporated into the Union, but they are far from explaining the limits 
of integration and the impediments that the enlargement will bring to the pace of the 
integration as a unitary process. Since 1970s models of differentiated integration were 
proposed to avoid the possibility of widening at the expense of deepening. The mam 
examples of such models are ‘Multi-speed Europe’, ‘Variable geometry’, ‘Europe a la 
carte’, and ‘Europe of concentric circles’. The multi-speed concept implies that some 
member states are more prepared to integrate because of their advanced economies, and 
therefore the timing of integration on issues like monetary integration may vary for 
member states with regard to their promptness. Yet this model has the danger of leaving 
some members behind the leading group as the integration process increases. ‘Variable 
geometry’ model imply that different configurations of members can be observed in 
different policy areas according to the needs, preferences and capabilities of the member 
states. So differentiation is multi-faceted and not limited to certain policy areas. In the
Paul Pierson, “The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis”, in 
Comparative Political Studies. Vol; 29 (2), 1996, pp. 123-63.
For example, as in Denmark, Ireland (1973) and Sweden (1995).
For example for the East Europeans the EU is an indicator o f  their ‘return’ to Europe; for Greece, 
Portugal and Spain, their acceptance enabled them to instantly cut their ties with their dictatorial pasts off; 
and for Turkey it is a goal o f its centuries old Westernisation attempts.
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‘Europe a la carte’ model; the policies are seen as a menu and a pick and choose option 
is given to candidates while implementing integrationist policies. The last model of 
‘Europe of concentric circles’ foresees a ‘core’ group of countries that accept the acquis 
in full, and the core is surrounded by wider circles of countries with lesser commitments
87with outer circle just accepting free trade in industrial goods.
All models mentioned above prescribe for differentiation of the integration 
process. They are simply technical models with some variation and are far from 
explaining the political nature of an enlarged Union. These are used as concepts to 
facilitate enlargement as the institution-building process continued at full flow yet they 
do not conceptualise the future of an enlarged Community whether it will be a
supranational entity or an intergovernmental forum.
These recent analyses treat the issue with prescriptive approaches. As it was the
case in the past, while the integration transmute into new forms, the theoiy making will 
continue and different paradigms of integration theories will prevail as the process 
continues. The intention of the founding fathers of the Union encapsulates the ultimate 
goal of the integration as a federal entity, yet with an enlarged Union up to thirty
countries, the achievement o f this ultimate goal will follow an attenuated and an 
unconventional track. Exploring this unconventional track of integration should be the 
main focus while conceptualising new theories and revising older theories that attempt 
to explain the enlargement process within the logic o f regional integration. Since the 
tracks that have been followed throughout the past have been the subject of the 
previously mentioned paradigms. As the impact of the enlargement process on
86
Christopher Preston, Enlargement and Integration in the European Union. London' New York' 
Routledge, 1997, pp. 231.
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transforming the EU institutions apparently becomes as compelling as the market forces 
and the domestic interest groups within the E(J on the decision-making process, new 
approaches will be welcomed as they replenish the gaps of the wide theoretical 
spectrum of regional integration theories. During the 1990s, the influence of external 
dynamics over the internal dynamics of the integration process has become much more 
evident. Consequently, the core organisation of this process is now much more prone to 
adjust internally according to the pressures of the closely linked, associated and 
bordering states that express their interests of inclusion into the integration process.
87 Ibid, pp.232-233.
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CHAPTER 2
HISTORY OF ENLARGEMENl
2.1 Enlargement and the EU
The main goal of the European Commumties founded by the Treaty of Rome of 
1957 was to create a political environment in Europe that would let peace prevail and 
make the chances of another destructive war materially impossible. The preambles to 
each of the treaties reflect the founders’ vision for building through economic 
integration, ‘an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’.' The preambles all 
express the wish for carrying the integration from the original six to other parts of the 
continent. This wish is materialised by article 237 of the Treaty of Rome. Therefore 
enlargement had been a consistent Community priority. The Community was meant to 
be a dynamic organisation with divergent institutional relations between the member 
countries. The integration process was originally conceived as one to include other 
European states in a wider family. With such a perception of the EEC through widening 
the ideal across Europe, the way opened up for the three enlargements of its 
membership to include Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom in 1973, Greece in 
1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986. The fourth enlargement was on January 1, 1995, 
under the provisions of Article under Title VII of the Maastricht Treaty on European 
Union, and Austria, Finland and Sweden entered to form the current membership 
structure of the EU of fifteen states.
’ Nelsen and Stubb, op, cit. pp. 13-15.
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Table 2.1 Enlargement Calendar
Date Countries
involved
Request for 
Adhesion
Result of the 
request
1951 Federal Republic Formation of the
Europe of six of Germany, 
France, Belgium, 
Italy, The 
Netherlands, 
Luxembourg
ECSC
1973 Ireland Adhesion request 31 Adhesion 1
Europe of Nine July 1961 -  renewed 
11 May 1967
January 1973
United Kingdom Adhesion request 9 
August 1961 -  
renewed 11 May 
1967
Adhesion 1 January 
1973
Denmark Adhesion request 10 
August 1961 -  
renewed 11 May 1967
Adhesion 1 January 
1973
Norway Adhesion request 30 
April 1962- 
renewed 21 July 1967
Refusal by 
referendum 25 
September 1972
1981 Greece Adhesion request 5 Adhesion 1 January
Europe of Ten June 1975 1981
1986 Portugal Adhesion request 28 Adhesion 1 January
Europe of March 1977 1986
Twelve Spain Adhesion request 28 
July 1977
Adhesion 1 January 
1986
1995 Austria Adhesion request 17 Adhesion 1 January
Europe of Fifteen July 1989 1995
Sweden Adhesion request 1 
July 1991
Adhesion 1 January 
1995
Finland Adhesion request 18 
March 1992
Adhesion 1 January 
1995
Norway Adhesion request 25 
November 1992
Refusal by 
referendum 28 
November 1994
■ Now referred to as Article 49 o f the revised Treaty.
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Enlargement is the process by which countries join the European Union/ Every 
single enlargement has prompted debates on issties such as applicants’ qualifications, 
the possible need for EU self-reform, impact on policies like agricultural and regional 
policy, the balance between widening and deepening, and voting criteria within the EU.^
In fact, EU enlargement has been a progressive and virtually continuous 
process/ As Table 2.1 demonstrates, the first formal applications were submitted in 
1961, only four years after the treaty of Rome had been signed. Since that date 
enlargement has become a significant issue in the agenda of the EEC/EC/EU, more than 
doubling its number throughout the course of the history. Since the Rome Treaty was 
signed, the Community has been driven by the need to balance the demand of widening 
and deepening.^
Enlargement has always been part of the EC/EU’s “historic mission”.’ Therefore 
the enlargement will continue to occupy the agenda of the EU and the possibility of EU 
composed of even thirty members is the greatest challenge for the EU for the years to 
come. Post -Cold War architecture of Europe resulted a move in the EU’s gravity centre 
‘well to the east of Brussels’.*  Even in the changing conditions of post-Cold War 
Europe, the widening versus deepening debate continues in full flow.
 ^European Commission, Background BrieFina No 25 11/1998.
* Knud Erik Jorgensen, “The Social Construction o f  the Acquis Communautaire; a Cornerstone o f  the 
European Edifice”, European Integration Online Paper.s Vol.3 (5), 1999.
 ^John Redmond, “The Enlargement o f  the European Union”, in Stuart Croft et. al. The Enlargement o f  
Europe. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999, p. 56.
* Christopher Preston, 1997, op. cit. p. 6.
 ^ Ibid, p. 3.
Richard Rose and Christian Haerpfer, “Democracy and Enlarging the European Union Eastwards”, 
Journal o f Common Market Studies. Vol.33 (3), 1995, p. 428.
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At different times, the emphasis has been placed either on widening or on 
deepening. The process of building a Community, later Union, involved alternating the 
course of European integration, and often widening and deepening issues proved to be 
complementary to each other in this process. The enlargement to the South with Greece 
in 1981 was followed by the Single European Act (SEA), a very huge step in the 
Community’s internal life, and the accession of Spain and Portugal in 1986.  ^After the 
Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which led to the European Union, the fourth enlargement 
took place with the accession of EFTAn countries (European Free Trade Area 
members) Austria, Sweden and Finland in 1995. Shortly after this enlargement, another 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) convened in March 1996 to deepen the European 
integration and to prepare for the necessary institutional reforms. Yet, this was not the 
only reason for the 1996 IGC and it convened with the explicit goal to adjust the 
European Union to further enlargement towards the Central and East European 
Countries.Therefore widening and deepening should be taken into consideration from 
a viewpoint that regards them as complementary to each other rather than treating them 
as two contradicting themes of the EU. As Christopher Preston states:
“The search for balance between widening and deepening is 
therefore a fundamental dynamic of the EC. Although vridening has 
been recognised as unavoidable at particular critical moments, the 
key EU Actors, France and Germany have always favoured 
deepening as a vital to maintaining the momentum of the original 
in ten tion  project. Enlargement has, therefore, only proceeded when 
the risks of dilution have been minimised, by linking enlargement to
’ Reinhard Rack, Judith Schwarzbauer, “Between East and West: The Pre-Accession Strategy in the Heart 
o f  Europe”, in. Kicker, Marko, Steiner (eds.), r.hanoin^ Borders: Legal and Economic Aspects o f  
European Enlargement. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Publications, 1998, pp. 123-145. See, p. 123.
For an account o f  this 1996 IGC, see: Desmond Dinan, “ The Commission and Enlargement”, in The 
Expanding European Union: Past. Present. Future J, Redmond and G. Rosenthal, (eds.), Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 1998, pp. 35-39, and Desmond Dinan, “Reflections on the IGCs”, in Pierre-Henri Laurent, Marc 
Maresceau, The State o f the European Union Vol.4· Deepening and Widening. Boulder; Lynne Rienner 
1998, pp. 35-36.
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new, deepening, projects, and by demanding reassurances from 
prospective members.””
Yet in the post-Maastricht period, the deepening of the integration process is 
considered to be a part of the enlargement process of the Union. To set them apart can 
not be the suitable strategy for the implementation of Pan-European political and
economic policies in the 1990s restructuring Europe. 12
Within this perspective, it is important to analyse past experiences of 
enlargement in order to expose this close link between enlargement and further 
integration and attempt to explain prospective enlargements that challenges the EU.
2.2 The Classical Method
These past experiences of enlargement have created what can be called a 
‘classical’ method of enlargement that became part of the Community’s integration 
method of incrementalism. This method was based on the spillover theory stating that 
integration by sector cannot be achieved in isolation; as one sector is integrated, there 
will be consequences, both advantageous as well as disadvantageous, for related sectors 
and a ‘spillover effect’ will occur, suggesting a kind of inevitability to the process.”  As 
member states give away their sovereignty in certain areas so as to legitimise EC 
structures over these areas, demands for further integration flourish in the related
C. Preston, 1997, op. cit. p. 8.
Tunç Aybak “Ortaldığın Dinamikleri, Türkiye ve Avrupa Bütünleşmesi”, in Bülent Gökay, (ed.), 
Türkiye Avrupa’nın Neresinde?. Ankara: Ayraç, 1997, p.85. For a detailed account o f the institutional 
challenges which enlargement constitutes over EC, see Michalski, Wallace, The European Community 
the Challenge of Enlargement. London: Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1992.
'^Pentland, op. cit. p. 119.
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sectors. Therefore this interdependence brought about strong incentives and motivation 
for cooperation in creating a regime with stable institutions over the related policy 
areas. Once ‘locked’ into the system, it is extremely difficult for a member state to ‘opt 
out’ of policy developments that may not have been its preferred choice, but which it 
can accept with some modification. Though the Community method may produce 
‘lowest common denominator’ policies, these are still seen by enough member states as 
preferable to the alternatives.
The ‘classical method’ of enlargement theorised, over four enlargements of the 
EU, a consistent pattern both to the accession procedures and implicit assumptions and 
rules that have shaped the expectations of the outcome of the negotiation process. It is 
necessary to analyse the previous enlargements since all subsequent enlargements 
whether different in context ‘ would be affected by the decision to apply existing EC 
conditions to its first enlargement’.'^ Preston lays down six key principles to 
enlargement derived from the Community’s method of integration, with its stress on 
incrementalism. Despite the diversity of the issues arising in the four enlargement 
roimds, the principles have endured.'^
These principles are:
Applicants must accept the acquis communautaire in full. No permanent opt- 
outs are available.
Accession negotiations focus exclusively on the practicalities of the 
applicants taking on the acquis.
"^Preston, 1997, op. cit. pp. 8-9.
Christopher Preston, “Obstacles to EU Enlargement: The Classical Community Method and the 
Prospects o f  a Wider Europe”, Journal o f Common Market Studies. Vol. 33, (3), 1995, p. 452.
C. Preston, 1997, op. cit. pp. 18-22.
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The problems arising from the increased diversity of an enlarged 
Community are addressed by creating new policy instruments to overlay 
existing ones rather than by fundamental reform of the existing instruments’ 
inadequacies.
New members are integrated into the EC’s institutional structure on the basis 
of limited incremental adaptation, facilitated by the promise of a more 
fundamental review after enlargement.
The Community prefers to negotiate with groups of states that already have 
close relations with each other.
Existing member states use the enlargement process to pursue their own 
interests and collectively to externalise internal problems.
Though these principles have sometimes been accepted only reluctantly, they 
have nevertheless underpinned the integration process and have ensured the 
attractiveness of the Community as a club worth making sacrifices to j o in . T h e  central 
theme to these principles is that the key outcome of the negotiations should be the 
integration of new members into a house which have already adopted many operating 
rules and aim at expanding these rules. As George Avery puts it: “The subject matter is 
not so much a future pact between the parties as the way in which one party will apply 
the rules of the other party’s club.” '* Therefore this gives much pressure and 
responsibility onto the applied parties in order to result the negotiations with a positive 
outcome as a means to reach the goal of getting into the club. Within this ‘classical 
method’, any outstanding disagreements are therefore left until the new member is
C. Preston, 1995, op. cit. p. 453.
George Avery, “The European Union’s Enlargement Negotiations”. Oxford International Review 
Summer 1994, p. 27.
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inside the club and has full decision-making and voting rights. The classical method 
also insulates accession negotiations from wider integration debates which might slow 
down the enlargement process even further.'^
Despite its success in managing the enlargement of the EU grow from six to 
fifteen, this method also has some serious weaknesses which are likely to become more 
evident in the future.^° The adjustment costs are generally expected to be handled by 
new members. This may lead to resentments by the new member and disrupt the whole 
integration process and makes the problem a collective one rather than a difficulty of 
one single country. Explanatory examples for that are the cases of the UK and Spain. 
The failure to address the predictable problems arising from the budgetary 
consequences of the UK’s trade patterns led to a renegotiation of entry terms in 1975."' 
The political acrimony caused by the British budget problem continued for over a 
decade.“^  The dispute constantly threatened to spill over into the Iberian enlargement 
and to slow down their progress even further. Similarly, the terms pressed on Spain, 
particularly for agriculture and fisheries, have led the Spanish to take hard line on 
subsequently CFP (Common Fisheries Policy) and CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) 
negotiations and to increase demand for side payments. Long transitional periods of 
between seven and ten years were set for freezing trade in sensitive industrial sectors 
such as agriculture and fisheries. Yet with such narrow focus of enlargement, 
negotiations may lead to the perception that EU is pictured as an ordinary international
Preston, 1997, op. cit. p. 9.19
Preston, 1995, op. cit. p. 457.
Ibid.
 ^Heather Grabbe, Kirsty Hughes, “The Impact o f  Enlargement on EU Trade and Industrial Policy”, in, 
Redmond and Rosenthal, (eds.), op. cit., pp. 125-154. See p. 133.
C. Preston, 1997, op. cit. p.9.
Grabbe, Hughes, op. cit. pp. 134-135.
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regime, with self-interest maximising governments than meeting its wider 
communitarian responsibilities and principles.^^
The framework for negotiating accession was put forward in Article 237 of the 
Rome Treaty. With some modification, as Article O of the Treaty on European Union, it 
states that:
“Any European State may apply to become a Member of the Union. It 
shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously 
after consulting the Commission and after receiving the assent of the 
European Parliament, which shall act by an absolute majority of its 
component members. The conditions of admission and the adjustments 
to the Treaties on which the Union is founded, which such admission 
entails, shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States 
and the applicant State. This agreement shall be submitted for 
ratification by all the contracting States, in accordance with their 
respective constitutional requirements”.^ ^
Before the fourth enlargement a framework was adopted by the Council in 
December 1992 as a standard procedural model for the definition of the formal 
negotiating process to be followed before the accession negotiations start. This 
framework contained eight elements as quoted fi-om George Avery;
1- The accession negotiations should be conducted according to 
uniform procedures by the EU.
^^For detailed explanations and conceptualisation o f  negotiations within the EU and between the EU and 
the applicant states; see Lykke Friis, “The End o f  the Beginning o f  Eastern enlargement- Luxembourg 
Summit and Agenda Setting”, in, European Integration Online Papers. Vol.2 (7), 1998, Micheál Smith 
“The European Union and a changing Europe : Establishing the Boundaries o f  Order”, 1996, in JCMS. 
Vol 34 (1), 1996, pp.5-28, Andrew Moravscik “Liberal Intergovemmentalism: A Rejoinder”, in JCMS, 
Vol. 33 (4), 1995, pp. 611-628, Andrew Moravscik, “Negotiating the Single European Act; national 
interests and conventional statecraft in the European Community”, in International Organization, 1991^ 
Vol.45, pp. 19-56, Lykke Friis and Anna Murphy “The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe; 
Governance and Boundaries”, in JCMS. Vol.37 (2), 1999, pp. 211-232.
26 Treaty on the European Union, Article O.
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2- The Council has responsibility for determining the common 
position of the EU, though this should not prevent COREPER 
(Committee of Permanent Representatives) from defining common 
positions if it is able to.
3- To ensure agreement with these common positions, the 
Commission is invited to make proposals on all problems posed by the 
negotiations on matters relating to the Treaties. Since the Maastricht 
Treaty, the Presidency, in liaison with Member States and the 
Commission, can make proposals on ‘second pillar’ (Common Foreign 
and Security Policy) and ‘third pillar’ (Justice and Home affairs).
4- In keeping with Article 151 of the EC Treaty, COREPER has 
responsibility for preparing the work of the Council concerning 
Common Positions.
5- Negotiating meetings between the EU and the applicants are 
chaired on the EU side by the acting Presidency of the Council.
6- Common EU positions are set out and upheld by the acting 
Presidency, or by a decision of the Coimcil and the Commission, if 
existing EC policies are concerned.
7- The rules of 5 and 6 also apply when negotiations are 
conducted at COREPER level.
8- Particularly in cases where existing common policies are 
concerned, the Council gives the Commission the task of seeking out 
solutions to problems with candidate countries and reporting these to the 
Council for further guidance.^’
This was a similar framework for the previous enlargements, of course, CFSP 
and JHA was not included before. Formally it accorded the leading role to the Council, 
unlike most of the external negotiations in which this responsibility is given to the 
Commission. Although this ‘role reversal’ is important in reminding applicants and 
member states of the sensitivity of the mutual adjustments which they may have to 
make, in fact the Commission still plays a pivotal role in the whole process.“*
When an application reaches the Council, this does not mean that the Council 
automatically opens negotiations with the member countries. The Council then requests
George Avery, op. cit. p.28. 
Preston , 1997, op. cit. pp. 12-13.
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the Commission to prepare its opinion."^ The preparation of the Opinion may vary and 
there is not a certain time limitation. (See Table 2,2)
The opinion is formally the decision of the College of Commissioners acting by 
majority vote. The Opinion may end with opening of the accession negotiations or 
postponing negotiations to a certain time or a mere rejection as in the case of Turkey in 
1989^0 The Commission’s Opinion has been accepted by the Council nearly in every 
case so far.^'
After the Opinion is adopted by the Commission and is sent to the Council of 
Ministers, the Council decides whether or not to open accession negotiations. This time 
period until the opening of accession talks also may vary (see Table 2.2). If the Council 
decides to open negotiations, it convenes an ‘Accession Conference’ with each of the 
applicants at Ministerial or Ambassadorial level. The Council has to agree imanimously 
to proceed to this stage and the approval of the European Parliament has also been 
required since the SEA came into effect in 1987.^  ^ During the negotiations, the 
Commission establishes an enlargement task force located in Directorate General I 
(External Relations) which coordinates the work of other Directorate Generals (DGs) in 
preparing common positions for the Council.^'’ The Commission submits compromise
The opinion is a comprehensive analysis o f  the applicant to take on the acquis, and to identify likely 
areas for negotiation should the EC proceed. Although the Commission’s Opinion is not a legal 
prerequisite o f  opening negotiations, it is a crucial criterion in shaping the accession talks since its 
preparation is undertaken by the Commission in collaboration with the relevant ministries in the applicant 
countries. Preston, 1997, op. cit. p.l3. Also see DGIA web page: http:// europa.eu.int/comni/DGlA as o f  
July 1999.
J. Redmond, 1999, op. cit. p.60.
The only exception was the opinion on Greece which was negative in general but was ignored by the 
Council, which decided to open negotiations that led to third enlargement integrating Greece in 1981.
J. Redmond, 1999, op. cit. p.60. 
C. Preston, 1997, pp. 15-16.
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solutions that usually become the basis for joint positions of the existing member states
and then for an agreement between them and the candidates 34
Table 2.2 Periods of Different Stages of Enlargement
Preparation of 
Opinion
(months)
Decision to 
open
negotiations
(months)
Duration of 
negotiations
(months)
Total period
UK 05 33 19 5 Years, 
7 months
Denmark 05 33 19 5 Years, 
7 months
Ireland 05 33 19 5 Years, 
7 months
Norway 02 33 19 5 Years, 
4 months
Greece 07 06 34 5 Years,
6 months
Portugal 14 05 80 8 Years,
9 months
Spain 16 02 76 8 Years, 
5 months
Austria 24 18 13 5 Years, 
5 months
Sweden 13 06 13 3 Years, 
6 months
Finland 08 03 13 2 Years, 
9 months
Norway 04 01 12 2 Years, 
1 month
Source: Preston, 1997, p. 14.
The EU negotiates with individual applicants rather than groups, although 
parallel negotiations take place when several countries apply at one time. However, the 
EU does tend to group countries and, consequently finds it difficult to offer significantly
Desmond Dinan in Redmond and Rosenthal (eds.), op. cit., p. 21.
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different terms to two or more countries joining at the same time - what is given to one
applicant sets a precedent for what can be offered to others. 35
The negotiations phase can be the longest phase as in the cases of the Second 
and Third enlargements. As Laurent indicates, with the six, eight, and ten years it took 
the new members to move from accession to full integration, enlargement, defined as 
joining and truly adhering to the integrated conditions of the member states has been a
painfully slow and internally combative process.36
As the accession conference convenes, the policy areas subject to negotiations 
are divided into chapters according to the spectra in which they are placed in the EC’s 
activities. Christopher Preston divides the negotiation phase into exploratory and 
substantive phases. In the exploratory phase, the Commission together with the 
applicant country goes through the acquis in order to determine the applicability of the 
applicant country’s legislation and the necessary adaptations of the Community acts and 
national legislation. During the substantive phase, both sides are working on the 
adjustments for the more substantial negotiations to come. The Commission prepares a 
general view of the Community on the common positions, while the applicant waits for 
the internal politics of EC within COREPER and the Council to be negotiated and 
decided over compromised common positions. After reaching this substantive phase, 
the Community normally sets a date for the completion of the application, and tries to 
compromise over critical issues with the applicant. Finding acceptable compromises 
that meet applicants’ needs vrithout breaching the acquis communautaire involves
35 J. Redmond, 1999, pp. 60-61.
Pierre-Henri Laurent, “Widening Europe; The Dilemmas of Community Success”, Annals o f American 
Academy o f  Political and Social Science. No: 531, 1994, p.l28.
C. Preston, op. cit., 1997, pp. 15-16.
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detailed work by the Commission, matched by a political determination by key 
Community actors to find solutions.^*
The conclusion of the negotiations with a political agreement starts the last 
phase and the final contract is affirmed by the next European Summit after the 
termination of the negotiations. After the approval of the European Council, ratification 
in both the EU and applicant countries is necessary. The applicant countries may utilise 
parliamentary or referendum procedures or both, this also is a very critical stage. The 
ratification procedure in the member states’ parliaments is generally regarded as a 
simple matter of formality with a pre-determined positive outcome.
All four enlargements have contributed to the formation of an EU policy of 
Enlargement depending on certain accession principles and criteria. Therefore 
understanding the past five decades of the EC/EU enlargements is a key to grasp the 
primary characteristics of the prospective enlargements and the criteria applied to the 
prospective members. Although not a general rule, there seems to be a linkage with 
other applicant countries for the timing of the applications as Danish and Irish 
applications were closely linked to the UK application and Portugal’s application was 
linked to the Spanish application. The fourth enlargement was of the EFTAn countries 
only. Greece’s adhesion was the only enlargement that only one country was 
considered.
For an example o f  such negotiations, the most difficult chapters to be decided upon during the fourth 
enlargement (EFTAn) were o f health and environment standards. One o f the major concerns o f  he 
applicant countries during the negotiations was to maintain their high level o f  health, safety and 
environment standards. For an account o f  these negotiations see Fraser Cameron, “Keynote Article: The 
European Union and the Fourth Enlargement”, Journal o f  Common Market Studies. Vol 33 (2), 1995, and 
Francisco Granell, “the EU’s Enlargement Negotiations with Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden”, 
Journal o f Common Market Studies. Vol.33 (1), 1995.
^^Norway has refused to adhere to EC/EU twice by referendum in 1972 and 1994 after successful 
negotiations.
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The first enlargement set out the framework within which fiiture applicants had 
to operate in the negotiations with the EC and the limits and scope of the domestic 
adjustments and adaptations needed to meet the qualifying factors of membership. It 
may be regarded also as the first EFTAn enlargement, since the joining countries, 
except Ireland, were the members of the European Free Trade Association.
2.3 The First Enlargement
2.3.1 The United Kingdom
In this first enlargement. United Kingdom’s membership was a debated subject 
throughout the 1960s. The events of the 1960s may seem to indicate a contradiction of 
the openness of the EC to new members as France under the De Gaulle government 
vetoed the membership of the UK twice, in 1963 and 1967. The reason for these vetoes 
seen mainly as Britain’s commitment to the “European ideal” was in doubt. Perhaps, 
more significantly, France vetoed British entry because General De Gaulle was 
concerned that France’s influence in Union affairs would be diluted and that the Franco- 
German alliance would be disturbed.'’“
From the initiation of the EEC project, Britain had doubts about an economic 
community in continental Europe since it based its economic development on the 
maintenance of maritime trade, gave priority to creating open trade agreements and 
preferred dealing with tariff issues and sector-specific schemes within the GATT,
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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.“^' From the very beginning of post-war 
restructuring attempts in Europe, the OEEC, Organisation for European Economic Co­
operation, established in 1947, was seen as the foundation of a European customs union 
that would enhance the European economic recovery by France and Germany. Despite 
the French initiative to appoint a strong executive to the OEEC, British opposition to 
this plan made the resulting organisation consist only of a weak Secretariat dependent 
on a General Assembly. This made the OEEC a very loose framework, whose 
recommendations were not always compelling.'*^ The French view of the 
institutionalisation of economic cooperation through customs union brought about 
British scepticism towards a continental understanding of Europeanism and distanced 
Britain from the original efforts in order to found such a community initiated with 
establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) by the 1951 Paris 
Treaty signed by France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux“*^ countries. However, during 
the formation years of the EEC, the Six had wished to incorporate UK into the 
Community as the 1955 Messina Conference resolution recorded the agreement of the
^  Phedon Nicolaides and Armand Close, “Accession to the European Union; The Ultimate Bargain”, in,
F. Laursen, The Political Economy o f  European Integration, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1995, 
pp. 283-304. See p. 289.
C. Preston, 1997, op. cit. p. 24.
Gülnur Aybet. op. cit. p. 59.
Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg are all together called the Benelux countries with reference to  
the first letters o f  their names. Belgium and Luxembourg had bilaterally formed an economic union in 
1921; plans for a customs union o f the three countries were made in the London Customs Convention in 
September 1944 by the governments in exile o f these countries and became operative in 1948. According 
to Martin Holland (op. cit. p.24), this also provided a model based on the concept o f economic integration 
between sovereign states that is instructive for the post-War restructuring o f the intra-European relations. 
By 1956 nearly all o f  the internal trade o f  the union was tariff-free. On Feb. 3, 1958, the Treaty o f the 
Benelux Economic Union was signed; it became operative in 1960. Benelux became the first completely 
free international labour market; the movement o f  capital and services was also made free. Postal and 
transport rates were standardised, and welfare policies were coordinated. In 1970 border controls were 
abolished.
For more information on integration o f  the Benelux countries see: Rıdvan Karluk, Avruna Birliği ve 
Türkive., Istanbul: İMKB, 1996. pp. 39-41.
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Six to invite Britain to participate in the Intergovernmental Committee set up to
consider possible models for economic development of Europe.44
Yet the British view was that the formation of a free trade area based on the 
OEEC should be the grounds for European economic development rather than a 
customs union approach. Europe, on the other hand, had chosen the more incremental 
approach of Monnet and Spaak as set out in the Spaak Committee Report of April 1956. 
With this report an ambitious federal approach has given concessions to rather 
intergovemmentalist approach of integration shifting the balance to national 
governments.**  ^The report stressed the importance of the overall internal consistency of 
the framework and, in effect, criticised the British free trade area proposals as lacking 
rigour and coherence. This effectively established a core principle of the Commumty 
method which shaped future enlargements, that the acquis communautaire should be 
seen as a whole which is greater than the sum of its parts.“*^
The British seemed to underestimate the determination of the Six to create an 
‘ever closer Union’ and forecasted that an integration, even if it was accomplished, 
would not endure.“*^ The non-participation of the UK in the Messina Conference and the 
Spaak committee prevented the British government from having any influence on the 
emerging Community.*** The potential success of the EEC brought about the need to 
accommodate with Britain and the other excluded West European states. After the 
signing and ratification of the Rome Treaty, the OEEC, with the support of Britain, set
^  C. Preston, 1997, op. cit. p. 25.
M. Holland, op. cit. p. 30.
C. Preston, 1997, op. cit. pp. 25-26.
The extent o f  the British miscalculation can be understood by the fact that the UK applied for 
Community membership within four years.
M. Holland, op. cit. p,32.
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up a committee“^^  to investigate the feasibility of establishing a European Free Trade 
Area encompassing the ‘inner six’ and the wider group who did not share their 
integrationist ambitions.^“ After the committee negotiations resulted with an 
unsuccessful outcome, Britain’s response was to participate in a rival organization, 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA), based on the principle of
intergovemmentalism and excluded the idea of supranationalism.^'
If the European Community was to be the centre of the European cooperation, 
then the unenthusiastic and hesitant states in the boundaries of this centre formed the 
EFTA.^^ Yet the Federal content implicit in the Community idea could never be 
reconciled with the purely intergovermnentalist arrangement of EFTA. In Jean 
Monnet’s words, there was a fundamental difference ‘ between the Community, which 
is a way of uniting peoples, and, the Free Trade Area, which is simply a commercial
arrangement 53
Negotiations, known as the ‘Maulding talks’, named after the President o f  the Board o f Trade in 
Britain, continued until 1959 and examined numerous proposals for developing a free trade area around
the EC’s customs Union. Yet, especially between the French and the British no compromise could be 
reached and the talks ended up futile.
^ C. Preston, 1997, op. cit. p.26.
Holland, op. cit. pp. 130-131.
EFTA was established in 1960 by the Stockholm Convention by Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK with the goal o f  removing import duties, quotas and other obstacles to 
trade in Western Europe and o f  upholding liberal, non-discriminatory practices in world trade. Rules o f  
origin were established and cooperation between customs and administrations was agreed. Iceland joined 
EFTA in 1970 while Finland became an associate member in 1961 and a full member in 1986. 
Liechtenstein became a member in 1991. O f these members six have left to join the EU and the present 
members are Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. Based on the source from http:// 
efta.int/docs/EFTA.
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By 1961, a major reassessment of Britain’s European policy became necessary 
due to the conjuncture of world politics and the immediate success of the European 
Community as the major European political organisation. Also the needs of the British 
economy were more or less vested in the enriching West European states of the EC. 
According to Finder:
23.1A  The First British Application
“Much had changed since the initial rejection of Schuman’s proposal. The 
British economy was becoming weaker than those of the neighbours on the 
Continent. The British Commonwealth was in the process of transformation 
into a loose association that might give Britain influence, but not the sort of 
power that had set it apart from its neighbours in the past. The Continent, on 
the other hand, was no longer weak and unreliable, but had made impressive 
economic and political progress, and was evidently capable of realising such 
an important project as the Community had become. British industry wanted 
full access to this rich market nearby; and people in government did not want 
to see Britain ‘relegated’ internationally, ‘to the second division’.” “^*
Meanwhile, the EC was viewed benevolently by the US, suggesting also that the 
US ‘special relationship’ (with the UK) would decline in importance as the US 
bypassed the UK in developing relations with the EC.^  ^ UK governments have also 
sought to pursue the UK’s global aims of free trade and international security through 
membership to the EC. This shift in Britain’s EC policy was matched also with the EC’s 
reconsideration of its role in Europe and the self-clarification of its long-term political 
aims. Especially, smaller states of the EC saw a necessity in increasing relations with 
the UK. At the July 1961 European summit, the conclusions included the Bonn
Jean Monnet, Memoirs. 1978, p.449, quoted in, Martin Holland, op. cit. p. 130.
John Finder, European Community: The Building o f A Union. Oxford: Chcford University Press, 1995, 
on. 55-56.
”  Jonathan Bradbury, “The UK in Europe”, in, Robert Bideleux, Richard Taylor, (eds.), European 
Integration and Disintegration . East and West. London: Routledge, 1996, pp. 66-92.
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Declaration, whilst emphasising the development of a (European) union within an EC 
framework, also looked forward to the ‘adherence to the European Communities of 
other European States’. B y  the summer of 1961, the already clear economic success of 
the Community and the collapse of any prospects for an EFTA-EC common accord, 
persuaded the United Kingdom, together with Denmark and Norway to apply for full 
membership.^^ Ireland, driven by close economic ties with the UK also made an 
independent application just prior to this.
On 31 July 1961, the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan announced to the 
House of Commons the intention of his government to apply for the membership of the 
Communities.^** The change in the British policy was confirmed by accepting the 
Community’s institutions including the elimination of internal tariffs, a common 
customs tariff, a common commercial policy, and a common agricultural policy. 
Britain’s ‘special problems’ the British Prime Minister argued, could be dealt with by
59means of special protocols, as had been the case with the Original Treaty signatories. 
Macmillan justified the change of front regarding the institutions by aligning himself 
with de Gaulle’s 'confederal’^  ^ concept against those who were working for a federal
system.61
C. Preston, 1997,op. cit. p. 27. 
M. Holland, op. cit. p. 33.
S. George, 1990, op. cit. p.33. “The tone o f the announcement was very cautious, however, and had no 
ring o f  enthusiasm about it. The implication was that Britain recognised the necessity o f  making this 
move, but was far from welcoming it”.
C. Preston, 1997, op. cit. p. 27-28. Three areas were identified ass the special problems; Agriculture, 
Commonwealth trade and Britain’s obligations to other EFTA states.
De Gaulle’s Europe was like an antithesis o f  Monnet’s federal Europe. He envisaged a Europe of 
sovereign states and a union o f them could only be possible on the grounds that operate through an 
intergovernmental understanding.
J. Pinder, op. cit. p. 56.
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According to the Commission’s unpublished Opinion on the UK’s application, 
any protocols would only deal with transitional dealings yet some adaptation would be 
essential in order to cope with the difficulties created by the enlargement. The Opinion 
indicated that:
“Exceptions made must not be of such scope and duration as to call into 
question the rules themselves or impair the possibilities of applying these rules 
within the Community. The accession of new members must take place in 
such a way that may subsequently share fully in the working out of common 
decisions in a Community spirit.
According to Christopher Preston, this was the first definitive statement of the 
classical enlargement method and has not changed substantially through all subsequent
enlargements.63
The negotiations made good progress until January 1963, when French President 
Charles de Gaulle announced a unilateral French veto on British membership.^"* The 
French veto^  ^ was based on British incompetence in its determination to a European 
ideal and Britain’s continuing special relations with the US. De Gaulle made no secret of 
his view that, if admitted, Britain would act as the US ‘Trojan horse’ within the 
Communities.^ Yet, General de Gaulle’s first veto of Britain’s membership bid was 
accompanied by the suggestion for an association agreement, with eventual membership 
as an open-ended and distant possibility.^^ Despite the disappointment of the other five
64
Nicholson and East, op. cit. pp. 24-32. 
C. Preston, 1997, op. cit. p. 28.
S. George, 1990, op. cit. pp. 34-35.
It is ironic in the sense that French insistence on intergovemmentalism hindered the enlargement o f  the 
Community since the applicant states were at first place criticized for their intergovernmental approaches
that were found insufficient in communitarian principles.
66 — —
67
S. G eo rg e , 1 9 9 0 ,op. cit. p. 35.
T sa lico g lo u , op. cit. p. 147.
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member states of the EC, this veto, on the British and the other three applications of 
Norway, Ireland and Denmark effectively inactivated the negotiations.
2.3.1.2 The Second British Application
Although the rejection of the British application to the Community might be 
regarded as an embarrassing event by the British authorities the absence of other 
alternatives in the European politics and the Community’s growing role in the daily 
activities of the member states’ economical and political life left Britain with no other 
practical alternatives. The Labour Government, which had replaced the Conservatives in 
1964^ **, again applied for membership in May 1967.^  ^With regard to the crucial role of 
the UK within the regional economic relations and within the EFT A, the other EFT A 
countries and Ireland also reactivated their membership applications.^^
In October the European Commission published its preliminary Opinion on 
Britain’s (and the other three) applications.^’ The Opinion stated once more the 
requirement of the full acceptance of the acquis communautaire. It also exposed the need 
to start negotiations in order to adjust monetary policies of applicants accordingly with 
the evolving monetary system of the Community along with the need to fix the British 
balance of payments equilibrium. With this positive interpretation from the Commission,
** Although Harold Wilson, who became the Head o f  the Government, appeared to perceive British 
membership o f  the EC was not desirable, during the 1966 election, Wilson draw a positive portrait 
towards membership to the EC convinced by the realities o f office as well as the Department o f  
Economic Affairs led by George Brown in his government. For the details o f  this period see George, S, 
1990, op. cit. pp. 35-38.
J. Finder, op. cit. p. 57.
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N ic h o lso n  and E a st, op . cit. p .46 .
C. P reston, 1 997 , op. cit. p .30 .
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the preliminary negotiations started at once. Again, despite a favourable response from
the Commission, de Gaulle was implacably opposed. 72
The Labour Government held to its policy towards membership and after de 
Gaulle resigned from office in April 1969, Britain immediately moved to reactivate its 
application. De Gaulle’s successor, Georges Pompidou did not share his rooted objection 
to British membership. Actually, he saw Britain as a counterweight against the 
strengthening Germany. Therefore, the Commission was requested to update its 1967 
Opinion and in its revised Opinion, published in October 1969 recommended that 
negotiations with all four applicants should be opened immediately.^“* Meanwhile, the 
Community, having completed the Customs Union, was discussing the need for 
developing new policy areas and how to accommodate these new policy areas with 
enlargement. At a summit meeting that was called at Pompidou’s insistence, in The 
Hague in 1969, the Six agreed to proceed with the negotiations for British entry along 
with the other three countries.^^ Also it is agreed that the widening, deepening, and 
completion of the previously started policies were inseparable. With a revived 
Communitarian spirit. The Hague Summit marked a relaunch of the Community as well 
as the opening of the enlargement negotiations.
M. Holland, op. cit. p.35 “This time French opposition focused on the weak state o f  the British 
economy and its prospective inhibitory effects to the Community development attempts and the 
deepening o f  the integration within the EC”.
^  The political condition in Eiu-ope has also changed in a way that made the French feel vulnerable. The 
launching o f a new ‘Ostpolitik’ by German Chancellor Willy Brandt, Soviet invasion o f  Czechoslovakia 
and US pressure for possible troop withdrawals created the need, for France, to strengthen the EC.
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2.3.1.3 Accession Negotiations
Although the Labour Government had prepared Britain’s ultimate, and 
successful, application to join, it was Edward Heath who carried it through after he 
became Prime Minister with the Conservative election victory in June 1970.^  ^
Immediately in that month, accession negotiations opened. Britain urged that negotiation 
talks should concentrate on certain matters of agricultural policy, its contributions to the 
Community budget. Commonwealth sugar exports. New Zealand’s special problems, 
and certain other Commonwealth questions.’  ^Heath, having no reservations about the 
membership,^* drove the negotiations as fast as possible.
During the abortive negotiations between 1961-1963, the Commission did have 
the right to advise the member states on the making of the common positions, but its 
mandate was not outlined over the presence of three separate executive bodies. This 
time, according to the implementing procedure established by the Council at its sessions 
of 8 and 9 June 1970, the responsibility for the negotiations remained with the Council, 
but the member states now spoke with a single voice through the presidency. They 
formulated common positions on the basis of proposals by the Commission, ironing out 
their differences through internal negotiations, which were often more intricate than 
those of the Conference, which was the arena for the members and the Community as a 
single entity, provided by The Hague Summit of 1969^^
Preston, 1997, op. cit. p.31.
S. George, 1990, op. cit. p.38.
J. Finder, op. cit. p. 58.
' Nicholson and East, op. cit. p. 65.
“Edward Heath is the only British Prime Minister to that date to have been fiilly committed to he idea 
o f the EC. His personal record o f  commitment goes back in early days in politics when he was a member 
o f Jean Monnet’s Action Committee for the United States o f Europe; and when he was the chief 
negotiator for Macmillan’s application for membership.” George, 1990, op. cit. p. 49.
Tsalicoglou, op. cit. p. 148.
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After the substantive phase of the negotiations ended, the UK Government put 
forward the White Paper, which emphasised the vitality of the EC membership for the 
British economic and political interests. Solutions to many difficult problems relating to 
agriculture, the Commonwealth, and EFTA had already been found during the long 
history' of membership application since 1961. Yet, the main issue was the agricultural 
policy and the British budget contribution for the British economy. Different 
transitional periods were foreseen but the ‘British budget question’ though thus 
circumvented in the negotiations, was to remain an incubus for the Community until the 
m id -1 9 8 0 s .The newly adopted Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) was also to be 
implemented over a transitional period upon Britain’s hard stance against it. The 
agreement opened the way for accession and by October 1971 the British Houses of 
parliament gave their assent to membership despite a slightly unfavourable British 
public opinion at that moment.**^  From the EC’s perspective, the accession terms 
preserved the integrity of the acquis and gave the UK transitional periods within which 
the necessary trade and policy adaptations could be made. As the Irish, Danish and 
Norwegian negotiations developed in parallel, these states together with the UK signed 
the Accession Treaties on 22 January 1972 starting the membership on 1 January 1973.
For the details o f  the negotiated matters see, S. George, “The Heath Government 1970-1974”, in S. 
George, op. cit.
J. Finder, op. cit. p, 60, The British budget problem was internalised into the EC and continued to 
create difficulties.
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2.3.1.4 Renegotiation
Only more than a year after the accession, the change in the government in the 
UK threatened this new beginning. The Labour Party in opposition remained 
discontented over the negotiation terms as well as the principle of membership itself 
When it formed a Government in March 1974, the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, 
pledged to renegotiate terms.*  ^ The main issue was Britain’s contributions to the EC 
budget creating constraints over the British economy and the proposed economic plans 
of the Labour Government. Although British proposals were discussed and accepted in 
March 1975 at the Dublin European Council,*‘*obtaining, however, only cosmetic 
adjustments, the British membership of the Community was placed in question by a 
referendum on the issue in June 1975. The Prime Minister decided to recommend a vote 
in favour after the Dublin Summit. The referendum resulted in a two-to-one majority in
favour of the membership. 85
The renegotiation can be explained primarily in the context of British domestic 
politics and the need for Wilson to retain internal party coherence. This demonstrated the 
weakness of the classical method of enlargement. Faced with pressure from newcomers 
to rewrite the rules of the club, the preference of its existing members was to close 
ranks. Seen from a longer perspective, however, such distinctions recede into the 
background; for what will eventually remain out of the whole process of enlargement 
will simply be the fact of membership itself: ‘ the most important fact about the first
M . H olland , op . cit. p. 39 .
”  C. P resto n ,1 9 9 7 , op . cit. p .36 .
S. George, 1990, op. cit., pp. 85-88. 
J. Finder, op. cit., p.60.
Preston, 1997, op. cit. p.37.
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British negotiation was that it failed and the most important fact about the second was 
that it succeeded.*^
2.3.2 Ireland, Denmark and Norway
All three countries’ policies towards European integration were strongly 
dependent to their close relations with the UK. Britain, being their major trade partner 
shaped the calendar of their accession negotiations and the vetoes for Britain in 1963 and 
1967 became also vetoes for them. Denmark and Norway being members of EFTA also 
showed similar reactions to the dimension of European integration as the UK did. Yet, 
membership, for these three countries, meant creation of a way of retaining trade links 
with the UK but within a larger, regional grouping that would reduce their historical 
dependence on the UK. Ireland’s, Denmark’s and Norway’s negotiations were not as 
complicated; and their terms of entry, while allowing for special provisions that took 
into account individual needs and circumstances, were in many respects similar to those 
of Britain.*^
2.3.2.1 Ireland
In search for different markets than the UK for its agricultural goods, Ireland was 
attracted by the EEC where proposals for implementing the CAP were being developed. *
Davidson, Britain and the making o f Europe. 1971, quoted in Tsalicoglou, op. cit. pp. 149-150.
** Preston, 1997, op. cit. pp. 37-38.
For a detailed account o f the three countries entry negotiations see Nicholson and East, op. cit. pp. 83- 
134.
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The possibility of some form of association with the EC, irrespective of British policy to 
the EC, was explored, though the outcome was inconclusive given the still 
overwhelming importance of trade with the UK.^  ^Therefore the European adventure of 
Ireland followed the same path with Britain. Although Ireland applied earliest among the 
applicants on July 31 1961 (See Table 2.1), this application was lodged after the 
announcement of British intention to seek membership by the Prime Minister 
Macmillan. The only problem for Irish entry could be its neutrality, but this problem was 
not all that important since a Common Foreign Policy was then almost inexistent except 
the Fouchet Plan for a draft Treaty for A Union of States presented in October 1961.^ * 
By October 1962, Irish negotiations started and, of course, broke down by the veto of de 
Gaulle. Yet, Ireland, in preparation for eventual EC membership, continued internal 
structural economic reforms and the maintenance of contacts with Brussels and member
states. 92
The second application in 1967 also had a similar course with Britain and turned 
down by the French Government. After 1969 The Hague Summit, negotiations in which 
Common Fisheries policy and transitional periods were the only major concerns for 
Ireland, opened in 1970. The classical method posed few problems for Ireland. Irish 
negotiation priorities threatened neither the overall acquis nor any powerful domestic 
interest groups in the EC.^  ^The EC focus on support for national regional policies prior 
to enlargement put Ireland and the UK in the position of major beneficiaries of regional 
funds. Overall, the first enlargement established the basis for EU regional policy and
Ibid. p.38.
M. Holland, op. cit., p.39.
C. Preston, 1997, op. cit. p.39. 
Ibid. p.41.
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affected its focus on reducing disparities in economic development, particularly 
industrialisation and social development.^“*
2.3.2.2 Denmark
Along with other Scandinavian countries, Denmark was sceptical about the 
European integration process towards a closer political and economic union and chose to 
pursue the looser framework of the OEEC. As one of Europe’s major food exporters, 
Denmark had two main markets, Germany and the UK, and their membership into two 
different trade blocs (EFTA and EEC) put Denmark in a situation that it had to prevent 
any barriers being erected between the groups. Denmark chose to be a member of the 
EFTA and use EFTA membership as a tool for relations with the EC over the continental 
trade issues. Following the Bonn Declaration of 1961 at the European Summit, Denmark 
announced its intention for membership and applied one day after the UK. (See Table 
2.1) It also displayed a similar ambivalent position towards the political aims of the EC 
as Britain. Denmark mirrored Britain’s path to membership, even to the extent of 
applying for membership on the same day as the UK in 1967.^  ^ After The Hague 
Summit negotiations were opened in June 1970 and were relatively easy and 
unproblematic. The Danes avoided identifying a long list of problems at the outset and 
accepted without reservations the acquis communautaire, but requested that they should 
enter without any transitional periods for industrial and agricultural goods and the
96
Grabbe and Hughes, in Redmond and Rosenthal (eds.), op. cit. p. 132. 
C. Preston, 1997, op. cit. p. 41.
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validity of the right of veto^  ^contained in the Luxembourg Compromise of 1966.^* Yet, 
Denmark negotiated solutions to issues concerning Greenland^^ and the Faeroe Islands, 
especially over fisheries, and there were transitional measures for a small number of 
a r e a s . I n  the government’s official motivation for joining the Conununity in 1973, 
economic arguments were pre-eminent as well and, in fact, during most of the following 
period Danish politicians saw the Community as principally an economic 
arrangement.'*^  ^With the two-thirds of the votes Demnark chose to enter the Community 
in October 1972 referendum accessing on 1 January 1973 with the other applicant states.
Denmark, similar to the UK, has external commitments to other groupings that 
provide an alternative to the EC. The Nordic Councilprovided a framework for 
Denmark to cooperate with other Scandinavian countries and an alternative setting for 
the continued opposition against the EC. The lesson for future enlargements is simple; 
preferably, the new applicant states should not have any pre-existing loyalties to other 
regional or political groupings that stand in conflict with development of the 
Community towards further integration.
97 Related parts from the Luxembourg Compromise as quoted in Holland, op. cit., p.l36, “Where in the 
case o f decisions which may be taken by a majority vote on a proposal o f  the Commission if very
important interests are at stake,..... the discussion must be continued until unanimous agreement is
reached.”
Danes regarded this to be an important factor in building public opinion towards membership in the 
October 1972 referendum.
Greenland as an overseas area o f  Denmark entered into the EC but in 1982 retired from the Community 
by a referendum on the basis o f fisheries problems.
 ^ Grabbe and Hughes, op. c it ., p. 129.
Nikolaj Petersen, “In the Strategic Triangle; Denmark and the European Union”, in Bideleux and 
Taylor (eds.), op. cit. pp. 93-110.
The Nordic Council o f  Ministers was founded in 1971 following a revision o f the Helsinki Agreement. 
The treaty recognized the Nordic Council o f  Ministers as the official organ for co-operation among the 
Nordic governments. In the summer o f 1971, work began to establish a permanent secretariat. The 
secretariat was officially established in Oslo on July 1, 1973. Source: 
http://www.norden.org/om_oss_uk/nmr/hist.htm.
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2.3.2.3 Norway
Norway, an EFTA country having close trade links with the UK and concerns 
about the political goals of the EC followed the same route with Denmark and the UK. It 
submitted its application in April 1962, almost one year after Denmark and Britain since 
it had concerns over national sovereignty as well as concerns about agriculture and 
fisheries. Substantial negotiations could not even start due to the French veto in January 
1963.'°“* Following the UK, the Norwegian application was reactivated in July 1967. The 
full accession negotiations opened in June 1970 and the Norwegian Government sought 
permanent exemptions for Norwegian agriculture, to ensure for the maintenance of 
settlement in remote regions, as well as special arrangements for fisheries, given the 
overall importance of fishing to the Norwegian economy and its special significance for 
coastal communities.“^  ^ These demands were contesting the classical enlargement 
method and led to difficult negotiations ending in the acceptance of transitional periods 
for fisheries and self-support of the Norwegian agriculture.Norway has signed the 
Accession Treaty in January 1972 along with other applicants yet the referendum in 
September 1972 resulted in rejection of the entry terms. Instead Norway negotiated a 
free trade agreement with the EC and gradually deepened the relationship with the other
EFTA countries. 107
The Norwegian negotiations tested the limits of the classical method. Despite the 
EC’s recognition of Norway’s concerns over agriculture and fisheries, no permanent
M. Holland, op. cit. pp. 165-166.
C. Preston, 1997, op. cit. p. 43.
Nicholson and East, op. cit. p. 120.
Ibid. p. 124.
'“^ Anjariitta Rantanen, Northern Exposure: Sweden. Finland, and Norway Join The European Unioa  
Unpublihed Master’s Thesis, Bilkent University, 1994, p. 38.
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derogations were allowed.Also,  the Norwegian case demonstrated the importance of 
the domestic political consensus and its possibility to override the most cautiously 
performed negotiations.
2.4 Second Enlargement (Greece)
Greece had a longer period of adhesion to the EC since on 8 June 1959, two 
years after the establishment of the European Economic Community, it submitted an 
application for association in accordance with article 238 of the Treaty of Rome. This 
move reflected a political choice in favour of European integration but also an 
awareness of the state of the Greek economy, which pointed to association as the 
preferable immediate objective that would eventually lead to full membership.From 
Greece’s perspective, the application was a choice in favour of the EEC over the EFTA 
model of economic development reflecting the hope of long term full membership' 
since the EEC covered the agricultural sector which is the crux of Greece’s economic 
structure, while the UK led EFTA was based on the industrial sector which was very 
backward then in Greece.
After almost two years of substantive negotiations. The Association Agreement 
was signed in Athens on 9 July 1961 and came into force on 1 November 1962 after 
ratification of parliaments of Greece and the member states. According to the European
108
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Commission, The Association Agreement between Greece and the EC was the first 
and most wide-ranging contractual arrangement of its kind undertaken by the 
Community."“ The European side also underlined the fact that the agreement with 
Greece could represent, in Council President Erhard’s words, “ a first step in the 
direction of the enlargement of the Community”.’"  Also, for the Community, the 
Agreement extended its political reach in the Mediterranean region and led to the 
Association Agreement with Turkey, seen, then, a vital point in Mediterranean security 
policy within the perspective of the Cold War.
Following the military coup of April 1967, the EEC decided to ‘freeze’ the 
Greek Association T r e a t y ' b y  limiting its application to tariff reduction while 
suspending its other provisions as long as democracy was not restored.’’^  This was 
important in terms of the European system of cooperation, since it exposed the 
Council’s, the Parliament’s and the Commission’s determination to highlight the 
political nature of the Community. Furthermore, ‘the freeze’ pointed out the principles 
of democratic government and respect for human rights as necessary conditions and 
prerequisites for membership.
In July 1974, the military dictatorship collapsed after the Turkish military 
intervention in Cyprus and Greece’s withdrawal from the military aspects of NATO. On
The Greek Association Agreement was followed by the Turkish one, which also specified eventual full 
membership but which has a number o f  other differences such as a preparatory phase before the actual 
transitional period. The agreement, then, was supposed to be reassessed after the end o f  the preparatory 
phase meaning that there was no automatic transition fi’om the preparatory to the transitional period. 
Turkey’s agreement, like Greece’s includes references to full membership as the ultimate goal yet it is 
more carefully worded in this respect.
Kostas A. Lavdas, The Europeanization o f  Greece: Interest Politics and Crises o f Integration. London: 
Macmillan, 1997, p. 99.
Ibid. pp. 117-125.
’’^Tsalicoglou, op. cit. p. 16.
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17 September 1974, shortly after the normalisation of political life in Greece, the 
Council of Ministers decided the resumption of the procedures for the development of 
association.' The formal application was submitted on 12 June 1975 without waiting 
for the full implementation of the Association Agreement with its provisions extending 
over 12 or 22 years until 1984.” ’ The main reasons lying behind Greece’s application 
was;
“Accession to the European Community was primarily sought by Greece 
in 1975 for political reasons. It was strongly believed by Greek pro-EC 
forces that joining the European Community would be a factor for; first, 
the consolidation of the newly established democratic political system 
and institutions, and secondly, the strengthening of Greece’s position and 
bargaining power in the peripheral and wider international system thereby 
enabling her to lessen her dependency on foreign powers, notably the 
USA. Economic considerations also played a role, though a secondary 
one, in shaping Greece’s decision to seek full membership of the 
European Community. It was specifically expected that the Community 
would offer Greece the financial resources and the ‘market conditions’ 
needed for the modernisation of the sclerotic economic structures and
institutions.’ 118
At its session of 24 June 1975, the Council of Ministers took note of the 
application and called upon the Commission to draw up its Opinion. Yet, the 
Community viewed the possibility of an early Greek membership as an ambiguous issue. 
Although the Association Agreement aimed at full membership as the final objective, 
the difficulties in implementing its provisions made the Community alert against the 
posed complexities of Greek membership. Adopted on 28 January 1976, the
“ *Ibid. p.l7.
Panos Kazakos, “Greece and the EC: historical review” in Panos Kazakos, P. C. lokamidis, (eds.), 
Greece and EC Memhershin Evaluated . New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994., p. 3.
“ * P.C. loakimidis, “From the EC and the Greek Political System: an Overview”, in Kazakos, 
lokamidis (eds.), op. cit. pp. 139-153.
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Commission’s Opinion amounted to a qualified and lukewarm statement.“  ^ As the 
opinion noted:
“Until now the balance on the Community’s relations with Greece and 
Turkey was found its expression in their identical status as Associates, 
both of them with possibility of full membership as the final objective, 
albeit with different timetables.”
The Commission saw Greece’s application for membership as upsetting the 
balance that had been the basis of Community policy towards the two countries since the 
late fifties.'"’ Another matter of concern of the Commission was focused on the 
economic implications of the Greek membership since the weaker Greek economy 
would require significant resource transfers from the EC budget. Also the impact of this 
enlargement on the structure of the EC was not certain. Here the Commission adopted its 
traditional role of arguing that widening should not be at the expense of deepening, and 
that steps toward EU, such as direct elections to the European Parliament and EMU, 
called for an acceleration of the integration process.'"" Furthermore, viewed from the 
wider perspective of the Commimity’s Mediterranean enlargement, Greece’s accession 
was regarded as a source of additional complications: on the one hand, the Greek terms 
of entry could create precedents for the Iberian candidates; on the other hand, the 
widening of the Community would leave little time to stabilise its institutional
Tsalicoglou, op. cit. p.30.
Commission o f  the EC: “Opinion on Greek Application for Membership”, Bulletin of  the European 
Communities- 2/1976. p. 8.
‘ ‘^Actually, the Commission proved to be right about its concerns about the Greco-Turkish relations 
shaping the nature o f the EC-Turkey relations. One country, which has expressed the most serious 
reservations about the possibility o f  the Turkish membership to the EC has become Greece. “The 
unanimous nature o f  EC decisions and the granting o f  veto power to member states places Athens in a 
much more advantageous position than Ankara in its dealings with Brussels. Greece has used the 
privileges accorded to EC member states to advance its ‘policy o f  conditionality’ on EC-Turkish relations. 
In essence, Greece may opt to use all Community mechanisms to set preconditions or block EC initiatives 
directed towards Turkey.” Pródromos Yannas, “The Greek Factor in EC-Turkey Relations”, in, Kazakos, 
lokamidis, (eds.), op. cit. pp. 215-221.
122 C. Preston, 1997, op. cit. p. 51.
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functioning and to improve its decision making processes, the more so given that the full 
consequences of the previous enlargement had still to be fully absorbed.
The Commission foresaw the necessity of a more open-ended period of 
convergence since the budgetary and financial implications of Greek entry would be a 
burden for the EC budget. Yet, by arguing that Greece was not ready for full 
membership, the Commission was also seeking to protect the principles underpirming
the classical enlargement method. 124
The Commission’s opinion provoked an angry response from Athens, especially 
as it touched on a couple of sensitive issues for the newly democratic government in 
Greece.'“^  The Opinion took also very negative responses from the governments of the 
member states, in particular, from France. With an immediate decision at its session of 
9 February, the Council rejected the Opinion and accepted the Greek application and 
asked the COREPER to prepare a mandate for the negotiations as soon as possible. The 
decision was facilitated by the assurances given by Greece that, as a full member, she 
would not block the EC’s developing relations with Turkey. In spite of the Council 
decision. The community was still not certain about an early membership of Greece, 
since the collapse of dictatorships in Spain and Portugal created an environment to 
consider all three countries in a wider Mediterranean perspective. Yet, on the other hand.
123 Tsalicoglou, op. cit. p. 31.
C. Preston, 1997, op. cit., pp. 51-52.
Lavdas, op. cit. p. 141.
French government’s criticism was not only due to the French support to the Greek membership but 
was also linked to the more general issue o f  relations between the French Government and the 
Commission, considering the Commission’s public statements on political issues much to the displeasure 
of the French government.
C. Preston, 1997, op. cit. p.52. Though these promises were soon broken after Greece’s membership, 
and Greece managed to unfreeze the Fourth Financial Protocol between the EC and Turkey, amounting to 
600 million ECU and linked this issue to the Cyprus problem.
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the possibility of delaying Greece’s membership would have sent wrong messages to the 
other two countries.
Having agreed to open negotiations, the Orthodox Community method of 
enlargement was restated.'"* Greece had to accept, in full, the acquis communautaire and 
transitional arrangement could only be realised under circumstances that would not 
hinder the process of further integration.
The Greek accession negotiations took thirty-four months longer than the first 
enlargement negotiations. The overall Greek negotiating strategy gave priority to the 
speed of the process rather than structural adjustments delaying some problems’ 
solutions after accession. According to Tsalicoglou:
“Greece’s emphasis on speed inevitably entailed a certain cost: it meant that, 
with the pressure of passing time, the assessment of the likely impact of 
accession entered only superficially in the formulation of her negotiation 
positions. The argumentation in the Greek position papers rarely rose beyond 
a mere identification of the sectors of the Greek economy that were 
considered ‘sensitive’ coupled with requests for temporary protection to
avoid disturbances. ,129
The main national interest was seen as achieving the member status as soon as 
possible rather than seeking a conclusion in defending specific policy positions. The 
Community also did not push for the economic arrangements since the significance of 
this enlargement were considered having geopolitical implications in the Mediterranean 
region.
128
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Ibid. p. 53.
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The Commission had difficulties in the negotiation since its Opinion was 
overruled. Yet, the complexity of the issues raised by the Mediterranean enlargement 
clearly tested the Commission’s role as an honest broker, a role that came under more 
stress following the opening of the even more difficult Iberian Negotiations.Greece 
played the trump card of cultural affinity and cultural heritage and, its relatively swift 
accession, was strikingly disproportionate to the length of its assimilation which 
arguably is ongoing.'^’ This second enlargement exposed how political considerations 
could be as strong as the economic ones in determining the full membership issues. The 
Commission had given a negative response to Greek accession on the basis of economic 
disparity: the political arguments - the support of democracy and the retention of Greece 
in the Western Camp - outweighed these considerations.'^^The Treaty between the 
member states of the European Communities and Greece and The Final Act was signed 
on 28 May 1979, fixing the membership date as 1 January 1981.
The Greek negotiations show that the Classical Community method of 
enlargement, with its exclusive stress on adaptation to the acquis through transition 
arrangements, could be maintained, even during a period of uncertainty about the future
of European integration. 133
As the challenges of membership come into full view, a new entrant is bound to 
be disillusioned by the daily grind of Community negot ia t ions .The  Greek 
membership was coloured by a pwlitical event, similar to that which the British had
C. Preston, 1997, op. cit. p. 60.
Desmond Dinan, in Redmond and Rosenthal, op. cit. p. 19.
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experienced after their access ion .In  the case of Greece the problem was more serious 
because the party that was brought to power by 1981 elections was the Socialist 
PASOK (Pan Hellenic Socialist Movement Party) which contained anti-European 
elements, therefore lacked a clearly defined European P o l i c y . T h e  opposition of 
PASOK against EC membership had gradually moderated adopting a cautious policy, 
quickly recognising international and economic realities- at least p a r t ly .T h e  PASOK 
government gained the reputation of tending to obstruct Community business whenever 
a problem arose for it.'^ ** The demand for compensatory payments through the 
Integrated Mediterranean Programmes, which the Greeks demanded in 1984 as their 
price for agreeing to Iberian accession, shows how quickly the Greeks learnt to use their
economic weaknesses to their advantage in Community bargaining. 139
The capacity of the Greek economic and political system to wholeheartedly 
implement the acquis remained questionable.Although the history of the Greek-EC 
relations date back to the early years of the EC, marked with its application for an 
Association agreement in June 1959, The Greek attitudes to the EC have long been 
characterised by degrees of division and inconsistency. According to Robert Bideleux:
135 J. Finder, op. cit. p. 64.
Actually, as an opposition party, PASOK rejected membership, seeing it as a major obstacle to 
socialist aspirations. As it had declared before assuming governmental responsibilities, EC accession ‘will 
consolidate the peripheral role o f  the country as a satellite in the capitalist system; will render national 
planning impossible; will seriously threaten Greek industry; and will lead to the extinction o f the Greek 
farmers’. Kazakos, op. cit. p. 5.
Kazakos, op. cit. p. 5, Tsalicoglou, op. cit. p. 168-169. Indicative o f  the mentality prevailing at that 
time in the Greek Goveriunent is the total absence o f  the Community dimension from the 1983-1987 five- 
year plan o f  economic and social development. For a more detailed account o f  the PASOK Government’s 
attempts to amalgamate the EC politics with the domestic politics, see: “Crisis o f  Adjustment in The
Europeanization o f  Greece’’, in, Lavdas, op. cit. pp. 147-185. ■ j c  ■
J. Finder op cit p 64. For example. It made the negotiations for the accession o f  Portugal and Spam 
more difficult than the real problems o f  Iberian competition with Greece could justify.
139
, C. Preston, 1997, op. cit. p.61. ^  .u i r- r-,-.
‘^ C  Preston, 1997 op cit p61 For a full acount o f the Greek performance at the early years o f its EC
membership see “Greece and EC Membership Evaluated” by Kazakos op. cit., Robert Bideleux, “The 
Southern Enlargement o f  the EC”, in Bideleux and Taylor, op. cit. pp. 127-153. Especially see; pp. 129- 
139.
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"These attitudes, which have been to a considerable extent both cause and 
effect of Greece’s relatively poor political and economic performance since 
joining the EC in 1981, are direct products of the still potent cultural and 
psychological legacies of the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires and of the 
inherently vulnerable, dependent, embattled and irredentist nature of the 
Greek national state that emerged in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. These legacies kept alive by perceived ‘threats’ and demagogic 
manipulation of nationalist issues, provide the keys to understanding 
Greece’s exceptionally fraught and ambivalent relationship with Western 
Europe.”““
In spite of all the difficulties that the EC had faced after the adhesion of Greece, 
the important point is that after a negotiation period that leads to accession of an 
applicant country, the Community has to internalise all the problems of the new 
member. These problems carry on to the intra-community negotiations, therefore 
exposing the significance of the necessity of arriving at common policy positions during 
the pre-accession phase and the accession negotiations. The impact of the enlargement 
can progress or impede harmonisation therefore widening may pose a threat to the 
deepening of the Community institutions and policies. As a result, the Greek 
enlargement has brought forward the infamous debate of ‘widening versus deepening’ 
into the European agenda once more.
2.5 The Third Enlargement
Enlargement negotiations with Spain and Portugal started before the Greek 
negotiations have been finalised. Therefore the EC had been faced with the need for 
policy adaptation along with various political and economic reform within the applicant
7 4
countries. Accordingly, the challenge of the expected degree of diversity within the 
enlarged Community protracted the enlargement process during the third enlargement 
(SeeTable 2.2). The extremely lengthy and difficult negotiations that took place before 
actual membership were due primarily to the fact that the acquis communautaire had 
been growing in importance over the years and that Spain was trying to get the best 
possible bargain on a number of economic issues.'"*  ^ By opening to the South, the 
Community faced an historic shift in its balance of power, away from the core founders 
of the EC and its close former EFT A northern associates, towards Europe’s new 
democracies on its southern periphery.
Although it is possible to consider the accession of Spain and Portugal together 
with the accession of Greece as one wave of Mediterranean enlargement, certain 
political differences of the Greek accession and the tougher characteristics of the Iberian 
enlargement negotiations with the EC separates the two enlargements. Yet, still these 
two enlargements are similar in many terms other than just being Mediterranean.
Greece, Spain and Portugal all applied to join the EU in the mid-to-late 1970s on 
their emergence from periods of authoritarian rule.''*'^  Therefore, The EC’s wish to widen 
towards the Iberic peninsula also displayed a political will and its wish to support these 
newly established democracies. Also, the two countries’ trade with the Cormnumty of 
Nine showed a similar degree of dependence-similar in fact to Greece’s- however their
MI Bideleux, op. cit. p.l29.
Karlheinz Neunreither, “The European Parliament and Enlargement, 1973-2000”, in Redmond and 
Rosenthal, op. cit. p. 71.
M3 Preston, 1997, op. cit., p. 63.
Redmond, 1999, op. cit. p. 58. Other than the fall o f  the Greek military junta in 1974, Portugal 
witnessed the overthrow o f the Salazar/Caetano regime in April 1974 and the death o f  Franco in 
November 1975 were the significant dates that sparkled the enlargement process.
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composition of exports to the EEC has a low degree of similarity.''’^  To a certain level, 
the economic weaknesses of these two countries and the economic impact of their 
accessions'“’^  were down-played in an attempt to integrate these two countries into the 
Community. The Portuguese dictator, Salazar bequeathed a small, secluded, stagnating 
and obsolescent economy which had to undergo drastic surgery and opening up in 1978- 
80 and 1983-85, whereas Franco bequeathed to his democratic successors an essentially 
sound, vibrant, outward-orientated capitalist economy, which only awaited a chance to 
‘take o ff after the economic doldrums of 1974-1984.'^^ Portugal applied for full 
membership in the EC in March 1977 and Spain has followed in July 1977. In each case 
EC membership was seen as a means of reinforcing the return to democracy; as the 
culmination of a process of opening up the economy to international (and especially 
European) trade, competition and investment; as the consummation of a spiritual ‘return 
to Europe’, marking the end of their extra-European ‘vocations’, the final attainment of
148First World status and the reversal of centuries of marginalisation in European affairs. 
This wish to join the EC showed a redefinition of their national identities and their 
historical orientations fermented with the will to develop their country in economic, 
political and social terms. As in the case of Greece, the issue of accession was
m
essentially a political one; Community membership was once more perceived as a means 
of consolidating democratic institutions at home.''’^
Loukas Tsoukalis, 1981, The F.uropean Community and its Mediterranean Enlargement. London: 
George Allen & Unwin, 1981, pp. 98-99.
Although French and ItaUan farmers protested the accession possibility and these interest groups 
succeeded to delay the accession o f Portugal and Spain for some years
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2.5.1 Spain
Due to the fascist Franco regime, Spain pursued isolationist and autarchic 
economic policies. It was in 1959 when a group of technocrats began to open up the 
Spanish economy to foreign trade and investment with a view of economic 
liberalisation.'^^ Aiming towards the European markets, Spain first requested associate 
EC membership in 1962. The application remained unanswered until 1964. The more 
serious discussions which began abortively in 1964 and again in 1967 eventually led to a 
preferential trade agreement in 1970'^' but the EC was unwilling to enter a closer liaison 
as long as Franco ruled Spain.
Following the death of Franco in November 1975, King Juan Carlos committed 
himself to the ‘peaceful establishment of democratic coexistence based on respect for the 
law as a manifestation of the sovereignty of the people’.'^^Trade negotiations resumed 
and the Government of Adolfo Suarez submitted formal application in July 1977 and, in 
February 1978, created a new Ministry for relations with the EC.' '^* The government had 
hoped that entry terms could have been negotiated and agreed by 1980, in time for 
admission soon after G re ec e .B u t  French, Italian and subsequently Greek fears of the 
economic consequences of Spanish entiy'^^ and German considerations, as the main
Tsalicoglou, op. cit. p. 153.
Preston, 1997, op. cit. p. 63, Bideleux, op. cit. p. 144.
'^'Xhe agreement was aimed at the establishment o f  an eventual customs union. Spain agreed to reduce 
tariffs on EC exports in six stages by 1977 and the EC reduced its tariffs against Spanish industrial goods 
and citrus fruit. The agreement was opened to renegotiation in 1973-75 in consideration o f  the second 
enlargement o f  the Community, however, the execution o f the Basque prisoners by Franco broke o ff the 
negotiations.
Bideleux, op. cit. p. 144.
Nicholson and East, op. cit. p. 215.
C. Preston, 1997, op. cit. p. 65,
Bideleux, op. cit. p. 144.
According to Tsalicoglou, op. cit. pp. 154-155; “There was aaxiety about the free movement o f  labour 
and the fact that as a group (and allowing for individual differences) the applicant countries- being 
Portugal and Spain- appeared to have a comparative advantage in sectors in which the Community
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contributor to the EC budget, on budgetary implications, prolonged the duration of the 
negotiations from 1979 until 1985 (See Table 2.2).
There was not any significant internal debate about the EC membership of Spain, 
mainly because the membership was a political return to Europe after a long isolation 
period marking this reintegration as well as strengthening its newly consolidated 
democracy. EC membership even can be regarded as a means of holding together the 
several nations and regions that make up modem Spain through the several regional 
programs adapted via the EC policies. Meanwhile, the classical enlargement process 
would still continue, and the Commission Opinion on Spain was delivered to the Council 
in November 1978 welcoming the Spanish application while pointing out six areas of 
concern in making the necessary adaptations.'^’
2.5.2 Portugal
Unlike the Franco regime in Spain, the Portuguese authoritarian regime had 
closer ties with the western powers during and after World War II. As a consequence, 
Portugal, unlike Spain, was allowed to become a founder member of the UN in 1945,
industry was experiencing a crisis- steel, shipbuilding and ship-repairing, textiles garment manufacture, 
and footwear.”
^^Vreston, 1997 pp. Op. cit. pp. 69-70. These six areas were; for industry, dismantling o f the tariffs, the 
reduction in state aids and the introduction o f  VAT, in agriculture; increase in the Community’s farming 
area by 30 per cent and agricultural working population by 31 per cent causing to further surpluses in 
some products due to the CAP’s price guarantees, in fisheries; the integration o f  the large Spanish fleet 
into the CFP, for the free movement o f labour; the propensity o f  the Spanish labour to emigrate to seek 
employment, for the regional policies in the EC; potential problems due to the regional imbalances in the 
French-Span’ish border as a result o f new sources o f Competition, for the external policy; the potential 
negative consec]uences o f the strong comparative advantage o f Spain in Mediterranean products on the 
other non-EC Mediterranean countries.
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NATO in 1949 and EFTA in 1960.’^ ** Furthermore, when UK joined the EC, the 
Community negotiated a Special Relations Agreement* with EFTA states including 
Portugal in 1972 despite of the fact that Portugal still had an authoritarian regime.
The Salazar regime (1928-1968) and his successor Marcelo Caetano regime 
pursued fascist policies that kept Portugal away from the mainstream political 
developments in Europe during the formation years of the EC. Yet its trade dependence 
on gave Portugal the opportunity to be a member of the EFTA. After the April
1974 coup, often referred as the ‘Red Carnation’ revolution, against the Caetano regime, 
Portuguese politics entered into a period of instability marked by abortive c o u p s . I n  
this period the relations between Portugal and the EC is also significant in terms of 
major international conjuncture, since the powerful Portuguese Communist Party posed 
a threat to the Western Camp with the possibility of restructuring Portugal as a Soviet- 
oriented country.Unti l  1975, Portugal remained as an imperial power with colonies in 
Africa. The loss of the African colonies in 1974-5, at the end of protracted and costly 
colonial wars, had played an important psychological role in reorientating Portugal 
towards E u r o p e . I n  May 1975 the European Council in Dublin called for the 
strengthening of links between the EC and Portugal and, at the Brussels Council meeting 
in July, the EC reaffirmed that it was ‘prepared to initiate discussions on close economic 
and financial co-operation with Portugal’, but reaffirmed that ‘in accordance with its
'^*Bideleux, op. cit. pp. 139-140.
’^^This agreement gave most Portuguese exports unrestricted access to EC markets by 1978 (the
important exceptions being so-called ‘sensitive products’ such as textiles, clothing, footwear, agricultural
products and processed foods), while by 1980, 80 per cent o f  ail imports from the EC and EFTA were
entering Portugal duty-free and tariffs on the remainder were low. See; Loukas Tsoukalis, The New
Fiirnppan Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 54-60, quoted in Bideleux, op. cit. pp.
140-141.
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historical and political traditions, the European Community car. only give support to a 
democracy of a pluralist nature’. T h e r e f o r e  the format application of Portuguese 
Prime Minister Mario Soares on March 1977 marked reinforcement of the still fragile 
transition to parliamentary democracy and the strengthening relations of Portugal with 
the EC states.
The Commission’s Opim'on on the Portuguese application was delivered to the 
Council in May 1978. The Opinion welcomed the application as an important step in 
consolidation of the democracy in Portugal, but stressed on the structural weaknesses of 
the Portuguese economy The Opinion effectively envisaged a ‘partnership’ between the 
EC and Portugal in order to effect economic restructuring. Therefore, the accession 
negotiations were turning into a something of a ‘reconstruction plan for Portugal’. The 
smaller size of Portuguese economy as well as its population and having no large 
exportable farm surpluses nor any major industrial export capabilities could neither 
threaten any EC state nor make burdensome claims on the EC budget or the CAP.
2.5.3 From the application to the membership
The transition of the Mediterranean countries from the peripheral emerging 
democracies into the member states of the EC necessitated a general guideline to shape 
the negotiations and the accession process. In a set of three documents that came to be 
known as the ‘Fresco Papers’, the Commission examined the institutional and
Nicholson and East, op. cit. p. 244 
Preston, 1997, op. cit. pp. 70-71
Bideleux, op. cit. p. 139. For more information on how the enlargements affected the EC/EU 
economics see: Grabbe and Hughes in Redmond and Rosenthal, (eds.), op. cit. pp. 125-154.
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transitional implications of the enlargement and established guidelines for the cohesion 
of an enlarged Community, including the accession of Greece, as well as the economic 
and cultural aspects of this enlargement.'^^ Following this guideline, the long 
negotiations period started and the Iberian enlargement negotiations lasted longer than 
Greece’s that this may be regarded as some sort of transitionary pre-accession period 
even though the idea was rejected when it was set forth by the Commission.'^" Spain 
approached negotiations with a strong belief that it has a self evident right to be treated 
as an equal by the Community. But, the asymmetrical bargaining inherent in the 
classical Community enlargement method was already long established. And had been 
most clearly seen in the British case.'*’^  This led to hard bargains on various issues, 
concerning mainly agricultural products of Spain and the effect of Spanish accession on 
the CAP. This protracted hard bargaining effected the negotiations with Portugal and in 
a sense, it was unfortunate that these negotiations got caught up with the much more 
problematic Spanish ones, postponing a likely early entry of Portugal into the EC.
Furthermore, another important factor for the prolonged phase of accession 
negotiations was that the negotiation phase of the Iberian enlargement coincided with the 
internal debate towards the political and economic and monetary union. During the 
negotiation phase of the Single European Act (SEA), both Spain and Portugal signed 
accession treaties; both countries attended the IGC and other community meetings as 
non-voting participants and fully accepted the evolving acquis communautaire .The 
negotiations ended on 12* June 1985 with the signing of the Treaties of Accession with
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extensive periods of transition, different to two countries,'^' for key economic sectors 
that did not distort the existing Community policies. Completed in 1 January 1986 by the 
accession of Portugal and Spain, this third enlargement relaunched the simultaneous 
process of deepening and widening integration within the Community.
A primary lesson that can be obtained from this third enlargement and its long 
enduring negotiation phase is that the widening and deepening should be balanced 
within each and every single policy area of the EC.‘^  ^A systemic change or adaptation 
seemed to be a necessary movement regarding the procedures of enlargement in order to 
confront later waves of enlargement.
Also it is important to note that although the political considerations shaped the 
member states’ attitude towards the possibility of the Mediterranean enlargement, 
economic differences procrastinated the negotiations and marked them as hard 
bargaining processes. Yet successful negotiations proved to be beneficiary for both the 
Community and the new members, Portugal, Spain and Greece. There has been a 
reorientation of their external trade towards the EC (see Table below), which has also 
incidentally promoted a major leap in Iberian economic integration, allowing Spain to 
take over Britain’s former role as Portugal’s major economic partner.
It should be noted that the dual transition period was used as a means to protect the EC from Spain 
and to protect Portugal from the EC.
Since the enthusiastic endorsements o f the Greek, Spanish, and Portuguese applications were foreign 
policy decisions imposed by the EC’s foreign ministers on a reluctant Commission as David Allen 
indicates in “Wider but Weaker or the More the Merrier? Enlargement and Foreign Policy Cooperation 
in the EC/EU”, in, Redmond and Rosenthal, (eds.), op. cit. p. 112.
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Table 2.3 EC Shares of Greek, Portuguese and Spanish Foreign Trade
1973 1977 1983 1991
Exports (%)
Greece 55 48 39 62
Portugal 49 52 58 75
Spain 48 46 48 71
Imports (%)
Greece 50 43 47 59
Portugal 45 44 40 72
Spain 43 34 32 60
Source: Bideleux, 1996, p. 128.
During the 1960s and 1970s, it was widely assumed, in the ‘dependency’ and 
‘core-periphery’ literature, that the ffee-market forces and capitalist forms of European 
integration would make it easier for the EC’s more developed and centrally located core 
areas to prosper at the expense of Europe’s less developed peripheries. Yet the Spanish 
and Portuguese success in integrating into the EC proved otherwise. EC membership not 
only accelerated economic growth and structural change, but also brought tangible 
welfare gains to most of their inhabitants and ‘progressive’ changes in thinking, 
attitudes, institutions and practices.Although the negotiations of accession were the 
longest and the toughest ones in the EC/EU history, they proved to be successful within 
the context of the Community enlargement method. It is also a fact that the Iberian
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83
enlargement became a major accomplishment in general and constituted an example of 
integration of countries with a lower level of development and with a looser 
infrastructure. Furthermore, the enlargement negotiations managed to be a minor catalyst 
in the elimination of the pessimistic era of Eurosclerosis that marked the slowing down 
the deepening process of the Community in the early 1980s. Therefore, the southern 
enlargement has been followed by a considerable extension of the Community’s policy 
instruments aimed at regenerating the Community as a fresh one with twelve members.
2.6 The Fourth Enlargement
The fourth enlargement of the Community, bringing in Austria, Sweden and 
Finland on 1 January 1995 was also the first enlargement of the EU since it took place 
after the Maastricht Treaty went into force. The EU’s position in the 1990s as the 
embodiment of ‘Europe’ and its rediscovery of its original dynamism after the 
‘Eurosclerosis’ of the early 1980s and the fading away of the other alternative European 
clubs such as EFT A were all reasons that turn the EU into a centre of attraction by the 
start of the 1990s.* ‘^* All of the acceding countries were members of the EFT A. The fact 
that these countries were acceding to a Union rather than a Community, however, did 
not markedly affect the accession negotiations.'^^ The 1995 enlargement, as the fourth 
enlargement may be called the last enlargement that the classical community method, 
whereby new members are simply added on to the existing EU framework of 
institutions, policies and processes, can be applied. Also, in historical terms, it is the 
first of the new, post-Maastricht, enlargements which will make significant changes in
174
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the EU inevitably; it therefore marks the beginning of a crucial phase in the evolution of 
the EU.‘^ ^
As a relatively homogeneous group of small, wealthy, open trading nations with 
long standing traditions of democracy, the EFTA countries were well able to adopt the 
acquis.'^’ However, this did not imply that the course of the negotiations was easy and 
stable. All the EFTA applicants had domestic political and economic concerns which, in 
many situations, inevitably proved to be contradictory with the conditions of the EU 
membership. Since these countries were not a threat to any major interest groups within 
the EC the negotiations has been the quickest negotiations and yet, the most complex to 
date concerning the ever growing acquis. Since the enlargement took place after the 
signing of the TEU, enlargement negotiations included acceptance by the candidate 
countries not only of traditional acquis communautaire but also the extensions provided 
for in the Single European Act (which created the single market) and the Treaty of 
European Union .Al so ,  this enlargement makes it clear that the European Union is 
open to the outside world even after moving towards a closer union by deepening the 
irmer ties and structures.
J. Redmond, The 1995 Enlargement o f  he European Union. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997, p. xii. 
Ibid. p. 175.
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F. Granell, op. cit. p. 118. “This means that new applicants have had to accept the acquis in its 
entirety;
-free circulation o f goods, persons and capital, freedom to provide services and freedom o f  establishment, 
-common Community rules and standards concerning harmonisation, fair competition and monopolies, 
indirect taxation, veterinary and plant health, etc.
-common Community policies, from the Common Agricultural Policy and the Customs Union Policy to 
Development Policy, via Regional Policy etc.;
-Economic and Monetary Union as a further stage o f the European Monetary System;
-the so-called new ‘pillars’ o f  Maastricht:
Common Foreign and Security Policy;
Co-operation in the fields o f  Justice and Home Affairs;
Citizenship o f  the Union.”
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Austria was the first of the ‘fourth wave’ countries to apply to join the EU in 
July 1989, followed by Sweden in June 1991, Finland in March 1992, and Norway in 
November 1992.‘^  ^ Switzerland also applied to join in May 1992 but its application 
became ineffective after the negative outcome of the referendum on the European 
Economic Area (EEA)‘^ ° in December 1992. In order to consider the relations of these 
countries with the EC, there is a need for a brief evaluation of the EFTA***’-EC 
relations.*®^
2.6.1 EFTA-EC Relations and the EEA Negotiations
The initial separation of the two institutions started to diminish when the UK 
and Denmark joined the EC in 1973, and free trade agreements were negotiated 
between the EC and individual EFTA countries also in 1973. Along with their growing 
interest in the internal market of the EC, the EFTA countries sought for deepening their 
relations with the Community. Since the progress of relations was a mutual interest, the 
program for the EEA commenced in April 1984, when the two organisations proclaimed 
their aim to establish a wider free trade zone through closer cooperation with the 
Luxembourg Declaration. Although accepting that a balance of advantages and
Fraser Cameron, op. cit., p. 18.179
The Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA) was signed in Oporto on 2 May 1992 by the 
EC, the then twelve member states, and the seven EFTA states (Austria, Finland, Sweden, Iceland, 
Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland). It came into force on 1 January 1994. The EEA extends the 
internal market o f  the EU- including three new members- to the three remaining EFTA countries except 
Switzerland, creating the world’s largest and most comprehensive multinational trading area. Under the 
EEA free movement o f  goods, persons, services and capital applies across the entire Area. In addition, the 
EEA agreement provides for cooperation in environment, social policy, education and research and 
development and a range o f  other programmes and aaiviiies are carried out in the EU. In return, the 
EFTA countries accepted the Community Legislation covering these areas.
See: http:// www.efta.int/docs/EFTA/GeneralInformation/221b.html.
For a brief account o f  the history o f the EFTA see the first enlargement in this chapter. Also see, Helen 
Wallace, The Wider Western Europe, London: RIIA, 1991, pp. 13-27.
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obligations had to be maintained on both sides in further negotiations, the Commission 
nevertheless confirmed that priority should be given to the Community’s own internal 
integration and that the Community’s decision-making autonomy should be 
preserved. The EEA negotiations contained many problematic issues for both sides 
but especially for the EFTA countries. In January 1989, Jacques Delors, the 
Commission President, proposed an initiative in which ‘ a new, more structured 
partnership with common decision-making and administrative institutions’ (emphasis 
added) to make EC-EFTA activities ‘more effective’ was foreseen.
After a long delay while the EC came to internal consensus over the EEA 
concept, in December 1989 both sides agreed to start formal negotiations. The start of 
the negotiations marked the desire of both the EC and EFTA to explore the possibility 
of a new partnership, though in contrast with full enlargement negotiations, the shape of 
that partnership was not predetermined. The attachment of the EC-EFTA countries in 
a closer perspective through the negotiations necessitated convergence in the individual 
positions of the EFTA countries. With economic considerations, all shared an 
uneasiness of exclusion from the Single European Market while trying to find solutions 
to compromise the EEA agreement with notions of national sovereignty. For Norway, 
Sweden, Finland and Switzerland, the EEA concept began to form a stage where they 
pursue an accession strategy without alarming the domestic political interest groups. For 
the EC the EEA seemed to be a good transitory period to postpone fiuther membership 
applications while completing the internal market and taking political integration one 
stage further with the Maastricht Treaty. Yet the EEA negotiations continued to cause
For a detailed analysis o f the EC-EFTA relations, see, Finn Laursen. “EC-EFTA Relations: A Game 
Theory Perspective”, in Finn Laursen (ed.). The Hague; Klüver Law International, 1995, pp. 179-210.
Preston, 1997, op. cit. p.88.
'*'*F. Laursen, op. cit. pp. 194-197.
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institutional problems. An arrangement within the institutional structures of the EC 
would eventually lead to derogation from the acquis which is unacceptable by the 
Commission as well as the European Court of Justice. In December 1991, the ECJ 
delivered its opinion stating that the powers given to the EEA Court wee incompatible 
with the EC treaties”^  ^ due to differences in the different objectives of he EC and the 
EEA. The judgement can be considered as reassurance of the inviolability of the acquis 
which constituted the most significant aspect of the classical method.
The EEA was eventually signed in 1992. The agreement, entailing the EFTAns 
to accept over 14,000 pages of Community legislation, was not a Customs Union but 
rather an improved free trade area allowing the EFTA countries to participate in the 
single market. Furthermore, it excluded agricultural policy, fisheries, structural policy, 
taxation and foreign policy, although it committed the EFTAns to contribute to the 
Cohesion Fund. However, the EFTA countries realised the shortcomings of the EEA, 
even before the EEA entered into force, notably that it offered no real participation and 
influence on EC decision-making.**^ To sum up, the EEA negotiations and the 
agreement itself were tools for postponing the membership*** used by the EC in order to 
deepen without any interruption form a pressure of widening.
2.6.2 Membership Applications and the Accession Negotiations
After the dissolution of the Eastern bloc in 1989, the EC became the most 
prominent political and economic platform that shaped the European affairs. This fact.
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combined with the ineffectiveness of the EEA negotiations within the overall EC 
decision-making, brought about the prominence of the EC membership.
Austria’s application for membership was followed by applications of Finland, 
Sweden, Switzerland and Norway. Although the economic aspects seem to be handled 
during the EEA negotiations, these applications raised many questions. In John Finder’s 
words:
“There were no doubts about the solidity of their democracies or the 
contribution that their economies could make to the Union and its 
budget. The main concern was, rather, whether they were ready to 
accept some political implications of membership: whether the 
neutral status of all save Norway would inhibit their participation in 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy and, in particular, in ‘the 
eventual framing of common defence policy, which might in time 
lead to a common defence’ (Article J.4(I) TEU); and whether they 
would resist the further sharing of sovereignty implied in the federal 
goal which the majority of member states had wished to affirm in 
the Maastricht Treaty.”
The parameters of the Cold War changed after 1989, therefore neutrality was 
redefined as ‘non-alignment to military organisations’ by the Swedes.’^Swedish leaders 
concluded that neutrality no longer precluded much more extensive collaboration with 
the EC.'^* Finland shared the same approach with Sweden. Only Austria, which applied 
in July 1989, before the fall of the Berlin Wall, had specifically entered a reservation on
192Its neutrality.
J. Finder, 1995, pp. 66-67. 
C. Preston, op. cit. p. 97.
Donald M. Hancock, (et. al.). Politics in Western Europe Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House. 1993. p. 
447.
F. Cameron op. cit. p. 19
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The European Council in Lisbon (June 1992) decided that the official 
negotiations with the EFTA countries wishing to become members of the Union would 
begin immediately following ratification of the TEU and once agreement on the Delors 
II Package had been reached, saying that ‘this enlargement is possible on the basis of he 
institutional provisions contained in the Treaty on the Union and the attached 
declarations (on the number of members of the Commission and the European 
Parliament)’. T h e  Commission was asked to prepare a general negotiating framework 
for the Edinburgh Summit in December 1 9 9 2 . At the Edinburgh Summit, following 
ratification of the Delors II package on the EC budget, the Council agreed that
negotiations’^  ^could start with Austria, Sweden and Finland at the beginning of 1993. 1%
The Commission’s O p i n i o n s o n  the applicant countries identified the areas of 
likely concern in the negotiations. These were mainly the agriculture, fisheries and the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The agriculture was traditionally 
subsidised in Scandinavia to a greater degree in the EC with price supports. The 
Fisheries was the main concern of Norway which affected the 1972 rejection of the EC 
membership by referendum. CFSP could create problems for Sweden, Finland and 
Austria if it were to evolve quickly into a Common Defence Policy.
Negotiations started in February 1993 and the Copenhagen Summit in June set 
the target date for accession as 1 January 1995. The negotiations were made individually *
F. Granell, 1 9 9 5 , p. 118-120.
C. Preston, 1997, op. cit. p. 98.ricsio υμ »-u
For a detailed account o f  the membership negotiations see; Anjariitta Rantanen, “Membership 
Negotiations”, in. Northern Fxposure: Sweden. Finland, and Norway Join The European Union. Master’s 
Thesis,, Bilkent University, 1994, pp. 46-58, and F. Granell, op. cit.
Following the rejection o f the EE A Treaty by the Swiss referendum in December, the Swiss 
aralication effectively lapsed, thou^  it was never formally withdrawn.
* See table 2.2 for the dates o f  the issuing o f the Opinions.
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in accordance with the classical method although their process was parallel. The main 
controversial issues tackled during the negotiations were Customs Union and External 
Relations, Environmental, Health and Safety standards (which are stricter in the 
applicant countries than the EC), Agricultural Policy and Regional Policy, State 
Monopolies- on alcohol in four applicants and tobacco in Austria, Fiscal Policies, 
Fisheries and Budgetary Provisions.
The negotiations ended successfully. The governments of the four applicants 
accepted participation in the CFSP without reserve, as well as all other elements of the 
TEU and of Community law, given some transitional arrangements and provision for 
special aid for less favoured agricultural areas. The institutional question on the future 
of the EU was another problem to be settled although this has never been a problem of 
the accession negotiations but the problem among the Twelve. The UK and Spain 
initially wanted to change the proportion of the weighted votes keeping it at 23 instead 
of raising it to 27 which is the correct mathematical figure after enlargement, in the 
Council of Ministers needed to block EU decisions. This has met the opposition of other 
EU members and the EP. In spite of the pressure put on them, the United Kingdom and 
Spain fearing a dilution of their power in the case of the former and a weakening of the 
Mediterranean front in the case of the latter - publicly resisted the increase of the 
threshold until a final compromise during several Council meetings was only agreed in 
extremis at the meeting held in loannina, Greece, in March 1994.^^
After the compromise in loannina, the EP ratified the draft accession Treaty 
since according to the procedures agreed at Maastricht, the EP had to give assent before
’’’ J. Finder, op. cit. p. 66.
F. Granell, op. cit. p. 133.
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the Council could ratify the Treaty. Therefore, the Treaty of Accession was signed by 
the four applicants at the Corfu Summit on 24-25 June 1994, leaving domestic 
ratification procedures as the only substantive hurdles to be cleared prior to accession.“*^'
The referanda in applicant countries took place consecutively in June in Austria, 
in October in Finland and in November in Sweden. With two-to-one majority, being the 
highest, in Austria followed by Finland (57%) and Sweden (52%), three countries voted 
in favour of the membership. It had always been hoped that the domino effect would 
influence Norwegians to vote in favour of membership. Yet, contrary to hopeful 
expectations, once again, the Norwegians voted against the membership uath a slight 
majority.
The 1995 enlargement constitutes a positive contribution to Community 
integration indicating that widening and deepening are not mutually exclusive options, 
but compatible processes within the framework of this enlargement. It has been the 
quickest in terms of the duration of the enlargement and to many observers the last 
enlargement to use the classical Community method.
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CHAPTER 3
PROSPECTIVE ENLARGEMENTS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF 
THE CHANGING FACET OF THE EU IN THE 1990S
As described before, the European Union increased its membership number to 
fifteen along with the accession of the three EFTAn states. Yet, the real challenge was the 
inclusion of the Central and East European states which by 1989 turned their policies 
towards cooperation with the EC. The EU has a vocation to welcome any European state 
that wishes to join. But the historic challenge of bringing Europe together again after the 
fall of the iron curtain has given a particular impetus to current enlargement.' The task of 
enlargement now incorporated more than ten countries including the Mediterranean states 
of Cyprus and Malta as well as the CEECs and moreover the institutional challenges of 
the confirmed political integration accompanied this intricate task. The first great 
challenge was faced during the German Um'fication on 3 October 1990.
3.1 German Reunification
The unification may well be considered as an enlargement process since it 
increased the population and the territoiy of the EC. The German Democratic Republic 
(GDR) opened negotiations with the EC in 1989 but these were overtaken by umfication
' European Commission, Background Briefing N o.25. 11/1998.
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and, hence, in effect, full integration.^ Of course, this is not an enlargement in the 
‘classical’ terms basing on a certain procedure and a process of accession negotiations yet 
it is obvious that it is a de facto enlargement which had financial, economic and 
institutional impacts on the Community as a whole. As an example to this impact was 
‘Germany’s high interest rates maintained as a consequence of German reunification 
affected the Community economy as an important factor leading to recession and unstable 
currency market (in 1992-93)’.^  Another impact of the reunification on the EU was the 
growing support of Germany to the idea of a political union in the EC ‘as a means to 
demonstrate its commitment to Western Europe’“*. It resulted with an increase of eighteen 
members in the number of German Parliamentarians in the European Parliament^ and 
other slight changes were made in the Commission as well. The breakdown of the non­
competitive industry of the former East German economy was, and still is, compensated 
by the national solidarity but has affected the Union’s economy as well as the distribution 
of the regional funds in general. Also this de facto enlargement reshaped the balance of 
power in the Community in favour of Germany.
Although the integration process of the Eastern states of the Federal Republic of 
Germany into the EC had many difficulties, it was relatively easy in many terms, giving 
hope to the Central and Eastern European States in their endeavour to ‘return to Europe’. 
Therefore the CEECs, one by one, started to pursue integration policies with the EU
 ^Christopher Preston, 1997, op. cit. p. 196.
 ^Alison Watson, “A Two-Speed Europe”, in. The State o f  the European Union Vol.4 Deepening and 
Widening- Laurent and Maresceau, (eds.), Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998, p.279.
G. Aybet, op. cit. p. 172. For a brief outline o f  the effect o f  the German Unification on the EC and European 
Integration, see, Gulnur Aybet, op. cit. pp. 169-174.
 ^Karlheinz Neunreither, “The European Parliament and Enlargement, 1973-2000”, in, Redmond and 
Rosenthal, (eds.), op. cit. pp. 73-74.
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starting  w ith  th e  ear ly  1990s.
3.2 The Central and East European Countries
After the demise of the Communist rule, the Central and East European countries 
oriented their policies towards a Europe becoming ‘one’ again and therefore announced 
their determination to ‘return to Europe’^  meaning all aspects of the West European 
integration such as the EU, the WEU and NATO. At the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Summit in November 1990, a Charter o f Paris for a New 
Europe^ was unanimously adopted delineating a Europe without synthetic fissures over 
ideological fault-lines, in which democratic government, market economies and respect 
for human rights would prevail. The revolutions in Central and Eastern European 
countries are accompanied with increasing pressures on the EU to work out a new 
political, economic and security order within a continent-wide framework which 
encompasses the changes in relations with the newly emerging democracies of the East. 
The Eastern countries pursue not only economic, but also political and security 
guarantees. Therefore the nature and the dimension of a prospective enlargement is likely 
to be much more different than the previously used ‘Classical Community Method’* ,
* Adrian Hyde-Price, The International Politics o f  East Central Europe. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1996, p.3.
 ^The Charter is significant for two reasons; it is widely regarded as ending the Cold War and it fonnalised the 
conversion o f  CSCE into a permanent intergovernmental organisation. For a brief information on the Charter 
and the CSCE see; G. Evans, J. Newnham, Dictionary o f  International Relations. London; Penguin Books, 
1998, pp.62-63 and pp. 108-110.
* The Classical Community Method focuses exclusively on the applicant’s acceptance o f  the acquis 
communautaire, and negotiations solely focus on the length and the nature o f  the transition periods in 
different policy areas.
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analysed in detail by Christopher Preston.^ In Bonvicmi’s words;
“[enlargement] calls for a new concept of the policy of widening which has 
to date served simplistic and pragmatic ends. From now on, it will assume a 
strategic character, as general political and security (as well as militaiy) 
considerations can no longer be overlooked. This means that a purely 
mechanical adaptation of the present institutional procedures... will not be 
sufficient to match the general political interests of the Union... There is 
therefore a need for new radical institutional changes.”
The EU has abundant experience of enlargement and therefore the process of 
enlarging the EU eastwards is a normal and acceptable incident within the Union although 
an unprecedented one. However, the main question as to whether the EU can deduce from 
its past experiences other facts than the observation that incorporating new entrants is a 
difficult task is at stake for the prospective enlargements. There is clearly a debate about 
the value of the experience of previous enlargements -  more specifically, the 
characterisation of the enlargement process as the traditional, ‘classical’ method is likely 
to be appropriate - and thus past experience is a helpful guide -  or whether enlargement 
post-1989 is better described as ‘adaptive’, with the implication that much of the future 
enlargement process will involve much more adjustment of the EU itself (and its
institutions) than in the past. II
It is obvious that the next round of enlargement of the EU will be much more 
different than the past experiences quantitatively as well as qualitatively. As the European
 ^Christopher Preston “Obstacles to EU Enlargement: The Classical Community Method and the Prospects o f  
a Wider Europe”, Journal o f  Common Market Studies. Vol. 33 (3), 1995, pp.451-463.
Gianni Bonvicini. “Political European Integration: Integration Requisites”, in. The Impact o f  the European 
Integration- Political. So<4olopical. and Economic Changes, George A. Kourvetaris, Andreas Moschonas, 
(eds,), Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1996, pp. 271-86.
”  J. Redmond, 1999, p.56.
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Commission proposed in its report, ‘Agenda 2000; for a Stronger and Wider Europe’’^  
and as agreed in the Luxembourg European Council*^, the first wave of enlargement 
should involve the same number*“* as the EU accepted in its first three decades. 
Furthermore, in a following wave, this amount is rising up to seven states- Slovakia, 
Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta (reactivated its application in 1998) and 
Turkey (as foreseen in the Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions)'^. Almost 
doubling the number of the current states and more than quadrupling the number of the 
original members, a Union of twenty-eight states is at prospect. There is also a qualitative 
difference that almost all of the applicants are much poorer and most of them have little 
experience of parliamentary democracy and operating a market economy. Therefore not 
only the new members but the EU itself has to adapt and adjust, especially its institutional 
structure what might be regarded as the extended form of the original structure established 
by the Treaty of Rome.
Of course, the adjustment and transformation process has to be mutual, therefore 
placing a greater magnitude of the tasks over the Central and East European Countries in 
order to attain their historic goals. Hence, the countries of the region, in order to pursue 
regional policies towards a common end, developed new structures of multilateral 
cooperation such as the Alpe Adria Working Community, the Central European Initiative
'^Cpmmission o f  the European Communities (CEC), Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union. 
Luxembourg: OOPEC, 1997.
'^According to the Luxembourg Presidency Council Conclusions on 12-13 December 1997 The European 
Council has decided to convene bilateral intergovernmental conferences in the spring o f  1998 to begin 
negotiations with Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia on the conditions for 
their entry into the Union and the ensuing Treaty adjustments. These negotiations will be based on the general 
negotiating framework acknowledged by the Council on 8 December 1997.
See: http://europa.eu.int/council/oflB'conclu/dec97.htm.
‘Six’ states being Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia and Cyprus.
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and the Council of Baltic Sea States, Carpathian Euroregion (followed by other 
Euroregions) and the Visegrad G r o u p . A s  an indicator for their aspiration towards a 
‘united’ Europe through the usage of these multilateral instruments, a worthy example is 
as follows;
“It is the conviction of the signatory states that their cooperation, in view 
of the political, economic and social challenges facing them and in view of 
the political, economic, and social challenges facing them and in view of 
their efforts for renewal on a democratic basis, is an important step 
towards the integration of the whole of Europe.” (Visegrad’’Summit, 
Declaration ... on the Road to European Integration, 15 Februaiy 1991)’*
Another fact that is significant for this rather quick initiation of the re-establishment 
of political and economic relations can be considered as the strong German support for the 
process of reformation in Central and Eastern Europe. Financial and political assistance of 
Germany to the areas is regarded as the new German Ostpolitik by some observers.'^ 
Germany, for moral and security reasons, believes that the EU must be enlarged to the 
east, and naturally it is geographically, economically, and financially the country most 
responsible. In fact EU enlargement eastward is Germany’s major foreign policy task in 
the coming period.’” In the words of Helmut Kohl;
Refer to paragraphs 4 and 12 in the conclusions (See Appendix A).
For a detailed analysis o f these tools and agencies o f  multilateral cooperation see: Emil J. Kirchner, “The 
Development and Importance o f Inter-regional Co-operation in Central European States”, in. Changing 
Borders: Legal and Economic Aspects o f  European Enlargement Kicker Marko, Steiner, (eds.) Frankfurt am 
Main: Peter Lang Publications, 1998, pp. 107-122, and Adrian Hyde-Price, op. cit. pp. 108-137.
A historic town in Hungary which gave its name to the cooperation efforts o f  Czechoslovakia, Poland and 
Hungary on politics and foreign policy issues, later led to signing o f  an agreement creating the Central 
European Free Trade Area (CEFTA).
Cited in A. Hyde-Price op. cit. p.l08.
’’ For an account o f  the Ostpolitik phenomenon see: Mahmut Şener. German Ostpolitik Before and After 
Unification: Continuity and Change, unpublished Master’s Thesis presented to Bilkent University, 1994. 
Ronald Tiersky, “France, the CFSP, and NATO”, in, Laurent and Maresceau, (eds.), op. cit. p. 184.
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“The Baltic Sea is just as much a European one as the Mediterranean. It is 
quite simply intolerable for us (the EU) to adopt the attitude that we want 
to create some sort of closed shop.”^‘
Even if no enlargement occurs in the near future, there is a certain fact that the 
different parts of Europe are now interdependent, with or without sharing membership in 
the European Union, and this is clearest in the richest and most powerful country in 
Central and Eastern Europe and the EU, the Federal Republic of Germany.^* Therefore as 
the strongest political entity in the Community affairs regarding its demographic and 
economic strength, Germany plays the leading role in the Community’s eastward 
enlargement that would enhance its sphere of influence within a single institutional 
framework.
The EC also realised the significance of these developments and considered 
enlarging eastwards as one of the most important opportunities for the Community as it 
prepares for a deepening of its integration. It is a unique, historic task to further the 
integration of the continent by peaceful means, extending a zone of stability and 
prosperity to new members. Soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the European 
Community quickly established diplomatic relations with the countries of central Europe 
with the discourse of overcoming the synthetic division of Europe. The EC realised that 
the transformation process in the Central and East Europe affected the limits of the 
Community’s internal relations rather than constituting an element of a wider foreign 
affairs. As emphasised in the Dublin European Council Presidency Conclusions, EC’s
Quoted in Richard Rose, Christian Haerpfer, “Democracy and Enlarging the EU Eastwards”, Journal o f  
Common Market Studies. Vol: 33 (3), 1995, p. 428.
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driving idea in elucidating this process should be ‘restoring unity of the continent, whose 
peoples share a common heritage and culture’.^ ^
Already before the popular revolutions had been concluded, the EC had offered 
trade agreements to the front-runners of the democratic movement, Poland and Hungary."“* 
It removed long-standing import quotas on a number of products, extended the 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) and, over the next few years, concluded Trade 
and Cooperation Agreements with Bulgaria, the former Czechoslovakia, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovenia.
3.2.1 Development of Strategies of Pre-accession
In the first years after the 1989 enthusiasm of the ‘Cold War Victory’ replaced 
itself with the reluctance of member states towards eastward enlargement even in 
principle.^^ The EU has since developed a series of institutional structures and policy 
approaches which together represent a significant commitment to enlargement, but the 
likely timing and the extent of the process remained unclear.
Ibid, p.448
European Council, “Conclusions o f  the Presidency, 25-26 June, Dublin”,in, Bulletin o f  the EC. Vol.2 (6), 
1990, pp.7-24.
Llykke Friis, Anna Murphy, “The European Union and Central and East Europe: Governance and 
Boundaries”, in Journal o f  Common Market Studies. Vol.37 (2), 1999, pp. 211-32. See, p.218.
For a discussion o f  this transitionary period see: Bideleux, R. Bringing the East back In, in European 
Integration and Disintegration, (eds.) Bideleux, R. and Taylor, R., Routledge, London, 1996. pp. 225-251. 
Heather Grabbe, Kirsty Hughes. Enlarging the EU Eastwards. London: Royal Institute o f International
Affairs, 1998. p. 29.
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The Copenhagen European Council in June 1993 was a turning point for the 
European Union’s ambiguity towards the accession of the CEECs into the Union. Acting 
on the Commission’s Report, ‘Towards a Closer Association with the Countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe’, the Council set down the basis for developing future relations.The 
member states of the EU agreed that the CEECs that desired to become a member should 
become members of the European Union. These countries are now regarded as fiilly- 
fledged partners within the restructuring process of a new European order and in the 
definition of the EU’s role within this order.
Therefore, enlargement was not any longer a questioned fact but rather the 
question became the timing of the enlargement. The Copenhagen European Council 
provided a general starting point by concluding that ‘accession will take place as soon as 
an applicant is able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic 
and political conditions required’. At the same time, the Member States designed the 
membership criteria, which are often referred to as the Copenhagen Criteria. As stated in 
the Presidency Conclusions, the Copenhagen Criteria is as follows;
‘Membership requires that the country; has achieved stability of institutions, 
guaranteed democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities, (political criterion)
-the existence of fimctioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope 
with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union, (economic 
criterion)
-(has) the ability to take on obligations of membership including adherence 
to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.’ (criterion concerning 
the adoption of the acquis)
27 C. Preston, 1997, op. cit. p.201.
Copenhagen European Council Presidency Conclusions quoted at: 
http.V/europa. eu. int/comm/enlargement/intro/criteria.htm
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Also it requires the country; has created: tiie conditions for its integration 
through the adjustment of its administrative structures, so that European 
Community legislation transposed into national legislation is implemented 
effectively through appropriate administrative and judicial structures.
Obviously, the Copenhagen European Council Decisions has been a landmark in 
the enlargement process by outlining the goals to be reached for the countries going 
through a period of metamorphosis. Yet, the criteria lacked the strategy and the tools to 
make this transitional stage operational despite the fact that it set clear targets for the 
CEECs.
At the Essen European Council in December 1994, a pre-accession strategy was 
agreed by the member states. This Essen package has been called a ‘route plan for the 
associated countries as they prepare for accession’ and constitutes what amounts to an 
ambitious pre-accession transitional period.
Co-operation across borderlines is the key to Europe’s integration and 
maintenance of peace and security^' and therefore seen as an immediate need for Europe. 
Yet, the prospects for widening could slow down the deepening process therefore a 
delicate balance was necessary in order to incorporate countries in transition into the EU. 
The pre-accession strategy has been a matter of debate for being developed relatively 
slow, for focusing on criteria for the associated countries rather than the fundamental
29
30
Ibid.
John Redmond, Glenda Rosenthal, “Inroduction”, in, Redmond, Rosenthal, (eds.), op. cit. p. 10.
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changes in the structure of the EU to cope with enlargement, and for not setting out a 
definite time-table encompassing incremental steps towards membership.
Yet, in setting conditions for membership, the EU has to find a balance between 
giving support to reforming governments while not devaluing the status of EU 
membership by admitting countries that fail to meet its standards.^“ The four main 
elements of the pre-accession strategy until the publication of Agenda 2000 were the 
Europe Agreements, the Single Market White Paper, the PHARE Programme and the 
Structured Dialogue.”
3.2.1.1 PHARE Programme
In the meantime, the European Community's PHARE Programme, created in 1989, 
set out to provide financial support for the countries' efforts to reform and rebuild their 
economies. It is designed to support economic restructuring (especially in priority sectors 
such as agriculture, industry and financial services), to encourage the creation of a market 
economy and private enterprise, especially small and medium-size enterprises, undertake 
comprehensive projects, transfer know-how, and to provide technical assistance. Of 
course particular note is the assistance being given to CEEC officials to adopt the acquis
Reinhard Rack, Judith Schwarzbauer, “Between East and West; The Pre-Accession Strategy in the Heart o f  
Europe”, in. Kicker, Marko, Steiner (eds.). Changing Borders: Legal and Economic Aspects o f European 
Enlargement. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Publications, 1998, pp. 123-145.
H. Grabbe, K. Hughes, op.cit, p. 40.
^^Ibid. p.31.
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communautaire.^“* PHARE"^ soon became the world's largest assistance programme in 
central Europe, providing technical expertise and investment support.Moreover, in July 
1992 the European Commission, following an initiative taken by the European 
Parliament, launched a pilot project called the PHARE Democracy Programme, designed 
to support non-partisan, cross-party projects aimed at facilitating the consolidation of 
stable parliamentary systems and pluralist civil societies.
Therefore the PHARE Programme has become the most important instrument of 
the pre-accession strategy at the operational level. Within seven years launched with two 
countries at focus, the programme increased its partner to 13 East and Central European 
countries of which ten of them are now candidates. The restructuring of the PHARE was 
facilitated with Agenda 2000 and for the ten candidate countries that have applied to 
become members of the EU, the aim is to help them prepare to join as quickly as possible. 
In the three non-candidate countries^*, PHARE is continuing to support their transition to 
democracy and a market economy as the main tool of the pre-accession strategy rather 
than being an emergency measure for the transition countries.
Nicholas Hopkinson, The Eastern Enlargement o f  the European Union. Wilton Park Paper: 91, London: 
HMSO, 1995a, pp. 33-34.
^^HARE is the acronym o f  the Programme’s original name: ‘Poland and Hungary: Action for the 
Restructuring o f  the Economy’.
^  From the European Union web site see: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/coop_access.htm 
A. Hyde-Price, op. cit. p. 199.
The three non-candidate partner countries within the PHARE programme are Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and the Former Yugoslavian Republic o f  Macedonia. Yugoslavian partnership was suspended 
in 1991 and since then it is not a partner.
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Following the Strasbourg summit in December 1989, the debate on EC-East 
European relations turned to the replacement of the ‘first generation’ and the more limited 
series of treaties of trade and economic cooperation agreements with the Association 
Agreements.In August 1990 the Commission proposed to the Council that the ‘second 
generation’ association agreements should be negotiated with Czechoslovakia, Hungary 
and Poland, and eventually with other countries. These agreements later called the 
‘Europe Agreements’ went beyond the scope of traditional association agreements in 
making provision for political and cultural dialogue besides economic aid and trade. They 
introduced an element of economic and political conditionality by linking implementation 
to the actual accomplishment of political, economic and legal reforms in the partner 
coun t ry .The  Europe Agreements were signed with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and 
Poland on 16 December 1991.“*' Due to the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federal 
Republic (CSFR), the agreement with that country was not ratified. It was renegotiated 
with the two new independent entities -  the Czech Republic and Slovakia - and two 
separate but almost identical agreements were signed on 4 October 1993. It was also the 
same year that Europe Agreements with Bulgaria and Romania were signed. Similar
3.2.1.2 The Europe Agreements
These would be based on Article 238 o f  the Treaty o f  Rome, and would include institutionalised political 
dialogue and regular consultations as well as more substantial forms o f economic, industrial and commercial 
cooperation. Their main objective was trade liberalisation, which was to be followed later by measures 
facilitating the free movement o f  people, services and capital. However, they would not automatically lead to 
full membership o f  the EC.
C. Preston, 1997, op. cit. p.l98.
They came into force by 1 February 1994 for Poland and Hungary and 1 February 1995 for Slovakia and 
Czech Republic (along with later negotiated agreements with Bulgaria and Romania). For the content and 
limitations o f  the agreements see; C. Preston, op. cit. pp. 198-202.
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arrangements furthermore agreed upon with Baltic States^“ in June 1995 followed by the 
last in the series of Europe Agreements is that of Slovenia in June 1996.'’^
The Agreements’ declared aim was; to improve market opportunities in the EU; to 
create a preferential system of trad; and to prepare the associated countries for an eventual 
EU Membership.'*^ After much initial resistance from some EC members, the Europe 
Agreements contain a reference to the possibility of eventual membership. These 
Agreements did not promise full membership, nor did they rule it out: rather, they 
shrouded this crucial question in ambiguity and left it open.“*^ Each Europe Agreement 
also creates a Council of Association that establishes within its own authority the rules of 
procedure regulating its activity, and has binding decision-making power in cases 
determined by the Treaties. The bilateral Councils are chaired alternately by the 
associated states concerned and the EU.“*^ The Europe Agreements proved to be successful 
in promoting trade and providing a stable framework, yet did not satisfy the CEECs in 
terms of meeting their demands for a concrete and a guiding documentation of their path 
leading towards full integration through membership.
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania
Marc Maresceau, “On Association, Partnership, Pre-accession and Accession”, in, Marc Maresceau, (ed.), 
Enlarging the European Union: Relations between the EU and Central and Eastern Europe. New York; 
Addison Wesley Longman, 1997, pp.3-22.
Anna Michalski, Helen Wallace. The European Community: The Challenge o f  Enlargement. London; 
Royal Institute o f  International Affairs, 1992, pp. 113-114.
Adrian Hyde-Price, op. cit. pp. 199-200.
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3.2.1.3 The Single Market White Paper47
The Single Market White Paper that is prepared by the Commission and then 
concluded by the Cannes European Council in June 1995, intended to set out the key 
legislation governing trade in goods and services in the EU with regard to the internal 
market adaptation process of the partner countries. The White Paper provided both a 
conceptual framework for the definition and delineation of the internal acquis and a 
detailed list of all the relevant legislation and policies in different sectors.“** The aim of the 
White Pape/^, therefore, is alignment with the internal market rather than accession 
which will involve acceptance of the whole acquis communautaire. It is a part of the pre­
accession strategy and identifies the key measures in each sector of the internal market 
and suggests an arrangement in which the legislation of the associate and partner countries 
is approximated to the legislation of the EU in relevant issues of internal market. In 
sequence the restructuring of the industry, trade and commerce in the CEECs as well as 
the economic reforms would be reinforced through the alignment with the internal market 
which is guided by the White Paper. In order to generate such a framework, the White 
Paper outlines the steps to be taken by the Commission, the associated countries and the 
member states. The White Paper stated ‘an internal market without frontiers relies on a 
high level of mutual confidence and an equivalence of regulatory approach. Any
^  N. Hopkinson, 1995a, op. cit. pp. 2-5.
The full name o f  the White Paper is “Preparation o f  the Associated Countries o f  Central and Eastern 
Europe for Integration into the Internal Market o f  the Union”. See; European Commission, COM (95) 163 
final, 3 May 1995 and its Annex issued one week later COM(95) 163 final/2, 10 May 1995. Together they 
form almost 500 pages o f  guidelines.
C. Preston, 1997, op. cit. p.202.
For a detailed analysis and a critique and the contents o f  the Single Market White Paper see; Marc-Andre 
Gaudissart,, Adinda Sinnaeve, “The Role o f the White Paper in the Preparation o f  the Eastern Enlargement”, 
in Marescaeu, 1997, op. cit. pp.41-71.
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substantial failure to apply the common rules in any part of the internal market puts the 
rest of the system at risk and undermine its integrity.
The legal nature of the White Paper is that of a purely unilateral act on the side of 
the Union, without any contractual commitment to accept an associated state as a member 
if the approximation measures are taken.^' Although lacking definite timetable for the 
accession negotiations to begin, the White Paper is regarded as key milestone in the pre­
accession phase in which the candidates can develop own effective autonomous plans^  ^
for integration whereas the EU can draw an assistance plan. Despite the fact that the 
White Paper is not a legally binding instrument, the significance of the White Paper is that 
it creates much more coherence to the pre-accession phase than before.
Also, the White Paper marked the willingness of the Commission for the 
continuous and growing assistance to the CEECs in the pre-accession phase and in the 
whole process of enlargement. It opened up the way to institutionalise the whole process 
of pre-accession as well as enlargement and accordingly, institutions were built allowing 
enhancement of the cooperation between the EU and the CEECs. As an example to such 
institutions. Technical Assistance Information Exchange Office (TAJEX) began 
operations in January 1996, originally with the aim of providing support in translating the 
acquis and in improving the translation and interpretation capacity of the partner
Quoted in, Nicholas Hopkinson,, The Southern and Eastern Enlargements o f  the European Union, Wilton 
Park Paper 102, London: HMSO, 1995b, p. 26.
Peter-Christian Miiller-Graff “Legal Framework for Relations between the European Union and Central 
and Eastern Europe; General Aspects”, in, Maresceau, 1997, op. cit pp.27-40. See: p.33.
The autonomy was seen necessary by the Commission since all o f  the CEECs have progressed differently. 
While at the time o f  the issuance o f the White Paper, some countries had a long history o f o f approximation
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countries/^ As a result the White Paper proved to be useful for stimulating and igniting 
the approximation process and the deepening of the continental cooperation centring the 
EU internal market as a pivotal starting point.
3.2.1.4 The Structured Dialogue
The structured dialogue was agreed at the Copenhagen European Council 1993. It 
provided for a multilateral framework of regular meetings between the institutions of the 
European Union and the associated countries. At the Essen European Council in 
December 1994, it was agreed to convene regularly at the ministerial level in order to 
exchange views on relevant issues that concern the member states as well as the partner 
states.
The structured dialogue made the discussion of issues of transcontinental concern 
possible. These issues ranged from cooperation in the fields of energy, environment, 
transport, and science and technology through to Justice and Home affairs and the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy '^ .^ These structured relations allow the associated 
CEECs to become progressively involved in the various EU activities and to get
task, some countries had just started this process. Therefore a uniform harmonization plan would prove to be 
discouraging to many countries if  it included certain dates to conclude approximation.
”  Along with the ever-growing significance o f  the implementation o f  the acquis in the candidate countries, 
the role o f  TAIEX has been enlarged much more. TAIEX now aims to provide information and expertise on 
the entire acquis (except in the field o f  justice and home affairs), in particular on the environment and 
transport, and on potential sources o f expertise. Thus, TAIEX is providing experts for targeted training and 
skills transfer, for example through workshops and seminars on the implementation o f  the acquis. For more 
information on TAJEX see: http://europa.eu. int/comm/enlargement/pas/phare/pt/taiex.htm.
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acquainted with them. Of course, from a legal point of view these ‘joint’ meetings have no 
legislative capacity -  they can not replace the formal EU institutions in the decision­
making process -  but they nevertheless have a great symbolic and above all psychological 
significance -  and a ‘classic’ European Council is almost always followed by a 
photograph of an ‘enlarged’ meeting at the end of the proceedings.^^ Lacking a decision­
making organ, the Structured Relationship only served as multilateral forum that brought 
together the policy-makers with an attempt to exchange views. But the importance of the 
structured dialogue was that it covered the all policy areas of the EU rather than focusing 
solely on economic and financial issues.
After the issuance of Agenda 2000 the structured dialogue left its place to the 
bilateral relations since it did not meet the needs of the enhanced agenda of the 
enlargement process. The new pre-accession strategy involved accession partnership that 
formulates the coverage of the acquis within bilateral frameworks with each of the 
candidate countries.
3.2.2 Moving Towards an Enlargement Strategy
The Madrid European Council of December 1995 confirmed and refined the 
guidelines adopted at the Copenhagen European Council and exposed its wish to start
For an account o f  the CFSP issues within the structured relations, see: Pal Dunay, “The Integration o f  
Central and Eastern Europe into the Common Foreign and Security Policy o f  the Europe Fifteen”, in 
Marescaeau, 1997, op. cit. pp. 322-335.
Marc Maresceau, 1997, op. cit. p.lO.
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negotiations after the completion of the Intergovernmental Conference. In its report to the 
European Council, the Commission stressed the potential benefits of enlargement for 
peace and security and economic growth and development throughout Europe but noted 
that the prerequisite for accession was adoption of the Community acquis as at the date of 
accession although transitional measures could be required in certain sectors such as 
agriculture and free movement of persons. Any transitional period would have to be 
limited both in scope and duration.^^
Therefore a new phase started in the relations of the EU and the CEECs with the 
aim to launch accession negotiations towards full membership. As the preparations for 
accession are gathering speed and the effects of the pre-accession strategy can be felt 
throughout Europe, the CEECs are looking ahead trying to assess their chances to join the 
EU.^  ^ Most of the Associated countries of the EU started to submit their accession 
applications to the Union in the light of these developments. (See Table below)
See, “Annex 6; Enlargement, Relations with the Associated CEE Countries in the Second Half o f  1995”, to 
the Madrid European Council Presidency Conclusions. See: http;//europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/dec95.
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Table 3.1 Associated countries and the European Union
Bulgaria
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Estonia
Country Association 
Agreement 
signed on
01-03-1993
19-12-1972
06-10-1993
dungary
-atvia
-ithuania
Malta 05-12-1970
Poland
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
urkey
12-06-1995 24-11-1995
16-12-1991 31-03-1994
12-06-1995
12-06-1995
16-12-1991
08-02-1993
06-10-1993
10-06-1996
2-09-1963
Accession 
application 
submitted on
14-12-1995
03-07-1990 31-03-1998
17-01-1996 31-03-1998
31-03-1998
31-03-1998
13-10-1995
08-12-1995
03-07-1990
05-04-1994
22-06-1995
27-06-1995
0-06-1996
4-04-1987
Accession 
negotiations 
started on
15-02-2000
15-02-2000
5-02-2000
5-02-2000
31-03-1998
5-02-2000
5-02-2000
1-03-1998
Source; http;//europa.eu.int/comm/enIargement.
2.3.2.I. Rising to the Top of the Agenda
The Florence European Council of 21-22 June 1996 adopted a detailed timetable 
for negotiations with the CEECs. Noting the conclusions of the Madrid Council it restated 
the need for the Commission’s Opinions and reports on each of the applicant countries to 
be made available as soon as the IGC had been completed so that the initial phase of 
negotiations with the Central and Eastern European countries could coincide with the start 
of negotiations with Cyprus and Malta which were foreseen to be started six months after
” R. Rack, J. Schwarzbauer, op. cit. p.l41.
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the completion of the IGC. 58
The Treaty of Amsterdam^^ signed at the Amsterdam European Council in June 
1997 marked the successful conclusion of the Intergovernmental Conference and opened 
the way for launching the enlargement process and accession negotiations. It instructed 
the General Affairs Council to examine in depth the Commission’s opinions, which would 
be ready in July 1997 and to present a detailed, report to the Luxembourg European 
Council in December that year. Although the Treaty of Amsterdam made significant 
advances on social and employment issues, it could not handle the institutional reform to 
cope with the expected enlargement of the EU with the same success. A further IGC 
would be required to reform the institutional system and design it for the governance of a 
structure with twenty or more members as it was the case in the 1999 Helsinki European 
Council.
The need for enlargement and the institutional reforms to tackle this enlargement 
became the major task of the EU by the end of the 1990s. In a speech in 1997, the Finnish 
Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen stated that:
“The decisions of Amsterdam enable us to start the enlargement process, but 
further reforms are needed to guarantee the proper functioning of the Union’s 
institutions... We are prepared to find lasting solutions to the weighting of 
votes in the council. We want to see a strong Commission, with 
Commissioners chosen from each Member State. This is particularly
Florence European Council Presidency Conclusions, 21 and 22 June 1996 see:
http://europe.eu.int/coouncil/ofi7conclu/june96.
For a detailed account o f  the Treaty o f  Amsterdam, see: Andrew Moravscik, Kalypso Nicolaidis, 
“Explaining the Treaty o f  Amsterdam: Interests, Influence, Institutions”, Journal o f  Common Market Studies. 
Vol. 37, (1), 1999, pp.59-85.
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important in order to ensure the influence of a small Member State and the 
legitimacy of the Union in the eyes of the ordinary citizen... Institutional 
problems should not, however, become an obstacle to enlargement. 
Enlargement of the European Union presents us with a historic opportunity... 
Enlargement is a process which can not be concluded in a short time span. It 
involves huge challenges both for the Union and the applicant states.”^
3.2.2.2. Agenda 2000
Therefore, the EU opened the way for the accession while aware of the institutional 
problems that might well hinder the further implementation of this process. The publishing 
of Agenda 2000^’' marked the Commission’s will to take the pivotal role in preparing the 
EU and the candidate countries towards adhesion. Published on July 16, 1997, Agenda 
2000 comprised a single framework in which the Commission outlines the broad 
perspective for the development of the EU and its policies beyond the turn of the century. It 
also addresses the challenge of enlargement. It draws the main conclusions and 
recommendations from the individual opinions on the applicant countries and gives the 
Commission’s views on the launching of the accession process and on reinforcement of the 
pre-accession strategy. It also points out the impact of enlargement on the EU as a whole. 
The Report also depicts the future financial finamework beyond 2000^  ^(2000-2006), taking 
into account the prospect of an enlarged Union. *
“Speech by Paavo Lipponen at the Helsingin Sanomat Europe Seminar”, Helsinki, 9 October 1997. See: 
http://www.vn.fi/vn/english/vn 1 e.htm.
** Agenda 2000 might be viewed at, http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/Agenda2000 or see: European 
Commission Press Release, IP/97/660, Strasbourg, Brussels: European Commission, 16 July 1997.
This financial framework ,established for supporting the pre-accession process in the applicant countries, 
provides 21 billion Euros worth o f financial aid which will take three forms for the CEECs between 2000- 
2006. These three forms are the Phare programme- institution building and investment financing, aid for
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According to the Opinions that are based on the Copenhagen accession criteria, the 
situation of the countries which were not included in the first wave of enlargement would 
be reviewed annually. The political criterion that comprises respect for democracy and 
human rights appears to have been met by all countries except Slovakia where, according to 
the Commission, the democratic principles and the application of the rule of law is not 
adequately entrenched in political life and there is insufficient protection of minorities. The 
economic criterion has been the key factor in determimng the first wave of the five Central 
and East European countries. The five countries chosen are considered to have viable 
market economies that can operate in a competitive environment and Slovakia is veiy close 
to this goal. Concerning the second requirement of the economic criterion, capacity to cope 
with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union, Slovenia and the Czech 
Republic are assessed to have made the highest progress along with Hungary and Poland 
following them with continuous restructuring. Estonia appears to proceed these four 
countries detaching from the other Baltic States in the enlargement process. In the Opinions 
on each country, the third criterion, ability to adopt the acquis communautaire, emphasises 
the major differences between the applicant CEECs. Bulgaria and Romania were 
considered to be unable to take on the obligations of membership in the medium term 
whereas Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia were thought to be able to take 
on the main part of the Community acquis in the medium term provided that progress was 
made in specific sectors. The three Baltic States and Slovenia were unlikely to be able to
agricultural development, and structural aid to be used to help CEECs comply with Community infrastructure 
standards in the transport and environmental sectors.
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adopt the body of the Community acquis in the medium term unless they made substantial 
efforts.
Accordingly with the Opinions, each applicant country received an original road 
map tracing its progress in adopting the acquis which is continually evolving along with the 
enlargement process. On the basis of this report the Luxembourg European Council in 12 
and 13 December 1997 took historical steps and decided to launch the accession 
negotiations with six countries along with an overall enlargement process for all countries 
wishing to join the EU. Its approach was two-folded; negotiations would proceed on the 
principle that the Community acquis be applied on accession and an enhanced pre­
accession strategy would be introduced to help all applicant countries "^  ^ align their law as 
quickly as possible on the Community acquis, preferably before accession.
The overall enlargement process as foreseen by the Commission in the Agenda 2000 
encompasses three main elements being the European Conference, the accession process 
and the accession negotiations process. The European conference was designed to 
accompany the other elements of enlargement process being a multilateral forum for 
political consultations on Common Foreign and Security Policy, Justice and Home Affairs 
and economic and regional cooperation.^^ It was assumed to bring together the countries 
aspiring to join the EU, the ten candidate countries from central Europe, Cyprus, Turkey 
and later Malta as well. The front-runner countries tend to see it as a useful political
“  The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia o f  the CEECs, plus Cyprus.
^  100 million Euros has been allocated to the second wave countries that consist o f Bulgaria, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia.
"  See Luxembourg Presidency Council Conclusions, (Appendix B).
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framework for the overall process of enlargement, particularly for those left out of 
negotiations.®^ This conference met for the first time in London on 12 March 1998. The 
second meeting took place in Luxembourg on 6 October 1998 and the third one in Brussels 
on 19 July 1999, at the level of foreign affairs ministers. On all occasions, Turkey®’ 
declined the invitation for not being included in the framework of the accession process.
The second element of the overall enlargement process is the accession process, 
which was launched in Brussels on 30 March 1998 for all the ten central European 
candidates and Cyprus®*. It is an evolving and an ample process directed towards expansion 
recognising that all these countries’ destination is joining the EU on the basis of the same 
criteria, regardless of whether or not they have already started negotiations. It includes an 
enhanced pre-accession strategy, the accession negotiations, screening®  ^ of the EU 
legislation with candidate countries and a review procedure.
The enhanced pre-accession strategy that is the reinforcement of the pre-accession 
strategy analysed before, is the key element in the accession process which prepares the 
candidate countries for full integration with the Community. The Europe Agreements and 
the PHARE program still constitute an important part of the enhanced pre-accession 
strategy along with the newly established ‘Accession Partnership’ agreements as proposed
H. Grabbe, K. Hughes, op. cit., p.68.
The position o f  Turkey within the context o f  the EU enlargement in the 1990s will be analysed in the 
following chapter.
Malta was added later on after reactivating its application.
The screening (o f the acquis) process is the first step in preparing the negotiations. It began in March 1998 
and was virtually completed in July 1999. The purpose o f  this exercise is to identify issues likely to arise in 
the negotiations. It consists o f  a detailed presentation by Commission experts on each o f the 31 chapters o f  the 
acquis to the six applicants in a multilateral meeting, followed by bilateral sessions with each applicant. At the
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in the Agenda 2000. These agreements will provide the basis for a reinforced pre-accession 
strategy, responding to a general view among policy-makers that the strategy needs 
strengthening.A n ‘Accession Partnership’ has been drawn up for each candidate 
country.^' This partnership document provides an assessment of the priority areas in which 
the candidate countiy needs to make progress in order to prepare for accession and outlines 
the ways in which the PHARE Programme will support such accession preparations. The 
PHARE Programme has been remodelled to become an accession driven instrument. With 
an annual budget of one and a half billion Euros it co-finances institution building^  ^ and 
investment^^ in the acquis.^“* The Luxembourg European Council underlined also the 
importance of participation in Community programmes as part of the enhanced pre­
accession strategy and as a useful preparation for accession by familiarising the associated 
countries and their citizens with the Union’s policies and working methods.
multilateral meetings Commission experts indicate what technical adaptations to the EU treaties will be 
needed upon the accession o f a new member.
H. Grabbe, K. Hughes, op. cit. pp.63-67.
The Accession Partnerships contain precise commitments on the part o f the candidate countries relating in 
particular to democracy, macroeconomic stabilisation, industrial restructuring, nuclear safety and the adoption 
o f  the ‘acquis’, focusing on the priority areas identified in each o f the Commission’s Opinions on the 
applications o f  the candidate countries for EU membership. Each country’s Accession Partnership is 
complemented by its own National Programme for the adoption o f the acquis (NPAA). For its part, the NPAA 
gives details o f  each country’s commitments with regard to achieving the Copenhagen criteria and adopting 
the ‘acquis communautaire’.
Institution building helps the candidates meet the important challenge o f strengthening their administrative 
and judicial capacity to enforce and implement the acquis. The Commission has mobilised significant human 
and financial resources to help them through the process o f  ‘twinning’ which involves the long term 
secondment o f  officials fi"om ministries, regional bodies, public agencies and professional organisations in the 
Member States to corresponding bodies in the candidate countries. This can be considered as a know-how 
transfer o f  the Community structures.
The investment in the acquis contributes to equipping the candidate countries with the infrastructures which 
enables them to implement the acquis.
European Commission, “Composite Paper: Reports on Progress towards Accession by each o f the 
Candidate Countries”, Brussels, 13 October 1999.
’’ Ibid.
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The third element of the enlargement process is the process of accession negotiations 
which determines the conditions under which each candidate country will join the EU. All 
of the 15 Member States are the parties to the accession negotiations on the EU side. The 
Presidency of the Council of Ministers, which rotates among the members every six 
months, puts forward the negotiating positions agreed by the member states and chairs 
negotiating sessions at the level of ministers or their deputies. While the General Secretariat 
of the Council and the applicant countries provide the secretariat for the negotiations, each 
applicant countiy draws up its position on each of the 31 chapters of the EU acquis and 
engages in negotiations with the member states. Of course only the specific chapters 
included into that certain round of negotiations are considered within an incremental 
approach. Each applicant country is represented by an appointed Chief Negotiator, with a 
supporting team of experts. Twelve of the candidate countries have now started the 
accession negotiations with the EU. (See Table 3.1)
The negotiations focus specifically on the terms under which candidates adopt, 
implement and enforce the acquis communautaire. In certain cases, the granting of 
transitional arrangements may be possible, but these must be of limited scope and duration. 
The orientation for the negotiations was set out by the Luxembourg European Council by 
stating that ‘the decision to enter into negotiations with these countries does not imply that 
they will be concluded at the same time’7^ Therefore each country will be assessed on its 
own degree of preparedness to comply with the membership criteria.
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The negotiations are conducted in bilateral accession conferences between the 
Member States and each of the applicants on the basis of 31 chapters covering all areas of 
the acquis. Although formally opened on 31 March 1998, they started on 10 November 
1998 at Ministerial level on 7 of the 31 chapters.^^ This is a significant date since it shows 
that the enlargement will be the main task of the EU from then on. In the words of Estonian 
Foreign Minister Raul Malk;
3.2.3 Approaching the Accession
“... It is an important event because... it shows that the enlargement process is 
on track... It is a very important day for both (parties) and shows the 
credibility of the enlargement process.”^
An accession strategy which is ‘destined to ensure that opening and conduct of the 
negotiations will progress in parallel with the candidate countries’ progress preparations for 
membership’ is adopted by the Commission, as indicated in its Composite Paper dated 13 
October 1999.
The Presidency Conclusions of the Cardiff European Council on 15-16 June 1998 
on the enlargement process has been a confirmation of the decisions taken at the 
Luxembourg European Council and the launching of the accession process. In addition to 
the initial evaluation reports of progress of the ten candidates by the Commission expected 
to be adopted by the end of 1998, the Council requested that these reports should include
Luxembourg European Council Presidency Conclusions. 
Composite Paper, 1999, op. cit.
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evaluation on Turkey and Cyprus/^ The Commission adopted the twelve reports on 4 
November 1998 showing that much has been achieved showing that the ‘inclusive 
enlargement process remains broadly on track and that the momentum in the candidates 
towards enlargement is being maintained
After the Vienna European Council endorsed the Commission’s regular reports on 
11-12 December 1998, the Berlin European Council in March 1999 reached an overall 
agreement on Agenda 2000. The Berlin Summit adopted the financial perspective for 2000- 
2006, including pre-accession funds and accession-related expenditures within the renewed 
PHARE programme, and agreed on the creation of two pre-accession instruments, a 
structural instrument and an agricultural instrument. It also established a financial 
framework for these instruments and decided to double pre-accession aid from 2000.
The European Commission issued its second set of Reports on progress towards 
accession by each of the candidate countries as a Composite Paper on 13 October 1999 
highlighting the success of the enlargement process and its speeded up momentum. The 
Commission proposed a series of recommendations in this report aiming at keeping up 
speed without sacrificing quality (of the enlargement process). As mentioned in the Report:
“The Commission is aware that there are two potentially conflicting 
objectives in the enlargement process: speed and quality. Speed is needed
Breffini O ’Rourke, “EU: Expansion Talks are Part Show, Part Substance”, Radio Free Europe. 11 
November 1998, Brussels.
Cardiff European Council Presidency Conclusions, 15-16 June 1998. See:
http ://europa. eu. int/counciI/off/conclu/June98.
Quoted from a speech by Hans van den Broek, Member o f the European Commission, “Presentation on 
Regular Reports to the European Parliament”, Brussels, 4 November 1998. Speech/98/326. see: http://
europa.eu.int/rapid/cgi
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because there is a window of opportunity for enhanced momentum in the 
preparations for enlargement, in accordance with the expectations of the 
candidate countries. Quality is vital because the EU does not want partial 
membership, but new members exercising full rights and responsibilities. 
Abandoning this principle would create severe internal tensions, hamper the 
EU’s efficiency and damage public confidence.”**
Also this report emphasised the greater awareness of the EU about the strategic 
dimensions of the EU enlargement after the crisis in Kosovo. It puts forward the 
enlargement process to achieve and promote continental peace and stability as well as 
democracy and the rule of law, growth and the foundations of prosperity throughout 
Europe.
The Helsinki European Council convened on 10-11 December 1999 confirmed the 
importance of the enlargement process and decided to take the necessary steps for the next 
enlargement to occur, especially for ensuring stability and prosperity in Europe on the basis 
of the above mentioned report of the Commission. It also reaffirmed the inclusive nature of 
the process, in which the 13 candidate countries participated on an equal footing including 
now Turkey. The Helsinki European Council stressed the need for the candidate countries 
to share the values and objectives of the European Union as set out in the treaties of Rome, 
Maastricht and Amsterdam. The European Council also reiterated that compliance with the 
political criteria set by the Copenhagen European Council was a precondition for the 
opening of accession negotiations. The European Council decided to convene bilateral 
intergovernmental conferences in February 2000 with a view to opening negotiations with
81 Composite Paper, 1999, op. cit.
1 2 2
Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Malta on the criteria for membership of 
the European Union and the corresponding changes that will have to be made to the 
treaties. Regarding the deepening process to comply with the prospective widening of the 
Union, the Helsinki European Council also announced its political commitment for the 
adoption of appropriate measures enabling the Intergovernmental Conference to be 
convened in February 2000.*^  ^The aim of the conference is to adapt the institutions of the 
Union to the requirements of an enlarged Europe. The proceedings are expected to 
conclude by December 2000. Once the results of the conference are ratified by the EU 
Member States, the Union will be prompt for the fifth enlargement by the end o f2002.
The Feira European Council of 19-20 June 2000 confirmed the importance and 
priority of the enlargement process for the Union and the Portuguese Presidency issued a 
report on the enlargement process annexed to the European Council Presidency 
Conclusions. As a symbolic importance, it was noted in the report that the negotiating 
rounds at Ministerial level held on 13 and 14 June 2000 included for the first time all 
twelve applicants for membership, thus ending the separation of applicants into groups.®'^
The process launched at the Luxembourg European Council has developed an ever- 
accelerating speed, with a vision of accepting new members after the completion of the 
current Intergovernmental Conference on institutional reform. To sum up, this
Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions paragraph 5 (See Appendix A).
”  Santa Maria de Feira European Council Presidency Conclusions, 19-20 June 2000 “Annex II; Report on 
Enlargement Process”, see: http;// europa.eu.int/counciI/offi'conclu/June2000.
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revolutionary process of enlargement undertaken by the EU, therefore, notifies the positive 
result of a Europe-wide reunification attempt after a synthetic separation lasting over four 
decades.
It is clear that the eastward enlargement of the EU will be beneficial not only for the 
CEECs but also for the EU itself It will lead to higher gro^vth across the continent and to 
the creation of jobs in both East and West provided that the economic criterion for 
enlargement is fully endorsed. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the CEECs’ foreign trade 
patterns have been reversed; the main trading partners now being the EU members.*'* 
Although there seems to be an imbalance of trade pattern, with the help of the restructured 
aid programmes and with the inclusion of the candidate countries into the various 
Community programmes, the economic performance of the CEECs can be maintained at 
more advantageous levels for them. (See Table 3.2) The obvious advantages to the newly 
admitted Member States, including foreign investments and technology sharing, are 
balanced by the increased competitiveness of the European Market. European firms would 
benefit greatly from better combination of production factors and the advantages of
increased trade.85
Hanns-D Jacobsen, “The European Union’s Eastward Enlargement”, European Integration Online Papers, 
Vol.l (14), 1997. See; http: //eiop.or.at.
Horst Giinter Krenzler, “The Geostrategic and International Political Implications ofE U  Enlargement”, 
Robert Schumann Centre Policy Paper. Florence; European University Institute, No 98/2, 1998.
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Table 3.2 External trade of the Candidate CEECs, 1998
Bulgaria Czech
Rep
Estonia Hungary Latvia
Balance of trade in 
Millions ECU
-607 -2198 -1376 -2409 -1232
EU share of total 
imports (%)
45.0 63.3 60.1 64.1 55.3
EU share of total 
exports (%)
49.7 64.2 55.1 72.9 56.6
Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia Lithuania
Balance of trade in 
Millions ECU
-16792 -3154 -2045 -936 -1858
EU share of total 
imports (%)
65.9 57.7 50.4 69.4 50.2
EU share of total 
exports (%)
68.3 64.5 55.8 65.5 38.0
Source; Eurostat, Memo No. 10/99 — 7 December 1999.
The CEECs are on an irreversible track that will be the end result of the process 
started in 1989 marking their ‘return to Europe’ officially. As Polish Deputy Prime 
Minister Leszek Balcerovsacz says, ‘the eastward expansion of the EU has a historical and a 
moral dimension because it will mark the end of the ‘unjust division’ of Europe after the 
Second World War.’^  ^ Yet still deepening is seen needing to be tackled before final 
decisions are to be taken on widening. Indeed, progress on deepening is seen by many as a 
precondition of widening. Therefore only a successful completion of the 
Intergovernmental Conference by the end of 2000 will clear the way for the accessions. It
Ben Partridge, “Poland;. EU enlargement Will End ‘Unjust Division o f ‘Europe’ ”, Radio Free Europe. 
London, 23 November 1998.
Nugent, Neill, Editorial; Redefining Europe, Journal o f  Common Market Studies, Volume 33, Annual 
Review, August 1995, pp. 1-16, p.4.
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seems that at the current pace of progress, the first new members from the Central and East 
European candidates will be able to join the EU between 2002 and 2006.
3.3 The Mediterranean Dimension
The unprecedented developments within Eastern Europe have had much impact, 
though an indirect one, over the Mediterranean applicants since both Malta and Cyprus 
applied in 1990 at the outset of a transformation period that affected the whole continent. 
These developments in the middle of Europe combined with the prospect of the northern 
enlargement of the EFTA countries undermined the prospects of a new wave of 
Mediterranean enlargement. Also the internal consolidation efforts regarding the 
Maastricht process has been a setback for pursuing an enlargement policy that 
incorporates countries that may have a slowing effect for the institutionalisation process 
of the first years of the ‘new’ Union. After the issuance of rather late Opinions on both 
countries by the Commission in 1993, The Corfu Summit in June 1994 assured Malta and 
Cyprus that they would be included in the prospective enlargement phase.*^
In 1989, Jacques Delors characterised Malta and Cyprus as the ‘Mediterranean 
Orphans’. I n  spite of their potential membership status through their longstanding *
** According to the Corfu European Council Presidency conclusions; “The European Council asks the 
Council and the Commission to do their utmost to ensure that the negotiations with Malta and Cyprus with a 
view to the conclusion o f  the fourth financial protocols, intended in particular to support the efforts o f  Malta 
and Cyprus towards integration into the European Union, are brought to a rapid conclusion. The European 
Council notes that in these conditions the next phase o f  enlargement o f  the Union will involve Cyprus and 
Malta”, See: http;//europa.eu.int/council/offi'conclu/jun94.htm.
C. Preston, 1997, op. cit. p.2I0.
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Association Agreements with the EC, they had always been tended to be marginalised 
when an enlargement debate dominated the Agenda of the Community. According to 
Preston;
“Were Malta, Cyprus and [Turkey] to accede to the EU, the Mediterranean 
enlargement of the EU would be complete. It would close a chapter in the 
EU’s external relations which, opening with the Greek application for 
association in 1959, and continuing through two rounds of enlargement, has 
been characterised by ambivalence on both sides as to how far full 
membership was desirable.
Both countries pursue internal political agendas and actually there is not much 
evidence of the pursuit of a growing vision of Europe^' but rather a sense of overcoming a 
possible isolation from the European affairs that affect them as the peripheral states. 
Cyprus’ membership has been an ambiguous process due to the unsettled political situation 
of Cyprus divided between two governments while Malta’s application depends on the 
domestic political dynamics which forms an arena hosting an ongoing debate about the EU 
membership. Both of these states’ sizes, being too small, are considered as a handicap and 
also a reason for not urging their membership applications. This ‘smallness’ raised 
difficulties as regards the effectiveness of the Union’s institutions^^ pertaining to the voting 
rights in the Council of Ministers and the disproportionate representation of small countries 
in other EU institutions. However, Luxembourg, an existing member state with a slightly 
smaller population than Malta’s, has contributed more to the EU than its size would
90 Ibid. p.210.
J. Redmond, 1999, op. cit. p.67.
Pace, Roderick, “The European Union’s Next Mediterranean Enlargement: Challenges and Uncertainties”, 
Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics. University o f  Catania, JMWP 06.97, 
1997. At http://www.fscpo.unict.it/EuroMed/cjmjmwpengl.htm.
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indicate, having conducted EU Presidency and having provided the Commission with two 
Presidents.
Cyprus and Malta have small economies that are easily absorbable by the EU 
therefore neither one presents a major economic burden for the EU.^  ^ As for the two 
applicants, economically membership requires an adaptation effort, yet the costs of non­
membership appear to be worse. Their external trade is extensively dependent on the EU 
(See Table below), as well as their service based tourism sector also attracts investment as 
well as tourists from the EU.
Table 3.3 External Trade of Cyprus and Malta, 199897
Malta Cyprus'^ **
EU Share of Total Imports (%) 69.3 61.9
EU Share of Total Exports (%) 52.8 50.4
Source; Eurostat Memo No: 10/99 -  7 December 1999.
”  Birol Yesilada, “The Mediterranean Challenge”, in, John Redmond and Glenda Rosenthal (eds ), op. cit. pp. 
177-193.
Nicholas Hopkinson, 1995b, op. cit. pp 12-13.
’’ B. Yejilada, op. cit. p. 183-184, p. 187.
R. Pace, op. cit.
^  Taken from the Memo No: 10/99- 7 December 1999, “Key Data on Candidate Countries”, Service Presse 
Eurostat.
Data is based on the Greek-Cypriot controlled part o f  the island.
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3.3.1. Malta
As a former colony of the Great Britain until 1964^ ,^ Malta’s relation with the EC is 
primarily affected by a search to find a suitable European framework in which its foreign 
policy can be conducted. Yet there is a lack of domestic political consensus in favour of full 
membership.Malta applied to the EU in July 1990 following an association agreement 
signed in 1970. The Commission’s Opinion'®', dated 1993 stated that Malta had the 
Necessary European Vocation and that priority reforms should be undertaken in order to 
prepare Malta for integration.'®’ Along with the adoption of Common Customs Tariff with 
the EU and the removal of customs duty on the EU goods since 1995, Malta is well 
advanced in aligning its legislation to conform to the acquis communautaire having started 
approximation in 1987.'®^  The only problem on political grounds is the Maltese neutrality 
that was enshrined in the constitution in 1987.'®“* Yet in the light of the examples of Ireland, 
Austria, Finland and Sweden, neutrality can be reconciled even within a Common foreign 
and Security Policy. Malta also can perform a role as that of a bridge linking Europe to 
non-EU Mediterranean States, especially the North African ones within the general context
of the EU’s Mediterranean Programme, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (MEDA). 105
Even during UK’s first application to the EC for membership.
John Redmond, Thf- Next Mediterranean Enlargement o f  the European Community: Turkey. Cyprus and 
Malta?. Aldershot: Dartmputh, 1993, p.98.
European Commission: “Opinion on Malta’s Application for Membership”, Bulletin o f  the European 
Communities. Supplement 4/93, 1993.
R. Pace, op. cit.
N. Hopkinson, 1995b, op. cit.p.l3.
C. Preston, op. cit. p.224.
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Although the 1994 Corfu and Essen Summits’ Presidency Conclusions declared that 
Malta will be in the next enlargement phase with a view of starting a pre-accession strategy 
six months after the IGC of 1995-96, after the October 1996 elections, the change in 
government hindered the Maltese membership, and the newly elected Labour Party'°^ ruled 
out the prospect of full membership. Malta was therefore not included in the enlargement 
process, launched by the Luxembourg European Council in December 1997, and the 
accession negotiations, which were opened in March 1998.
In November 1996, the Maltese government expressed its wish to seek as close 
relationship with the EU as is compatible with Malta’s particular economic and geo­
political circumstances. In response to a request of the Council, the Commission published 
a Communication to the Council on ‘future relations between the EU and Malta’, based on 
the existing framework of agreements. The substance of this communication was endorsed 
by the tenth EU-Malta Association Council in April 1998.’°^  Following Malta's decision to 
re-activate its membership application after the change of government in the September 
1998 general elections, at the Vienna European Council held in 11-12 December 1998, The 
European Council ‘welcomed Malta’s decision to reactivate its application for European 
Union membership and takes note of the intention of the Commission to present at the 
beginning of its favourable opinion in 1993.'°^ On request of the General Affairs Council in 
October 1998, the Commission presented in February 1999 a report updating the
For more information on MEDA see, Jean Monnet EuroMed Center o f the University o f Catania at 
http://www.fscpo.unict.it/EuroMed/ and Euro-Mediterranean Partnership at http://www.euromed.net. 
R. Pace, op. cit.
European Commission, “The Regular Report from the Commission on Malta’s progress Towards 
Accession”, 1999, http://www.foreign.gov.mt/Malta-Eu/Avis/Avis99.
European Council Presidency Conclusions, Vienna 11 and 12 December 1998 see: 
http://europa.eu/int/council/offrconclu/dec98.htm.
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Commission's opinion on Malta's application for membership. The Opinion concluded that 
‘when the European Council discusses the possibility of extending the accession 
negotiations, Malta will be able join the candidate countries with which negotiations are 
already u n d e r w a y . W i t h  the Helsinki European Council, the Presidency Conclusions 
included Malta to the countries with which bilateral intergovernmental conferences would 
be convened by February 2000 to begin negotiations on the conditions for their entry into 
the Union and the ensuing treaty adjustments.^’^
The last phase commenced with the decisions of the Feira European Council in 19 
and 20 June 2000. According to the Presidency Report on the Enlargement Process: “... in 
accordance with the mandate of the Helsinki European Council, the Portuguese Presidency 
formally launched accession negotiations in February with Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Bulgaria, Malta.”'"  This is welcomed by the European Council which 
considered that it should be feasible to open negotiations in all area of the acquis with the 
most advanced of these candidates as early as possible.'
“The Regular Report from the Commission on Malta’s progress Towards Accession”, 1999, op. cit. 
Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions, 10 and 11 December 1999. See: 
http://europa.eu/int/council/ofFconclu/dec99.htm.
Santa Maria de Feira European Council Presidency Conclusions, “Presidency Report on the Enlargement 
Process”, (Annex II). See: http://europa.eu/int/council/ofFconclu/june2000.htm.
Santa Maria de Feira European Council Presidency Conclusions, op. cit. paragraph 13.
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3.3.2. Cyprus 113
Although ensnared in a political problem that led to the division of the island into 
two different political governments’'“* following the Turkish military intervention"^ on the 
basis of its international rights derived from the Treaty of Establishment (of the Republic of 
Cyprus) and Treaty of Guarantee"^ (for the prevention of independence and the 
constitution of Cyprus), Cyprus is the second island-state that is on the path towards 
integration with the EU.
Cyprus’s early relations with the EC were determined by its position as a British 
colony until 1960 and its heavy trade dependence on the UK market."^ Cyprus applied for 
association after the UK’s first application for EC membership but the French vetoes on the 
UK membership impeded the Cypriot demand as well until 1971 when the application was 
reactivated. The Association Agreement was signed in 1972 and became effective in 1973 
along with the accession of the UK. The Agreement followed the classic association model 
and foresaw the establishment of a customs union after a transition period of ten years
For the sake o f convenience and within a view for a rightful and unifying -on equal terms to the both 
Turkish and Greek communities- solution o f  the ‘Cyprus problem’, in the post-1974 relations o f the EU and 
Cyprus, whenever the name ‘Cyprus’ is mentioned, it is used synonymously with the Greek-Cypriot 
Government although they alienate the Turkish side (Turkish Republic o f  Northern Cyprus founded in 1983) 
in their negotiations with the EU.
Turkish Republic o f Northern Cyprus and Greek-Cypriot Government (which is regarded by the EU as the 
Cyprus Government).
'* For an overview o f the Cyprus issue see. Şükrü S. Gürel, Tarihsel Bovut İçinde Türk Yunan İlişkileri 
11821-19931. Ümit Yayıncılık, Ankara, 1993, pp. 53-65.
According to the Article II o f the Treaty o f  Guarantee: “Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking 
note o f  the undertakings o f the Republic o f Cyprus set out in Article I o f  the present Treaty, recognise and 
guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security o f  the Republic o f  Cyprus, and also the state o f  
affairs established by the Basic Articles o f  its Constitution. Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise 
undertake to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either 
union o f  Cyprus with any other State or partition o f the Island.’’ For the fiill text o f the Treaty see: 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/add/f612.htm.
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involving a two-stage reduction of internal tariff and quotas. The second stage oi the 
agreement, which had been due to begin in 1977, kept being postponed because of the 
uncertainties surrounding the division of the island, but in 1987 it was decided to delay no 
further and a protocol to the 1972 Association Agreement was signed providing for the 
second stage to be implemented, in two phases"^ by 2002-03. Yet, it must not be 
neglected that the division also carries an economic aspect. Due to the different levels of 
economic development in southern and northern Cyprus, the abilities to withstand 
increased competition that EC membership would e n t a i l m a y  differ to a great extent.
By the late 1980s, Greek Cypriot decision-makers, conscious of the growth of 
internal market as well as the Greek accession of 1981, decided that they should move 
beyond a future customs union, and applied for full EC membership in July 1990. The 
Greek Cypriot Government also saw thee application as a way of breaking the deadlock, 
particularly given the explicit linkage between the resolution of the ‘Cyprus Problem’ and 
the Turkish application noted in the Commission’s 1989 Opinion on Turkey.’*^  EC member 
states reacted without enthusiasm to the Cypriot application, but tried under the 
Luxembourg presidency in 1991 to launch an [unsuccessful] initiative for mediation 
between the two commumties. No official declaration of the EC was made over the 
Cypriot application until the Commission’s 1992 Paper on Enlargement. The paper points 
that except being ‘small’, Cyprus along with Malta did not appear to pose problems to the
C. Preston, 1997, op. dt. p.219.
The first stage has applied fully since 1 January 1998, and the second stage is on schedule to be completed 
by 2002.
Neill Nugent, “EU Enlargement and the ‘Cyprus Problem’ ”, Journal o f  Common Market Studie.s. Vol.38 
(1), 2000, pp. 131-50. See, p. 132.
John Redmond, op.cit p. 62-3.
Preston, 1997, op. dt. p.220
133
acquis within the context of further integration. From an institutional point of view, the 
prospect of a small country wanting dual representation in some sense is the worst possible 
nightmare.'“^  Yet on the Cypriot application the Commission argued that;
“In the case of Cyprus, there is inevitably a link between the question of 
accession and the problem which results from the de facto separation of the 
island into two entities, between which there is no movement of goods, 
persons or services. The Community must continue to encourage all efforts to 
find a solution, in particular through support for the resolutions of the United 
Nations and the initiatives of its Secretary General. In the meantime, the 
association agreement should be exploited so that Cyprus is enabled to pursue 
its economic integration.
After this report, the Commission published its ‘Opinion on the Application of 
Cyprus’ in 1993. It essentially said the application raised no major difficulties other than 
those associated with the Cyprus problem that is seen as constituting a major obstacle. 
The Greek Cypriot currency is tied to the ECU, and Cyprus meets the Maastricht 
convergence criteria and the 1988 Protocol provides for the adoption of key Community 
legislation such as competition rules, tax provisions, and approximation of l a w s . B u t  not 
wishing for that obstacle to be either insurmountable or everlasting, the Commission 
requested the revaluation of Cyprus’s accession to the EU in January 1995. As mentioned 
before, the European Councils of Corfu and Essen in 1994 confirmed that the next round of 
the Union’s enlargement would involve Cyprus and Malta and the negotiations would 
start six months after the 1996 IGC. In line with this decision, the EU-Cyprus Association
A. Michalski, and, H. Wallace, op. cit. p.l29. 
John Redmond, 1993, op. cit. p.79.
124 Europe and the Challenge o f  Enlargement. Paragraph 30 in “the Report from the Commission o f  the EC to 
the European Council”, Lisbon, 24 June 1992, reprinted in A. Michalsld, and, H. Wallace op. cit. pp. 157-68. 
Neill Nugent, op. cit. p.l39.
Nicholson, 1995b, op. cit p. 10-11.
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Council on 12 June 1995 adopted a common Resolution on the establishment ot a structural 
dialogue between the EU and Cyprus on certain elements of strategy to prepare to for 
access ion .Along with the publishing of Agenda 2000 which reiterated the Union’s 
determination to play a positive role in bringing about a just and lasting settlement ot the 
Cyprus Problem in accordance with the relevant UN Resolutions, the start of the accession 
negotiations was confirmed as planned. The timetable that is agreed for the accession 
negotiations to start included Cyprus within this process. This meant that they could start 
before a political settlement was reached. Furthermore, the EU shared the view expressed 
by the UN Secretary General that the decision to open negotiations should be seen as a 
positive development which would promote the search for a political settlement.
The Luxembourg and Cardiff European Council meetings of December1997 and 
June 1998 launched the accession process as of March 1998 along with the applications of 
the five Central and Eastern European countries meeting the criteria for accession. Cypriot 
application (compared with those of the CEECs) is -the Cyprus problem apart- relatively 
straightforward. The southern area of Greek Cypriots which have made the application 
(with the name of Republic of Cyprus) is in a position to meet virtually all of the 
Copenhagen Criteria without too much difficulty.Indeed, in the two annual progress 
reports of the Commission on the pre-accession progresses in the applicant countries, 
Cyprus has been seen as being by far the most advanced in terms of the ‘normal’ entry
As a package deal brokered by the French Council Presidency with Greece, Cyprus was included in 
exchange to unlock the Turkish Customs Union.
Kostas Apostolides. “Cyprus and the Enlargement of the European Union”, Jean Monnet Working Papers 
in Comparative and International Politics. University o f Catania, JMWP 15.98, 1998. at
http://www.fscpo.unict.it/EuroMed/cjmjmwpengl.htm. 
Ibid.
Nugent, op. cit. pp. 133-34
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criteria.'^' Also Greece has threatened to veto CEEC accessions if Cyprus’s accession is put 
on hold.'^^ Yet, there are still many European political actors that see Cyprus problem as a 
stumbling block to membership. The French in particular have taken this view, with the 
Foreign Minister, Hubert Védrine, stating at the time of the opening accession negotiations 
in March 1998 that, whilst it was correct to start negotiations, it would be a mistake to grant 
EU membership to a divided count ry .Al so  accession of Cyprus means exporting an 
externally rooted security problem and border dispute into the internal affairs of the Union. 
This may also in long-term affect the internal politics of the Union considering that the 
other party of the dispute, Turkey, is an associate member that waits for its accession 
negotiations to start.
It is unlikely that the Cyprus problem will be an impediment for the largest and 
historic enlargement mission that awaits the Union through a Greek veto yet it is equally 
unlikely that the problem will be resolved in the near future. Consequently, a new strategy 
for EU-Cyprus relations can be observed in the Helsinki European Council Presidency 
Conclusions together with a new strategy of EU-Turkey relations. The conclusions imply 
that new member accessions may .start by the end of 2002 targeting the first wave of 
countries that include Cyprus. In paragraph 9, the Conclusions state that:
“(a) The European Council welcomes the launch of the talks aiming at a 
comprehensive settlement for the Cyprus problem on 3 December in New 
York and expresses its strong support for the UN Secretary General’s efforts 
to bring the process to a successful conclusion.
Commission o f  the European Communities (1999) “Regular report From the Commission on Progress 
towards Accession by Each o f  the Candidate Countries: Composite Paper and Country Reports”. See; 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_10_99.
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Nugent, op.cit p. 134-35. 
Ibid, p. 134.
136
(b) The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate 
the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been 
reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council’s decision 
on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the 
Council will take account of all relevant factors.” '^
Of course, the relevant factors will range from the Turkey’s relations with the EU at 
that specific moment to Greek insistence on vetoing other prospective members’ 
enlargements, the progress in the peace talks as well as the internal political factors of the 
EU members. The political uncertainty still prevails. Therefore until the negotiations end 
with an outcome of affirmation of membership of Cyprus or shelving the Cyprus’s 
admission, it is not possible to predict the consequences that will arise due to this 
decision.'^^
Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions, 10 and 11 December 1999. (See: Appendix A). 
For possible scenarios see; Nugent, op. cit. pp. 141-46.
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CHAPTER 4
TURKEY-EU RELATIONS
Turkey, being the second country after Greece to apply for partnership with 
the European Communities has a somewhat different place in the history of the 
enlargement of the European Union. Despite the history of four decades of 
relations that are characterised by ups and downs wavering from ‘semi-cordial’ to 
‘extremely strained’’, Turkey did not succeed to become a member of the Union 
due to many different and complex problems. Such enmeshments that are of 
historical, economic, social, cultural and political nature have to be analysed in 
detail to work out a solid set of reasons for the non-materialisation of the long 
awaited membership. These problems constitute a conglomerate, which is veiy 
difficult to break down into parts, hence, leading to a rather never-ending quest. In 
the words of Ahmet Evin;
“Trying to get a perspective on Turkey’s relationship with the 
European Community has been a difficult task, somewhat like 
attempting to paint landscape on a fast moving train: the scenery 
would change before a particular setting could be captured with its 
significant detail, and each new vista that came into view would 
appear in a different light. The constant shifts of focus that 
characterise the long history of Turkey’s association with the 
Community have been predicated no less by factors external to this 
relationship than a seeming instability of the two sides to develop a 
clear agenda of mutual concerns. It is true that both sides were 
informed by a different set of concerns right from the beginning... 
These differences stood in the way of obtaining a coherent framework
' These descriptions are borrowed from Lauren M. McLaren. “Turkey’s Eventual Membership o f the 
EU; Turkish Elite Perspectives on the Issue”, Journal o f Common Market Studies. Vol. 38. (1),
2000, pp. 117-129.
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within which to consider Turkey’s role as an associate member and an 
eventual partner of the Community.”^
The evolution of this intricate relationship has been affected to a greater 
extent by the constantly changing economic and political conditions in Turkey as 
well as in Europe. Transformation process of Europe during the 1990s have 
brought about new prospects for Turkey along with the Central and Eastern 
European Countries. As the CEECs have started to seek closer ties with the EU, 
widening of the Community has become a key issue for the composition of a pan- 
European system within the ‘New World Order’. In reach of this climate, Turkey 
has to use its chance to incorporate itself in these continental reconstruction efforts. 
Yet, in order to assess the significance of the events during the 1990s for Turkey’s 
place within this framework, a brief evaluation of the history of the EU-Turkey 
relations is necessary.
4.1 History of the Turkey-EU Relations^
In order to understand the nature of the relations between Turkey and the 
European Communities, a comprehensive approach covering the historical roots of 
the relations of Turkey -Ottoman Empire- and the European Continent as a whole 
is needed. Historically, Turkish culture has had a profound impact over much of
 ^Ahmet Evin. “Introduction”, in, Ahmet Evin and Geof&ey Denton, Eds. Turkey and the European 
Community. Opladen; Leske und Budrich, 1990, p.9.
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Eastern and Southern Europe throughout the centuries of Ottoman rule starting 
with the fourteenth century. Yet the nature of the relations with the Western Europe 
had developed a configuration of the Turkish identity as the ‘other’ for the 
European identity. This ‘otherness’, being the opposite or the outsider where a 
threat is perceived from, depicted with negative factors in order to identify 
Europe’s own identity and to form a foundation for its integrity and unity.
The period between the outbreak of the French Revolution and the close of 
the 1830s witnessed a quickening of the pace of change, most aspects of which one 
way or another had to do with the changing relationship between the Ottoman 
Empire and Europe^ in the fields ranging from territory, population ideology, 
administration, economics and international relations. The first fundamental 
change appeared when the European influence began to affect Turkey through the 
Tanzimat Charter^, and this reform policy became a distinctive feature of the rest 
of the nineteenth century. The mechanism set in motion by the reform movement 
worked at a number of levels, but concentrated on three main areas; provincial 
administration, education, and the judiciary, with policy formation at the centre.^ 
The nineteenth century and the first decades ending the long life of the Ottoman
 ^ For a detailed chronology o f Turkey-EU Relations see; Mehmet Ali Birand. Türkiye’nin Avrupa 
Macerası 1959-1999. (lOth revised ed.), İstanbul: AD Yayıncılık, 2000.
‘*A. Nuri. Yurdusev. “Avrupa Kimliğinin Oluşumu ve Türk Kimliği”, in, Atila Eralp (ed.). Türkiye ve 
Avrupa. Ankara; İmge Kitiijevi, 1997, pp. 18-85.
^Erik J. Zürcher. Turkey; A Modem History. New York; St. Martin’s Press, 1993, p.23.
 ^The charter provided for the protection o f ‘life, property and honour’ and stated that government 
was in future to be based on ‘fundamental laws’.
’Şerif Mardin. “European Culture and the Development o f  Modem Turkey”, in. Evin, Denton op.cit. 
p.l6.
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Empire had been characterised by a struggle between the reforms and reactions to 
them from several classes, sometimes even including the ruling classes.
Following the First World War and the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, 
as a new state called the Turkish Republic, Turkey overtly chose Western Europe 
as the model for its new secular state structure. As the foimder of the Turkish 
Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk has implied regarding the structural 
transformation of the state, ‘Eveiy significant step towards the road to progress has 
its predicaments. In order to limit these constraints, there should be no doubt about
O
taking the necessaiy step and measures’. Within this approach, the westemism of 
this new republic was in one respect fundamentally different from that of the 
Tanzimat·. Republican reform attempted to approach western civilisation from the 
position of a nation, which claimed equality with other European nations. ^  This 
new orientation towards equality is of great importance for understanding the 
relations of Turkey with the European states throughout the rest of the century. As 
the republic evolves, social and cultural contacts with Europe multiplied and the 
new state saw itself as one of the European democracies. The road map of Turkey 
was guided by ‘science’ and the direction was the level of contemporary 
civilisation which is regarded as the Western civilisation. Accordingly, the 
structural transformation ranging from conversion to Latin alphabet to the adoption
^Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Nutuk. Zeynep Korkmaz, (ed.), Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basunevi., 
1994, pp. 301-2.
’Şerif Mardin, op. cit., p .l6.
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of the Swiss Civil Code prevailed in many areas of the social, political and 
economic life.
This western-oriented approach of Turkey continued throughout the twentieth 
century as the dominant factor of its international relations.Turkey has ever since 
closely aligned itself with the West and has become a founding member of the 
United Nations, a member of NATO, the Council of Europe, the OECD and an 
associate member of the Western European Union." During the Cold War years, 
Turkey became one of the major components of the Western alliance which was 
defending freedom, democracy and human rights within the perspective of those 
years. From this point of view, Turkey has performed a vital role in the defence of 
the European continent and as a member of NATO, it is still a significant actor in 
the European security. Consequently, most of the main elements of its foreign 
policy have converged with those of its European allies. The close relations in the 
political field have brought forward the prospects of co-operation in the economic 
matters. Therefore, Turkey chose to begin close cooperation with the EEC in 1959.
For a detailed account o f  Turkish foreign policy, see: Faruk Sönmez, (ed.), Türk Dis Politikasuun 
Analizi. İstanbul: Der Yaymlan, 1994.
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4.1.1 Turkish application to the EEC for Association
Turkey applied for partnership of the European Communities on 31 July 
1959. Turkish government made this application urgently by the DP government 
without consulting to the Grand National Assembly immediately after Greece’s 
application to be a member on 9 June 1959.*' The foremost reason for this 
application is that the Turkish foreign policy was adopted to act accordingly with 
the western countries and to take a part in the decision-making mechanisms that are 
formed within the West as a result of its traditional western orientation during the 
Cold War period. Gaining free access for Turkish exports to the European market 
and providing a stimulus for economic growth’^  were among other components of 
this historic decision. Despite these economic arguments for membership, the 
motives were mainly political. Such as an other significant reason and maybe the 
most determining one for the timing of this application was, as mentioned before, 
the earlier Greek application for association with the EEC. Because if Greece were 
to become a member of the EC, Turkey’s political as well as economic interests 
would be hurt, economic interests on account of the competitive nature of the
exports of the two countries. 14
Turkey joined OEEC (later OECD in 1948), the Council o f Europe in 1949, and NATO in 1952. It 
became an associate member o f the WEU in 1992 after an observer status.
'^Mehmet Gönlübol, Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (9th ed.), Ankara; Siyasal Kitabevi, 1996, pp.700- 
726.
'^Meltem Müftüler-Baç, Turkey’s Relations with a Changing Europe. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1997, p.54.
’“‘Selim İlkin. “A history o f Turkey’s Association with the European Community”. In Evin and 
Denton, eds. op. cit. pp, 35-49.
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The EC’s initially positive response reflected a desire for a diplomatic 
success in its external relations, following the proposal to establish EFTA.'^ Also 
the expanding Turkish market and the opportunities of cheap labour in Turkey were 
among reasons for EC’s warm reception. The US was also concerned that the EC 
should maintain a balance in its dealings with both NATO members in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, Turkey and Greece.*^
Between 1959 and 1962, 8 meetings were held to agree on the articles of the 
partnership agreement which was to be signed between EEC and Turkey. There 
was a clear disagreement that EEC was insisting on limiting the provisions within a 
trade agreement whereas Turkey followed the policy of Greece and insisted on 
making a full membership application. The negotiations with the EC took quite a 
long time. Also the military takeover of the Turkish government on 27 May 1960 
and especially France’s radical response'^ to this have been a factor for the delay of 
the negotiations and the signing process when compared to Greece. The lack of 
experience of the EC formulating a model appropriate for dealing with Greece and 
Turkey, two countries at a level of development below that of original Six, and the
‘^Christopher Preston, Fnlarpement and Integration in the European Union. London: Routledge. pp. 
213-19. EFTA and EEC were two competing economic cooperation bodies o f  the time. See in 
Chapter 2 British application to the EC, in this study.
Though this search for a balance has characterised the EC relations with Greece and Turkey, since 
this period, equilibrium has proved hypothetical and elusive as Greece was considered as the ‘Golden 
Child’ o f  the West since 1829.
‘^Sibel Turan. “Türkiye Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri ya da Bitmeyen Senfoni”, Balkan Arastırmalan Vol. 1 
(1), Edime: Trakya Üniversitesi Yayınlan, 1998, pp. 298-311.
For a brief account o f  Greek-EC relations see Chapter 2 o f this study.
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almost total lack of preparatory studies on the subject in these two countries were
the main reasons for the retardation of this process 19
4.1.2 The Association Agreement
After three more meetings, Ankara Association Agreement, which specified 
the partnership provisions of Turkey with EEC, was signed on September 12 1963. 
In EC affairs, ‘association’ is seen as a form of partial membership, enabling a 
country to benefit from certain preferential provisions, such as reduced tariffs on its 
exports, which express a special relationship. Crucially however, association does 
not confer voting rights in the EC council, so that it does not give a country a direct 
influence on EC policy formation.^'
The agreement sought for acquisition of a customs union of EEC with Turkey 
which was foreseen to be implemented through a number of phases. The first phase 
was the Preparatory Phase planned as five years, which would be extended by EEC 
to nine years if necessary. This was followed by a transitional phase which was 
foreseen as twelve to twenty-two years that would move to a customs umon 
eventually. The agreement also envisaged the possibility of a third final stage
‘^Selim İlkin, op. cit. p.36.
^^Robert C. Hine, “Turkey and the European Conuminity; Regional Integration and Economic 
Convergence. In, Togan and Balasubramanyam. eds. The Economy o f  Turkey since Liberalization 
London: Macmillan Press, 1996, pp. 131-154.
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which could involve full EC membership, though no specific timetable was given 
for this. In the preamble of the Agreement, it was mentioned;
“[recognizing] that the support given by the European Economic 
Community to the efforts of the Turkish people to improve their 
standard of living will facilitate the accession of Turkey to the 
Community at a later date”^^
However, these expectations did not turn out correct still Turkey is faced 
with many barriers as the EEC transformed into the EU while deepening and 
varying its level of integration throughout the years. Yet the Association Agreement 
has been a designating step for the development of the EC-Turkey relations by 
providing a framework fundamentally for economic cooperation. Also this 
agreement implies the European status of Turkey not only in the policies of Turkey 
but also in the views of the European institutions^^ as Walter Hallstein, then 
Commission President actually declared that ‘Turkey is part of Europe’^ '* at the 
time of the signature of the agreement. Moreover it has been the major legal 
instrument throughout the years which the EC-Turkey relations were built upon.
It is true that association agreements provide for consultations through association councils, but 
given the economic disproportion between any individual associate and the EC, the associates have 
very little political leverage.
Preamble o f the Agreement Establishing an Association Between the European Economic 
Community and Turkey (Signed at Ankara, September 1963) For the complete document see: 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/adc/default.htm
^ Although there could be contrary personal views at that time (or even today) among the politicians 
and bureaucrats o f the European institutions, the agreement comprises a possibility o f  fiill 
membership as mentioned in the text above. Full membership according to the article 238 o f  the 
Rome Treaty, is a right given to ‘any European state may apply for membership. For a good example 
of the issue see: Mehmet Ali Birand, Tiirldve'nin Gümrük BirliS Macerası. 1959-1996, (9*** revised 
ed.), Istanbul: AD Yayıncılık, 1996, pp. 183-84.
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Although the share of Turkish exports directed to the original six countiy 
showed a strong orientation towards the EC, at 34.7 per cent in 1958,^  ^the disparity 
between the Turkish economy and those of the EC members was very large, hence, 
necessitating a wide range of measures to promote convergence without excessive 
adjustment costs. During the preparatory phase, which lasted from 1964 to 1972, 
the EEC granted certain rights to Turkey to increase the agricultural exports of 
Turkey. At the same time it provided 175 million ECUs worth of financial aid to 
Turkey during 1964-1969 period.^^ Yet, Turkey was not strengthening its economy 
in preparation for the next stages of the association agreement as evidence, for 
example, by the very general treatment of the consequences of associate EC 
membership in Turkey’s First and Second Five Year Development Plans (1963- 
1967 and 1968-1972, respectively).^^ For Turkey political rather than economic 
expectations were decisive motives for the signing of the agreement. Therefore, 
Turkey had followed a policy of laissez-faire, failing to take the measures necessary 
to establish the sound economic structure needed for entry into a customs union. 
Similarly, engaged with internal developments, the Community also followed an 
indifferent policy, which can be called as a policy of benevolent negligence.
Quoted in John Redmond, The Next Mediterranean Enlargement o f the European Community 
Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993, p.23.
^^Hine, op.cit. p. 143. 
Gönlübol, op.cit. p.702.
Redmond, 1993, op.cit. p.27.
Roswitha Bourguignon, “The History o f  the Association Agreement between Turkey and the 
European Community”. In, Evin and Denton, op.cit. pp.51-63.
147
4.1.2.1 The Additional Protocol
The Turkish government proposed a shift into the transition period in 1968 
for predominantly political reasons.^^ Yet the EEC did not accept this proposal 
since the Commission opted for an extension of the preparatory stage on the 
grounds that the Turkish economy was not yet ready for stage two.^° Also the years 
witnessed political debates within Turkey about the extent of cooperation with the 
EC since the Turkish Left having anti-imperialistic tendencies was arguing that the 
superior economies of the EC would exploit the Turkish Economy as a result of 
their neo-imperialist policies.' '^ The Turkish Right also was against further 
improvement of the association with the EC, on the premise to protect the infant 
industries of Turkey which is a developing country and, therefore, needed 
protection from the developed ‘giant economies’.
Following the negotiations over improving market access to the EC for 
Turkish goods, the position of immigrant labour in the EC, and EC financial 
assistance to Turkey, the additional protocol, which specified the rules of the 
transition period^^, was signed on November 23 1970. Starting to be implemented
29 Turkey hoped for better prospects from the EC as Greece witnessed a military take-over. Trying 
to get a better leverage against the EC after the Cyprus crisis in 1963-67during which Turkey was 
faced with lack o f diplomatic support.
Müftüler-Bac. op.cit. p.58.
Engin Erkiner, Avruna Birliei ve Türkiye; Soldan Bir Bakış. Ankara; Öteki Yayınevi, 1998, p.96
For a detailed account o f  the views o f  the political parties on this issue and all o f  the EC-Turkey 
relations as well, See: Esra Çayhan, Dünden Bugüne Türkiye- Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri ve Siyasal 
Partilerin Bu Konuva Bakısı. İstanbul: Boyut, 1997.
Main provisions o f  the agreement were;
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by 1973, the protocol foresaw a step-by-step approach of trade liberalisation 
stretching over 22 years with an ultimate aim of establishment of Customs Union 
between the two parties by December 31 1995. Because of the difference in the 
level of Turkey’s economic development, the Community agreed to establish the 
transitional period in such a way not to hinder Turkey’s economic development.^“*
4.1.2.2 1970s and 1980s: The Years of Turbulence
The transitional phase actually did not work out as it was foreseen because 
of the global oil crises and economic recession of the 1970s, which had detrimental 
effects on the economies of both Turkey and the EEC. Also in 1971, Turkish 
political instabilities, which led to militaiy intervention, affected transition period’s 
timetable unfavourably. Furthermore Turkey’s third Five Year Development still 
incorporated import substitution proposals incompatible with the Association 
Agreement, whilst the EC’s commercial concessions were vulnerable to the to
-for industrial goods the EC was to abolish all duties on imports from Turkey with exception o f  
refined petroleum goods and textiles.
-Turkey was to divide its imports into two lists and then to reduce its tariffs in stages over 12 years 
for one list (45 per cent o f  total imported goods) and over 22 years for the rest as Turkish 
quantitative restrictions were to be phased out.
-for agricultural goods some 80 per cent o f  EC imports from Turkey received preferential treatment 
whilst Turkey was to adjust its agricultural sector gradually to the EC’s Common Agricultural Policy 
over a 22 year period.
-the EC’s common external tariff was to be adopted by Turkey over 22 years;
-free movement o f labour and capital between the EC and Turkey was to be phased in between 12^ 
and 22”^  year;
-there was to be closer alignment o f economic policy
-a second financial protocol provided loans o f  up 300 million ECU over a five and a half-year period 
to assist with Turkish development.
Bourguignon, op.cit. p.53
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special pleading from domestic producers interests.^^ Also exclusion of textiles 
from the removal of duties was devaluing Turkish gains from the agreement since 
the textile industry was the primary industry with the strongest competitive 
advantage for Turkey.
The value of EC’s trade concession further depreciated as the EC introduced 
its General System of Preferences (GPS). The GPS opened the EC market to the 77 
underdeveloped or developing country having similar export goods with Turkey. 
Turkish part was not satisfied with the provisions of the Second (1973-1976) and 
the Third (1977-1982) Financial Protocols and requested the initiation of the 
revisions and amendments in the Additional Protocol but could not obtain any 
concrete outcomes. Furthermore, the enlargement of the Community to nine 
opened the EC market for these industrialised countries’ and the approaching 
second enlargement to include Portugal and Spain were continually weakening the 
Turkish economy that was trying to increase its European market shares. EC’s 
Mediterranean Policy was also a blow to the EC’s trade concessions granted to 
Turkey with the Additional Protocol.
The controversies in the political arena were even harsher especially after the 
Turkish military intervention in Cyprus and the Greek application for membership 
of the EC in 1975. Turkey lost almost all of the leverage it had over Greece in the 
EC affairs during the 1967-1974 period when Greece was ruled by a military junta
Preston, 1997. op.cit. p.214.
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government. The global repercussions of the Cyprus issue were much more 
favourable for the Greek side. Also the Turkish attempts to participate the meetings 
of the European Political Cooperation (EPC), the body formed to organise the 
external relations of the Community, were rigidly opposed by the members states.
Another issue negatively affecting the relations was the free movement of 
Turkish workers within the EC. According to the Additional Protocol this was to be 
implemented in progressive stages between 1976 and 1986.^  ^The Turkish workers 
within the EC had helped Turkey to cover its trade deficit through the foreign 
exchange they provided for the country. During the recession years this became 
more important. On the contrary, also affected by the oil crisis and recession, the 
EC, and in particular West Germany took various measures to halt the work force 
migration from Turkey. As the years passed, this became a critical element in 
German domestic politics. As in one of his speeches after becoming the Chancellor 
in 1982, Helmut Kohl stated that;
“Germany is not a country of immigrants. The number of foreigners, 
and especially the Turks, should be decreased by encouraging their 
return, and the regulation providing for the free movement of Turkish 
workers, which the EC will implement by 1989, should be 
cancelled.
By 1976 the Association Agreement was in trouble, and due to increasing 
economic difficulties In 1978 Turkey formally requested a five-year freeze in its
Bourguignon, op.cit. p.56.
Quoted in Birand,1996, op. cit. p.l63.
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commitments under the Additional Protocol. The Community did not react before 
May 1979. The EC then agreed to a new financial protocol, providing 600 million 
ECUs over the following five years, plus emergency aid of 75 million ECUs. 
However, the Ecevit government found the offer made by the Community 
inadequate. The formal meeting of the Association Council after a lapse of more 
than three years took place in Brussels in Februaiy 1980. The two parties, Turkey 
and the EC, discussed ways in which to revive their political and commercial 
relations with a view to facilitating Turkish entry at a later date.^* However the 
betterment of relations were halted after the military coup in Turkey on 12 
September 1980. Although both sides stated their desire for continuing in the 
Association relationship, and the Foreign M inisters of the Community decided to 
maintain co-operation in the hope that the Turkish Junta’s stated intention to 
restore parliamentary democracy would soon be a reality, the European Parliament, 
which had criticised the limitation of human and civil rights in Turkey several 
times in the past, called on the Commission in April 1981 to freeze the financial 
Protocol.^^ By January 1982, the Association Agreement was suspended by a 
Resolution of the European Parliament.
After the 1983 elections, as the Ozal government rallied for the development 
of relations with the EC, the relations were normalised gradually by 1986 with a
Müftüler-Baç. op.cit. p.62. The Turkish Foreign Minister Hayrettin Erkmen even announced at a 
press conference in Brussels that Turkey would make a formal application by the autumn, in June 
1980.
Bourguignon, op.cit. p.58-59. After the imprisonment o f former Prime Minister Ecevit at the end 
o f 1981, Turkey-EC relations deteriorated so much that the Commission decided not to recommend
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meeting of the Association Council at ambassadorial level. The Association 
Agreement was resumed on 15 September 1988.'**^  The third enlargement of the EC 
that let Greece into the club have hampered the prospects of a swift progress of the 
EC-Turkey relations even after the restoration of democracy.
In retrospect, the Association Agreement was not a satisfactory instrument for 
the assignment of getting Turkey ready for full EC membership, given the wide 
income disparity that existed between the parties during the signing period of the 
Agreement. The Associate member status, yet, affected Turkey, as it becomes 
vulnerable to changes in the European Community, and led to a degree of 
integration between the EC and Turkey.“**
4.1.3 Turkey’s Application for Full Membership
On 14 April 1987, Turkey applied to the EC for full membership. The main 
economic incentive for the application was to be included in the Single Market 
programme of the Commission in order to eliminate its trade imbalance by 
acquiring new foreign investments.“*^ The Turkish economy after 1983 have 
become a steadily liberalising economy and needed access to greater markets. The
the Fourth Financial Protocol to the European Council. This meant the temporary suspension o f  
financial aid to Turkey.
Muftiiler-Bac, op. cit. p. 63.
Ibid. p.5.
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Greek obsession to hinder any EC-Turkey relations has also been a factor for 
applying“^^  Also, the revitalising of the relations by full membership application in 
order to be noticed by the EU institutions and to capture their attention was another 
tactical motive behind this application.
The Commission’s Opinion, which took thirty-four months to prepare, gave a 
strongly negative response to the application.'*^ Whilst reaffirming the principle that 
no enlargement could take place before 1993, following completion of the Single 
European Market, the Opinion in any case listed a number of formidable economic 
obstacles to Turkish membership“*^ , all of which posed fundamental challenges to 
the classical enlargement method.“*^ As for the political handicaps preventing 
Turkey to become a full member, the human rights violations and antidemocratic 
measures against ethnic minorities were specified as shortcomings of the Turkish 
democracy. Also the Cyprus issue and the problems with Greece were mentioned in 
the Commission’s Opinion as the other political obstacles that still impede 
relations. The Commission’s Opinion of 1989, in many ways, has become the 
major criterion for the EC in handling relations with Turkey throughout the 1990s. 
The Opinion confiimed many of the considerations that the EC has had about
‘’^ Christopher Brewin, “Türkiye ve Avrupa Birliği”, in, Bülent Gökay (ed.) Türldve Avrupa’nın 
Neresinde. Ankara: Ayraç Yaymlan, 1997, pp. 42-71.
Birand. 1996. op.cit, p.406.
For a fiili text o f  the Opinion see; http:// www.mfa.gov.tr/gnipa/ad/adab/opinion.htm
Beyond general concerns about the capacity o f  the Turkish economy to adapt the acquis within a 
transitional stage o f  the EC towards Single Market, the Opinion noted major structural disparities 
leading to a GNP per capita one-third o f the EC average, with 50 per cent o f  the labour force still 
employed in agriculture, high levels o f  inflation, unemployment and industrial protection, and low 
levels o f  social protection.
Preston, 1997, op. cit. p.215. For the classical enlargement method see Chapter 2 o f this study.
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Turkey on economic, political, strategic and cultural grounds. Yet, the Opinion still 
considered Turkey eligible for membership and foresaw the betterment and 
advancing of the relations with regard the completion of Customs Union by 1995 as 
was planned.
On the other hand, Turkey, between the 1980-86 period, witnessed a period 
of economic development in which exports have trebled, and the rate of inflation 
has fallen from 100 per cent to 29.8 per cent and achieved the leading growth rate 
among the OECD countries.'*’ From the Turkish perspective, the EC Commission’s 
assessment of Turkey’s economic position reflects a static approach. Critics of the 
commission’s opinion charge that it fails to reflect the dynamic quality of Turkey’s 
economic, industrial and social evolution, and neglects the rapidly narrowing gap 
between the EC and Turkey.
Another asserted point was the Cyprus problem, and Turkey’s conflicting 
standpoint with Greece, an EC member reflected a negative position with regard to 
membership.'*^ Also Greece’s overall attitude towards Turkey has become a 
determining factor for the delay of improved relations. Even until 1999, Greece 
threatened the EU by blocking the eastern enlargement if Cyprus was not included 
in the enlargement process.
Bourguignon, op. cit. p.59.
Ian Lesser. “Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West After the Cold War. In, Graham E. Fuller and 
Ian O. lesser, eds. Turkey’s New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China. Boulder; 
Westview Press, 1993, pp. 99-140.
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In fact, most EC members objected to full Turkish membership for a variety 
of economic, social, and political reasons. The principal economic objections to 
Turkish membership highlighted the relative underdevelopment of Turkeys 
economy compared to the economies of EC members and Turkey’s high rate of 
population growth. The latter issue is perceived as a potentially serious problem 
because of free labour movement among EU members and the fact that Turkey's 
already large population is expected to surpass that of Germany, the most populous 
EU member. Closely related to the concern about the existence of having too many 
Turkish workers is the social problem of integrating those workers into European 
culture. Throughout Western Europe, the early 1990s witnessed a rise in anti­
immigrant feeling directed primarily against Muslim workers from North Africa, 
and Turkey. These developments have also affected the public opinion as well as 
political opinion negatively about the prospects of Turkey’s accession.
Moreover, the third enlargement incorporating Portugal and Spain into the 
Community has brought forward many budgetary questions as the newcomers 
along with Greece significantly differed from the former members in their level of 
prosperity. Therefore, the members did not consider Turkey’s application at that 
time as a correct move.
Later on, the application o f Cyprus for full membership o f the EC in 1990 further complicated the 
issue.
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EU members have also expressed reservations about Turkey's human rights 
record. Amnesty International and Helsinki Watch, two human rights monitoring 
organisations supported by the EU, have reported the persistence of practices such 
as arbitrary arrests, disappearances, extrajudicial killings, torture in prisons, and 
censorship. The Turkish Human Rights Association, has prepared detailed 
chronologies and lists of human rights abuses, including the destruction of entire 
villages without due process, and has circulated these reports widely in Europe. 
The documented reports of human rights abuses sustained questions, especially in 
the European Parliament, about Turkey's qualifications to join a collective body of 
countries that have striven to achieve uniform standards for protecting citizen 
rights. Turkey, aiming to be a part of the EU, is bound to abide by the written and 
unwritten norms and principles of the European human rights regime and the 
minority rights sub-regime. A common definition pertaining to minority rights does 
not exist. Each country defines its minorities and treats them as it sees appropriate. 
This is the case even for the Member States of the EU.^‘ Therefore while the 
conditions of human rights in Turkey should be upgraded, the minority issues can 
not constitute an impediment for the membership because of different approaches 
to the concept of minorities.
For a very detailed study on the position o f  Turkish workers in the EC, See: Centre For Turkish 
Studies, (ed.). Migration Movements from Turkey to the European Community. Brussels: Working 
Paper No. 12, 1993, Prepared for the Commission o f  the European Communities.
^'çiğdem Nas, “The Approach o f the European Parliament to the Issue o f Ethnic Minorities and 
Minority Rights in Turkey within the Context o f  the European Minority Rights Sub-Regime” Jean 
Monnet Working Papers. No. 18. University o f Catania. See: 
hhtp://fscpo.unict.it/vademec/jmwp 18.htm.
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Although it did not attain its basic objective, Turkey's application revived 
Turkey-EC relations as efforts to develop relations intensified on both sides, the 
Association's political and technical mechanisms started meeting again and 
measures to complete the Customs Union in time were carried on. Meanwhile, the 
Commission's promised cooperation package, the ‘Matutes Package’, was disclosed 
in 1990, but could not be adopted by the Council due to Greece's objection.
4.1.4 The Customs Union
Consequently four major areas of cooperation were specified for the EC- 
Turkey relations within the framework of the Opinion. These were the completion 
of Customs Union until the end of 1995, re-activation of the financial and industrial 
cooperation with Turkey and EC, increasing the scientific and technological 
cooperation and strengthening of political and cultural ties. Among them the 
Customs Union was of particular importance. Countries that form a customs union 
release the tariff and quota limitations against each other and facilitate free 
circulation of goods and services. Also they apply common customs tariffs to third
countries. 52
The partnership Council conclusions dated 6 March 1995 between Turkey 
and European Union reiterated that the ultimate goal is the full membership of
52Rıdvan Karluk. 1995. “AB- Türkiye Gümrük Birliği”, In Yeni Türkiye. Vol. 1 (3). pp. 187-93.
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Turkey to the EU. The provisions of 1963 Ankara Agreement and of the Additional 
protocol remains valid with the building of the Customs Union to start from 1 
January 1996.^  ^The Customs Union Agreement legally ended the transitional stage 
which had begun with the 1970 Additional Protocol and started the final stage of 
the association between Turkey and the EU.^ '^  With the customs union, Turkey 
undertook to enable compliance with the EU legislation in the related issues while 
the EU undertook to relieve the quotas applied to Turkish textile products and to 
provide the necessary financial aids.^  ^ The Customs Union aims to intensify not 
just the level of economic co-operation but also political co-operation between the 
two sides. Political dialogue between the two parties increased through high level 
meetings. Yet, according to some experts, the Customs Union Agreement has 
provided eveiything the EU has hoped from developing relations with Turkey, and 
therefore this agreement would be the last stage in which the relations are shaped 
accordingly without considering full membership. Furthermore, the Customs union
The general provisions o f the Customs Union are; Only the industrial products and processed 
agricultural products are covered and Turkey relieved ail o f the customs taxes and similar taxes 
against the member states o f  the EU by 01.01.1996. EU’s releasing o f the textile quotas is bound to 
Turkey’s compliance with the relevant legislation. Turkey undertakes to comply with the provisions 
o f the preferential trade agreements o f  the EU with the third countries within five years. With the aim 
o f protection o f the Turkish automotive industry, Turkey may enforce import ban and tariffs upto ten 
years on second hand automobiles. Turkey undertakes to adopt and enforce the Common Customs 
Tariff o f  the EU towards third countries with a delay o f five years on certain products. Turkey must 
comply with the international regulations on protection o f the Intellectual properties within 3 years 
State subsidies without social content should be banned by Turkey and can only be allowed to less 
developed regions up to five years. State monopolies that have commercial quality should comply 
with the relevant EU legislation in two years. The EU agreed to undertake provision o f loan facilities 
to Turkey including 375 million ECU within five years from the EU Budget, 400 million ECU for the 
infrastructural projects under the Mediterranean program, 700 million ECU within the fi-ame o f the 
Renewed Mediterranean Program, 750 million ECU as project credit fi*om the flmd o f European 
Investment Bank within five years and 300 million ECU in the form o f macroeconomic aid.
Müftüler-Baç, op. cit. p. 69.54
Yahya Sezai Tezel, “Bu Gümrük Birliği Anlaşması Mutlaka TBMM’de Görüşülmeli ve 
Oylanmalıdır”. In Yeni Türkiye. Vol.l (3), 1995, pp. 182-186.
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puts Turkey in a very vulnerable position within the framework of mutual
relations. 56
Although the customs union could be considered as an important step 
towards Turkish membership, The Essen European Council of December 1994 
proved that the European states did not regard Turkey as a prospective member and 
preferred to regard Turkey within the Mediterranean Region. ^ ^Yet it should be 
highlighted that Turkey is the only country to have concluded a customs union 
agreement with the EC without being a full member. Also the Customs Union, by 
intensifying the economic integration in many areas, has allowed Turkey to test its 
economic competitiveness against the stronger economies. Although an imbalance 
of trade occurred in the favour of the EU after the implementation of the customs 
union, Turkey adapted to the removal of tariffs by 1998. (See Table below)
Erol ManisalI, Türkive-Avruna İlişkileri. İstanbul; Çağdaş Yayınlan, 1998, p.l25. 
Ibid. p.l83.
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Table 4.1 External Trade o f Turkey with the EU
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
EU share of total 
imports (%) 47.1 46.9 47.2 54.2 54.0 52.4
EU share of total 
exports (%) 49.5 4 7.7 51.2 45.4 44.4 50.0
Source: Eurostat and DIE (Devlet istatistik Enstitüsü)
Furthermore, as a result of Turkey’s attempts to adjust to the EU’s 
commercial policy towards third countries resulted with the Free Trade Agreements 
signed with the EFTA countries, the other associate countries of the EU and the 
North African countries. Also the free trade agreement with the European Coal 
and Steel Community has been another step towards integration with Europe.
Another important point is that although the EC did not need to have the 
Customs Union Agreement ratified in the European Parliament, this became a pre­
condition of the adoption of the Treaty.^ The EP has been known for its hard 
position against Turkey especially on the issues of human rights and minorities. 
Therefore, this voting procedure has become a very political issue rather than a 
simple evaluation of an economic agreement. The affirmative vote, in a sense.
http:// www.die.gov.tr and http:// europa.eu.int/conini/eurostat. 
’’ Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt.
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meant the inclusion of Turkey into Europe although it brought some political 
conditions for the agreement. The Commission has been given the role to view the 
conditions in Turkey in the light of certain expectations. From then on, the 
Commission started to prepare annual report on Turkey documenting the economic 
and political developments in Turkey.
The achievement of the Customs Union provides not only for economic 
regulations, it has a greater impact on the social and political life of Turkey since 
the Customs Union allows intensified relations between the two parties. An 
incremental integration through the ‘spill-over’ mechanism will eventually occur as 
the relations increase. The Customs Union has demonstrated the Turkish 
economy’s ability to cope with the competitive challenges of free trade in 
manufactured goods, and the trade, competition and intellectual property 
components of the EU’s acquis communautaire, and can therefore be take as proof 
that Turkey can fulfil the economic conditions of the Copenhagen criteria*’’ for EU 
membership.Therefore, it sets a precedent for Turkey’s ability and will to cope 
with the political criteria and the handling of the rest of the acquis in order to be a 
part of the Union.
Mehmet Ali Birand, 2000. op. cit. p. 489.
See Chapter 3 o f  this study for the Copenhagen Criteria.
Meltem Müftüler-Bac. 1999. “The Never-Ending Story; Turkey and the European Union”. In, 
Sylvia Kedourie, (ed.). Turkey before and after Atatürk: Internal and External Affairs. London: Frank
Cass Publishers.
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4.2 Turkey and the Enlargement Process of the EU in the 1990s
The end of the Cold War had a profound effect on the overall system of the 
world while most radically affected the European continent. As one of the 
geopolitically and strategically cardinal actors of the European system of states, 
when the overall effects were apportioned, Turkey took one of the larger pieces. 
Turkey has faced, may be for the first time in its modem history, with a myriad of 
foreign policy alternatives with the changing global conjuncture. Consequently, It 
tried to form an equilibrium between its traditional Western orientation and newly 
emerging alternatives of eastward, northern and southern prospects, such as the 
mentoring of ex-Soviet Turkic Republics, the Black Sea cooperation projects, and 
the turbulent Middle East, as well as the Balkans."^  ^These challenges have come in 
a decade when Turkey itself has hardly been standing still; The eighties have 
probably brought sharper change to Turkey than perhaps any time since Atatürk, 
who founded the new Turkish secular nation-state on the mins of the Ottoman
Empire.64
Turkey’s relations with the EU have followed a constant pattern of change 
throughout the decade. The changing global context was an important reason for 
this intricate relationship. As Atila Eralp points out:
These new options are dwelled upon in Mustafa Aydui, (ed.), Turkey at the Threshold o f  the 21* 
Century: Global Encounters and/vs. Regional Alternatives. Ankara: International Relations 
Foundation, 1998. And also see: Fuller and Lesser, (eds.), 1993. op.cit.
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“Turkey’s relationship with the Community was less problematic 
when the international system was viewed within the East-West 
context and when security considerations dominated the political 
agenda. As the East-West axis became less determinant of the 
relations of the international system, and security issues were 
intertwined with political, economic, and cultural factors, Turkey- 
European Community/Union relations increasingly became more 
problematic. We have witnessed increasing divergence between the 
dynamics of European integration and the Turkish case. This trend, 
which started during the 1970s and 1980s, accelerated with the end of 
Cold War.” "^
Turkey, being part of the European defence during the Cold War, feels that it 
has a place in the new architecture of the continent which in now centred on the 
EU. The longstanding Association between Turkey and the EU aiming at Turkey's 
full membership, in the 1990s, entered into another stage with the Customs Union 
bringing about further integration between the two Parties. Therefore, especially 
after the completion of the Customs Union, Turkey expected its inclusion in the 
enlargement process of 1990s that incorporates the ex-Soviet bloc countries.
In June 1992, the European Parliament’s Committee for Foreign Affairs and 
Security adopted the Duty report on EC-Turkey relations. The report stressed that 
the relations should be improved as Turkey became a major actor of the regional 
politics.^^Within this perspective. The Community, although not considering
^Graham E. Fuller. 1993. “Turkey’s New Eastern Orientation” in Fuller and Lesser, op.cit. pp.37-96.
Atila Eralp, “Turkey and the European Union in the Aftermath o f  the Cold War”. In, Libby 
Rittenberg, ed.. The Political Economy o f Turkey in the Post-Soviet Era: Going West and Looking 
East. Westport: Praeger Publications, 1998, pp.37-50.
^  Anna Michalski, The European Community: The Challenge o f  Enlargement. London: REA, 1992, 
pp. 120-124.
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Turkey’s accession, aligned with a policy of betterment of relations with Turkey. 
Similarly, a report on closer relations between the EC and Turkey, presented by the 
British as the incoming presidency in June 1992, reconfirmed the ‘significant role’ 
Turkey played as a regional power in the proximity of three regions of increasing 
instability and highlighted the fact that Turkey is a member of NATO, an applicant 
for EC membership and a probably a future associate member of the WEU. 
Therefore, the report argued that the Twelve have an interest in establishing 
relations with Turkey in their debate on European construction.*’^  Within this new 
context, the relations improved as the Customs Union Agreement was finalised in 
1995. Therefore, the new European strategy towards Turkey incorporated closer 
relations while not mentioning the possibility of membership since the EU had just 
enlarged to fifteen in 1995.
After the Association Council of 29 April 1997, the EU once again acclaimed 
Turkey's eligibility for membership and asked the Commission to design a plan to 
intensify Turkey-EU relations, while noting that the development of this 
relationship depended on a number of political factors.^* But it also implied that 
Turkey would be evaluated on the basis of same criteria with other applicants. 
Turkey was invited to the Amsterdam European Council along with the other 
candidates on 16-17 June 1997. Yet this wave of optimism was short lived as the 
European Commission issued its report on enlargement. *
Ibid. p. 123.
** Of course these factors were covering the Turco-Greek relations, the Cyprus problem and the 
human rights issues and the treatment o f minorities in Turkey.
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The Commission did not include Turkey in the enlargement process in its 
report ‘Agenda 2000’^  ^ which it made public on 16 July 1997. While the report 
acknowledged that the Customs Union was functioning adequately and that it had 
made Turkey's ability to adapt to the EU norms in many areas evident, it repeated 
the same political and economic factors against Turkey and made no allusion to 
Turkey's full membership objective. The Commission, on the same day with 
Agenda 2000 issued its Communication to enhance relations with Turkey, which 
accepts Turkey's eligibility for full membership. It brought a number of suggestions 
ranging from liberalisation of trade in services to consumer protection, which is 
designed for developing Turkey-EU relations beyond the Customs Union, but 
brought up a number of political issues as pre-conditions for taking the relations a 
step forward. Actually the content of this report provided the framework for the 
development of mutual relations after 1997. It stated that:
“The Association Agreement and the customs union provide the 
foundations for building an increasingly close political and economic 
relationship. In this process the EU attaches particular importance to 
Turkey's progress in pursuing démocratisation and the protection of 
human rights; the establishment of good neighbourly relations 
between Greece and Turkey; respect for the principles of international 
law; and the achievement of a just and lasting settlement in Cyprus.”’*^
See Chapter 3 for details o f ‘Agenda 2000’ in this study. 
Agenda 2000: for a Stronger and Wider Union
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Also particular attention is given to the role of the Turkish military and the 
National Security Council in the political life of Turkey, and compatibility of this 
situation with democracy is often questioned by the European institutions, 
especially the European Parliament. Yet the strategic and economic importance of 
Turkey as a European power and a growing market could not be eluded. Even the 
European Parliament took the view ‘that the application for EU membership of 
Turkey needs a serious approach and [underlined] the necessity of a special 
relationship at high level between this country and the Union that goes beyond the
existing customs union, 71
4.2.1 The Luxembourg European Council
The Luxembourg European Council of December 1997 has become another 
milestone in the enlargement process of the 1990s and EC-Turkey relations. In 
spite of the considerable political efforts of the Turkish govemment^^ Turkey was 
not considered as a part of the enlargement process that incorporated eleven 
countries-later twelve with the inclusion of Malta- although it was considered
European Parliament, “Enlargement Briefing No. 7 Turkey and Relations with the European 
Union”, Brussels, 1999.
See, Appendix B for the European Council Presidency Conclusions on the enlargement process. 
^  For details o f  the political efforts, see: Mehmet Ah Birand, 2000. op.cit. pp.498-508.
167
eligible for membership. The Luxembourg meeting ‘came as a slap in the face’ 74
The decisions of the Luxembourg Summit were based on the content of the 
Commission Report, Agenda 2000. The most prominent implications for Turkey 
were; the decision to set up a strategy for Turkey with a view to accession and the 
creation of a review procedure to implement this strategy; the invitation of Turkey 
to the European Conference; and the initiative given to the Commission for the 
submission of proposals to increase the relations with Turkey. (See Appendix B)
In a statement issued after the Luxembourg Summit, the Turkish Government 
criticised the approach of the EU. It stated that Turkey's full membership goal and 
Associate status would nevertheless be maintained. Yet, the progress of bilateral 
relations is relying on the EU’s undertaking of its commitments, and that the 
Turkish Government would not further discuss with the EU issues remaining 
outside the contractual context of the bilateral relations as long as the EU did not 
change its attitude towards Turkey. Accordingly, Turkey did not participate in the 
European Conference held in London on 12 March 1998. Therefore, Turkey 
exposed the necessity of the recognition of equal terms for the continuity of the 
relations and gave the initiative to the EU for the revival of the mutual relations.
Bernard Kennedy. October 29, 1998. “Europe can Wait: After Luxembourg, Turkey Adopts a 
Realistic Position.”, International Herald Tribune. Sponsored Sections: Turkey at 75.
For the full text o f the statement, see: http:// www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/adab/luxembourg2.htm.
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The Commission published its proposals for a ‘European Strategy for Turkey’ 
on 4 March 1998. The proposals generally included:
“ - development of the possibilities afforded by the Ankara 
Agreement;
-intensification of the customs union;
-implementation of financial co-operation;
-approximation of laws and adoption of the Union acquis; 
-participation, to be decided case by case, in certain programmes 
and in certain agencies, as provided for in paragraphs 19 and 21 of 
the conclusions of the Luxembourg European Council.
Yet, the need for financing is still an ambiguous and unsettled issue as the 
Commission ‘draws attention to the urgent need for the Council to adopt the 
financial regulation for the special financial co-operation arrangements for Turkey 
as fast as possible, as this will enable a comprehensive and consistent strategy for 
Turkey to be implemented’. On the other hand, the enlargement process for the 
first wave countries has started at full flow. The Cardiff European Council on 15- 
16 June 1998 have viewed the ‘European Strategy’ to prepare Turkey for 
membership as a successful inauguration of the progress of the relations with 
Turkey and concludes that:
“... taken as a package, this provides the platform for developing our 
relationship on a sound and evolutionary basis. The European Council 
invites the Commission to carry forward this strategy, including the 
tabling of any proposals necessary for its effective implementation.
European Commission. 4 March, 1998. ‘European Strategy for Turkey- Commission’s Initial 
Operational Proposals’, Brussels.
77 Ibid.
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The Strategy can be enriched over time, taking into account Turkey’s 
own ideas. The European Council further invites the Presidency and 
the Commission and the appropriate Turkish authorities to pursue the 
objective of harmonising Turkey’s legislation and practice with the 
acquis, and asks the Commission to report an early Association 
Council on progress made. Recalling the need for financial support for 
the European Strategy, the European Council notes the Commission’s 
intention to reflect on ways and means of underpinning the 
implementation of the European strategy, and to table appropriate 
proposals to this effect.
The wording of the conclusions was slightly different than in Luxembourg^^, 
yet, this did not prove sufficient for Turkey. An important result of the Cardiff 
Summit for Turkey was the request of the Council to the Commission for finding 
solutions to avail the financial resources required for carrying out the ‘European 
Strategy’. Also the request to the Commission to view the progress of the strategy 
as annual reports was, in a sense, incorporating the Turkish position in a wider 
framework of enlargement. But the report on Turkey would be based on Article 
28**’ of the Association Agreement with Turkey as well as the conclusions of the 
Luxembourg Summit of 1997. Yet the Turkish Government expressed that legal 
documentation covering the Turkish inclusion to the pre-accession phase of the 
enlargement process including the pledge by the EU is essential for the 
normalisation of the relations in a Statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign
Cardiff European Council Presidency Conclusions, 15-16 June 1998. Paragraph 68. See; http:// 
europa. eu. int/council/oflD'conclu/june98. htm.
The term ‘eligible to become a member’ has been replaced by the term ‘candidate for membership’ 
Article 28 states that “as soon as the operation o f  the Agreement has advanced far enough to 
justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey o f the obligations arising out o f  the Treaty establishing 
the Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility o f the accession o f Turkey to 
the Community”.
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Affairs following the Cardiff Summit.** The questioning of diversion of financial 
resources for the implementation of this strategy was considered as an indication of 
the EUs awareness of the need for concrete steps in this area. The absence of 
financial resources and a suitable standpoint for Turkey's accession constituted the 
main obstacles challenging the appropriate implementation of the Strategy.
The Commission adopted the twelve reports, including Turkey and Cyprus, 
on initial evaluation of progress made by each of the applicants towards 
membership on 4 November 1998. On Turkey, the latest Commission report goes 
beyond updating the 1989 opinion. The criteria applied were the same as for the 
CEECs although some difficulties were encountered in gathering information 
concerning the adoption of the acquis in areas that were not covered by the 
Customs Union. As the report implies the evaluation of the situation in Turkey 
according to the same criteria as for the countries of central and eastern European 
reveals a singularity of Turkey with regard to the political criteria for membership. 
The Commission expressed the willingness of the EU to develop its assistance in 
economic reform and the adoption of the acquis communautaire in the framework 
of the European Strategy. But, It is regarded as the sole responsibility of Turkey to 
improve the situation with regard to the pressing need to reinforce democracy and 
to protect human and minority rights.*^
** Republic o f Turkey, Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs, 17 June 1998. ‘Statement Regarding the 
Conclusions o f the Cardiff European Council’, Ankara.
European Commission. 4 November 1998. “Composite Paper: Reports on Progress towards 
Accession by each o f  the Candidate Countries”, Brussels.
”  Ibid.
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The report drew the conclusion that in economic terms and conformity with 
the acquis, Turkey is likely to progress at a balanced pace in co-operation with the 
Union. But, to overcome the political obstacles and anomalies such as the 
persistent violations of human rights and important deficiencies in the treatment of 
minorities and the absence of real civilian control over the army. Turkey did not 
consider the report very satisfactory since it dwelled upon the political situation of 
Turkey on the contrary to the Statement of the Turkish Government issued after the 
Luxembourg Summit.
After the Cardiff European Council, the EU-Turkey relations neither 
ameliorated nor deteriorated. Following a rather steady era, the Helsinki European 
Council witnessed a peak in mutual relations, which can be called the ‘Helsinki 
Process’. A number of political conditions have changed in the period following the 
Cardiff European Council, thus, allowing for the acceleration of the improvement 
of position of Turkey vis-à-vis the EU. These conditions can be summarised as; 
Turkey’s strategic importance was once again reaffirmed during the Kosovo crisis; 
the U.S. efforts to emphasise the necessity of Turkey’s inclusion for its importance 
as a counterweight against Russia in the Middle East, Central Asia and Caucasia 
within the long term interests of the West; election victory of the Social Democrats 
in Germany replacing Christian Democrats that are opposing to full membership of 
Turkey; the successful reformist legislation of the coalition governments in Turkey 
following 1998; Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit’s letter to his German
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Counterpart, Schroeder, about the Turkish attitude for continuing reforms including 
the situation in the Southeastern Turkey was considered as an official acceptance of 
the Copenhagen Criteria; the seizure of the leader of the secessionist terrorist group 
in February 1998 has lifted the pressure of terror from the Turkish public opinion as 
well as the Turkish Government; the changing position of the Greek Goverrnnent^“* 
against Turkey by pursuing more negotiating policies in the controversial issues.®^
4.2.2 The Helsinki European Council
The EU-Turkey relations have entered a phase of continual diplomatic 
meetings as the Helsinki European Council approached. The EU was aware of the 
miscalculated move it had made during the Luxembourg European Council by 
excluding Turkey from the Enlargement Process instead of granting candidacy 
status. This led to a tense and obscure era between the two parties. Therefore the 
EU decided to let Turkey in the accession process since this process does not have 
a certain timetable as each candidate is assessed by own conditions. Furthermore 
this status is not a certifícate for a guaranteed membership status since the 
fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria is a pre-condition of accession to the Union.
84 In a sense, the Marmara earthquake o f 17 August 1999 has been a catalyst for furthering these 
developments at the societal level.
Mehmet Ali Birand, 2000. op.cit. pp. 520-523.
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The Commission issued its second regular Report on Turkey’s progress 
towards accession (see Appendix C) along with the Composite Paper in which the 
all candidate countries are generally evaluated on 13 October 1999. In the 
Composite Paper, the Commission signalled significant change by proposing that 
Turkey be considered as a candidate, and foresaw the implementation of certain 
procedures that are similar to the procedures provide for the other candidate 
countries within the enlargement process whose elements are identified by the 
EU.^  ^The Composite Paper indicated that:
“On the basis of shared ideals and agreed common rules of political, 
economic and social behaviour the current Member States and 
candidate countries will be able to chose to join together in a wider 
Union. The countries of central and eastern Europe, Malta, Cyprus 
and Turkey have already shown their determination and their 
capacity for change, their economies are increasingly integrated with 
that of the Union and huge efforts are being made by Parliaments, 
governments, the public and private sectors to prepare for EU 
membership. The EU is actively supporting these efforts and has set 
in motion the steps needed to make its own financial and 
institutional preparations for the accession of new members.”*’
Turkey welcomed these proposals that lay down the necessary measures for 
its preparation for full membership. In the Statement made by the Foreign Ministry 
of Turkey, it was stated that the endorsement of all these EU Commission 
proposals at the Helsinki European Council, in other words, Turkey's recognition as 
an official candidate with all its inherent modalities, would initiate a new phase in
“  See Chapter 3 o f this study.
European Commission, 13 October 1999. “Composite Paper: Reports on Progress towards 
Accession by each o f  the Candidate Countries”, Brussels.
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Turkey-EU relations.*^* For the recognition of the Turkish candidacy, the European 
Commission proposed that;
“Turkey has expressed the wish to be a candidate country and should 
be considered as such. To date the European strategy for Turkey has 
been more narrowly focused than for the other candidate countries. 
In particular the financial support from the EU which could have 
underpinned the process of alignment has been limited. To 
encourage in-depth reforms, it is now time to take a step forward and 
to further develop the strategy with regard to Turkey. While 
retaining specific features linked to the current situation of the 
country it can in future be aligned more closely on the strategy 
followed with the other candidate countries.
The Helsinki European Council on 10-11 December 1999 opened a new era 
in Turkey-EU relations. It has also been considered as a historic incident and 
regarded as a historic step taken by the formal rivals. It confirmed the importance 
of the enlargement process particularly for ensuring stability and prosperity in 
Europe. By stressing the candidacy of Turkey within the inclusive nature of the 
enlargement process which the thirteen candidate countries participated on equal 
footing, the European Council officially affirmed that Turkey will be evaluated on 
the same criteria with other candidates accordingly with the expectations of the 
Turkish government since the Luxembourg European Council.^' *
** Turkish Republic Ministry o f Foreign Affairs. 13 October 1999. Press Release Regarding the 
Progress Report o f  the European Commission. Ankara.
^  European Commission. 13 October 1999. Composite Paper, op.cit.
^^ 13 December 1999. ‘Bringing Turkey into Europe'. New York Times.
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The Helsinki European Council has given the initiative for the 
iniplementation of the accession criteria to Turkey which will use the guidance of 
the European Commission like the other countries. Therefore, in this new era, 
Turkey itself will be the determinant factor for attaining the goal of membership, 
which it pursues since the signing of the Association Agreement.
4.3 Post-Helsinki Developments
The Presidency Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council endorsed the 
proposals of the Composite Paper of the Commission dated 13 October 1999. 
Therefore, Turkey will receive the benefits of the pre-accession strategy to 
stimulate and support its reforms as the other candidate countries. Turkey will 
participate in Community programs open to other candidate countries, and will 
naturally be invited to the meetings between candidate states and the Union in the 
context of the accession process. A single framework for coordinating all sources 
of EU financial assistance for pre-accession will also be created.
Turkey-EU relations are on an accelerating course after the Helsinki 
European Council. For the first time in the 1990s membership discussions are made 
alongside with concrete structural developments towards membership. The 
Association Council meeting that took place in Luxembourg on 11 April 2000,
See Appendix B for the Presidency Conclusions on the enlargement process
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after an interim of three years, illustrates a notable shift of course within the 
framework mutual cooperation. The Association Council adopted important 
decisions for the period ahead including the formation of an accession partnership, 
a national programme, and the collective screening of the acquis communautaire 
along with the formulations of the 1997 Luxembourg Council originated enhanced 
pre-accession strategy.
4.3.1 The Association Committee
Eight sub-committees under the Association Committee have been set up to 
carry out the screening process. As it has done for the other candidates, the EU has 
assigned the 31 chapters that constitute the acquis communautaire to those eight 
sub-committees for Turkey. The screening process should be started in the period 
of May to June. For this purpose, the Association Committee will meet in May and 
decide the working procedures of the sub-committees.
It has been decided to start negotiations in the area of services on which work 
has been done since the introduction of the Customs Union. The negotiations are 
expected to be finalised by the end of 2000 as they have started in June. The 
European Commission has begun to prepare a draft agreement for the Accession 
Partnership as it did for the other candidate countries for the first time by taking the 
views of the sides into consideration. The Accession Partnership document to be
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prepared by the Commission should be submitted to the EU Council by the end of 
October. An assessment of Turkey’s political, social and economic evaluation on 
the basis of the Copenhagen Criteria and the Community’s acquis will constitute 
the major component of this instrument. The Commission will submit its progress 
report together v^th the Accession Partnership document to the EU Council on the 
same date as it will for the other candidates.
4.3.2 National Programme
The National Programme for Turkey will depend on the basis of the two 
documents mentioned above. The programme will include detailed information on 
Turkey's alignment schedule, priorities and periods. In this context, it is important 
that Turkey should complete its internal preparations by the summer holiday. In 
this way, it should be possible to draft the national programme in a greater degree
of preparedness. 92
4.3.3 Financial Cooperation
The issue of Financial Cooperation, which has been a major setback for long 
years, is now revitalising as the Turkish-Greek relations enter into a new phase
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which motivated Greece to lift up its veto over EU-Turkey financial cooperation. 
This will enhance the prospects of further cooperation on equal grounds with the 
other candidates, and facilitate the previously blocked financial protocols.
A loan agreement has been signed in Ankara for the first portion of EURO 
450 million out of the EURO 600 million that was pledged in 1999 in the 
framework of Earthquake Assistance. The formal acts have been concluded for the 
first of two individual Regulations in the amount of 15 million EURO and 135 
million EURO which have been delivered for a three year period designed for 
preparing Turkey for accession. This Regulation, which has been adopted with 
unanimity, has been the first decision that was not hindered by the Greek veto in 
the financial area. The second Regulation amounting to 135 million EURO has 
already been submitted to the European Parliament for approval in the context of 
the co-decision procedure.
The Commission is continuing its efforts without interruption to bring 
together in a single framework all the financial assistance^^ that will be provided to 
Turkey on the road to full membership as decided at the Helsinki Summit.’“* The 
Commission intends to ensure that the entire amount is made available by the end
For a detailed analysis o f  the future enlargement process and Turkey, consult: http:// 
www.mfa.gov.tr and http:// europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/Turkey.htm as o f  July 2000.
The Commission has stated that the share to be allocated for Turkey out o f  the M EDAII Fund will 
be set much higher compared to the past and to other beneficiary countries. Turkey and its private 
sector will also benefit fi"om the amount o f  8.5 billion EURO that is allocated to the candidate 
countries for a period o f  three years as the pre-accession facility. It is estimated that there may be a 
disbursement o f  approximately 400 million EURO this year out o f  the EIB loan o f  EURO 750 million 
dating back to the initial period o f  the Customs Union.
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of 2002. A legal framework to clear the way for using the loan is currently being 
formed.
4.3.4 Prospects for the Future of European Union Enlargement Incorporating 
Turkey
The Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) passed a law on Formation 
and Duties of General Secretariat of European Union on 27 June 2000 with the aim 
of coordinating the internal state policies and activities directed towards preparing 
Turkey for the membership of the European Union. This should be considered as 
a very important step in Turkey’s quest for membership since it emphasises a 
determined Turkish stance to overcome the hard and long process of transformation 
necessary for the EU membership. Turkey’s relations with both the member 
countries of the EU and the candidates for membership have entered into a course 
of concentration accordingly with the Helsinki. Process. Political and technical 
levels of cooperation have intensified increasingly. For example, a new consultative 
meeting has been held with Germany, which gives increased support to Turkey. 
Contacts with other candidate countries are also increasing. Lithuania, Romania, 
Slovakia and Sloveiua have proposed to exchange ideas with Turkey in order to 
convey their own experience. Very recently, Turkey signed two United Nations
See Appendix B. Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions. Par. 12.
Article 1 o f  the above-mentioned law. For a complete text see: http://www.tbmm.gov.tr. 
^  Latest developments are gathered from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/adc/latest.htm
180
Covenants^^ that were already signed by all of the member states and the candidate 
countries. This is regarded as an important preliminary step on the issue ot human 
nghts in the road to compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria.
The utilisation of the phases of enlargement as foreseen in the Luxembourg 
process, for Turkey, might take longer compared to the other associated countries 
due its size, which is larger than all other candidates’ sizes are. Therefore, the 
prospects for accession of Turkey should be considered as a middle-range 
objective, and consequently, the prevailing debates in Turkey about the EU should 
shift to the application of the necessary criteria,rather than concentrating on the 
membership itself
4.3.5 Developments within the EU
The candidate countries for EU membership are evaluated as the first wave, 
the Luxembourg group, which includes the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, and as the second wave, the Helsinki group, which 
includes Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovakia, accordingly 
with the series in which they have initiated accession negotiations. It was 
previously assumed that the candidates in the Luxembourg group would be able to
^  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights dated 1966.
98 16 August 2000. “AB Yolunda Iki İmza”. Hürriyet.
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reach full membership earlier than the second wave countries. However, as the 
negotiations with candidates enter into more difficult areas such as agriculture, this 
assumption seems to have considerably changed. As a result, it is often indicated 
that the first wave of enlargement may be expected to shift towards 2006 rather 
than the end of 2002 or 2003 as previously stated.
In order to prepare the EU institutions for the enlargement, the 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) as the top negotiation forum of the Union is 
continuing to operate on issues concerning decision-making and representation that 
are seemingly creating adversities within the EU.’°° Although the IGC was 
envisaged to be limited to finding settlement to institutional issues, new negotiating 
areas such as the European Security and Defence Initiative (ESDI) are being added 
as a result of arising needs. In addition, the IGC wants to include the future of EU 
institutions such as the European Court of Justice and the Economic and Social 
Council. The European Parliament insists on the adoption of a "Charter of Basic 
Rights and Freedoms" for the EU. So far, it has only been possible to agree on an 
extension of qualified majority voting to other areas. Also the weighting of the 
qualified majority voting system poses another challenge at a great extent as the 
candidate countries, especially the more populous ones like Turkey and Poland*®’,
99 Copenhagen Critena.
For details, discussions and legal texts about the content o f  the IGC see: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/igc2000/index_en.htm.
The qualified majority voting procedure o f  the European Union will be largely affected by the 
enlargement since it has been thought to terminate the veto right o f  one single country. The 
enlargement process expected to be finalised in three to ten years will put great pressure on the QMV 
system as the new members will change the balances within the Union in terms o f  voting weight. The 
enlarged Union will be introduced with new groups o f  member states. For the effects o f  possible
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start to enter the EU. This course of development will certainly affect the original 
scheme of completing the IGC by the end of 2000 and start the enlargement in
2003. This is one of the reasons behind the above-mentioned new target date of 
2006.
Therefore, along with other countries, Turkey has the opportunity to 
accelerate its efforts to catch up at least the second wave countries not to be 
excluded if all the countries can succeed in concluding their accession negotiations 
and access the EU before Turkey. Yet, it must be understood that the classical 
method of enlargement will replace itself with an ‘adaptive’ formula that 
minimises or excludes the possibility of transitional periods, therefore, entailing a 
greater task on the candidate countries to comply with the membership criteria if 
they wish to pursue their accession efforts.
enlargements incorporating different sets o f  countries see: Philippe C. Schmitter, Jose I. Torreblanca. 
“Old ‘Foundations’ and New ‘Rules’- For an Enlarged European Union”, in, European Integration 
Online Papers. Vol. 1 (1), 1997. See: http://eiop.or.at.
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CONCLUSION
The enlargement of the EU is not a recent process but rather a continuous one, 
us the EU became a focus of attraction of non-member states since its inception. 
Moreover the history of the Community displays that the emerging Union did not 
discard such a role, and made the enlargement an inherent principle whenever deemed 
suitable. Yet the Community rules, the acquis communautaire, has become the main 
focus wile incorporating new members since the deepening of the integration process 
wanted to be safeguarded from the possible diluting affects that may derive as a result 
of the widening of the Union. Therefore, the Community have developed a method 
what can be called a ‘classical enlargement method’ and tried to preserve its institutions 
from the complexities that may arise due to adhesion of new members. During the first 
four enlargements, this classical method had worked out well and the Community was 
able to raise its membership to fifteen members from six.
During the 1990s, a real challenge to the Community came from the East and 
Cental Europe, as the former Soviet Bloc countries picked the EC, among other 
continental organisations, as the focus of their post-Cold War orientation within the 
New World Order. As Bideleux points out;
Membership of the Council of Europe, EFTA, OECD, WEU, or NATO 
may have played analogous roles in some instances, but none of those 
organisations could rival either the EC’s capacity for deep and pervasive 
penetration of political systems or its potential for promoting political, 
institutional, and economic change and liberalisation.”*
Robert Bideleux. 1996. op.cit. p. 127.
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Consequently, enlargement became one of the major issues of the Community 
which, at that moment, tried to further institutionalise towards a political union. After 
the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, the attention given to 
the process of integrating new members increased and occupied the top place of the 
Union agenda. New guidelines for enlargement, which can be regarded as the ‘adaptive 
method of enlargement, has been developed after the launching of the Agenda 2000 by 
the Luxembourg European Council. While the EU is assisting to prepare the candidate 
countries with lesser levels of development compared to the members of the Union, it 
continues to adapt its institutions for a wider Um'on through the Intergovernmental 
Conference.
The enlargement poses tough challenges for the integration process. Beyond 
expected short-term benefits of the negotiating parties (the EU and the candidate states) 
from the completion of enlargement, in order to proceed the ‘European Project’ 
involving a deeper integration of a wider Europe, willingness of the new members will 
be a requisite condition. Although it is proposing a noteworthy challenge to the 
endeavour of integration, the enlargement of the community was not studied in detail at 
the theoretical level. The federal vision of the founding fathers of the Union have 
transformed into many different patterns as the Union evolved throughout the decades. 
The scholars that develop regional integration theories, which developed as a response 
to the European integration, did not contemplate on the enlargement process as a factor 
in its entirety, and preferred to treat it within an intracommunity framework after new 
members entered and became a part of the community. The motives behind the non­
member countries’ inclination towards the EC and whether these countries shared
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supranational or intergovernmental views on integration was not deemed as an 
appealing subject by the scholars of regional integration theories.
For example, Turkey’s position within the development of the EU is still 
ambiguous within the scope of the integration theories. The challenges posed by the 
external dynamics of the surrounding regions of the EU prove to further complicate the 
matrix of theory building. The regional integration theories will have to develop 
accordingly considering these external dynamics that pressures the institutionalisation 
of the EU and the integration process. The alternating nature of the political conditions 
should further taken into consideration while conceptualising the integration dynamics. 
As the enlargement process comprises thirteen different countries, the different 
approaches that they will bring into the integration process should be deliberated upon.
The future of the EU is unclear as the ultimate outcome of the integration 
process can not be identified as the EU involves fifteen different members. With the 
increased number of member states, the future will be even more ambiguous, and new 
theories should be conceptualised as efforts to make the future of Europe more 
transparent. The German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joschka Fischer indicated that:
“The task ahead [of the EU] will be anything but easy and will require all 
our strength; in the coming decade we will have to enlarge the EU to the 
east and south-east, and this will in the end mean a doubling in the number 
of members. And at the same time, if we are to be able to meet this historic 
challenge and integrate the new member states without substantially 
denting the ELTs capacity for action, we must put into place the last brick in 
the building of European integration, namely political integration.”^
186
As for the future of the EU, although the completion of accession of candidate 
countries may extend over from ten to fifteen years, ‘it is increasingly likely that even the 
European Union will not be a homogenous region, but will be one in which regional or 
national differences and inequalities, though hopefully contained within the common 
framework, persist’.^  Once the processes of institutional reform and enlargement are 
amalgamated, the European Union will certainly become a more competent and confident 
member of the global community, and it will promote the security of the continent by 
providing peace and stability through different levels of integration, and it will contribute 
functionally to the maintenance of the globalisation of the free market economy. The 
enlargement will be a continuing process just like the deepening of the integration even 
after the accession of the thirteen candidates over the following decades As stated in a 
Commission Report;
“The enlargement of the Union is a complex undertaking, posing internal 
questions about institutional reform which need to be addressed before the 
Union can increase the number of Member States, and external questions 
involving redefining the relations of an enlarged Union with its neighbours. 
Apart from the thirteen countries which are already candidates the Union 
also has close relations with other neighbours which are based on very 
different views of the future. Although it is not possible to draw up neat 
classifications into which all of the Union’s European neighbours fit it is 
nonetheless possible to identify different groups of countries based on their 
eligibility for and aspiration to future membership.”^
With the recognition of the EU’s position of becoming the gravity centre of the 
European affairs and its ever-growing role in the global politics, Turkey has to 
materialise its prospect of membership within the next enlargement process. Bearing in
 ^Joschka Fischer. 12 May 2000. “From Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the Finality o f  European 
Integration”. Speech at the Humboldt University, Berlin.
 ^E. J. Hobsbawm. “An Afterword: European Union at the End o f  the Century”. In Jytte Klausen, Louise 
A. Tilly, (eds.), European Integration In Social and Historical Perspective: 1850 to the Present. Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1997, pp. 267-275.
European Commission. Composite Paper: Reports on Progress towards Accession bv each o f  the 
Candidate Countries. 1999.
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mind that other non-member states, such as Croatia, Yugoslavia, Albania, Macedom'a, 
Bosnia-Hercegovina, Ukraine and, even, Russian Federation forming the periphery of 
an enlarged EU, will be willing to become members in another wave ot enlargement, 
Turkey, with a determined attitude, must utilise this membership prospect and occupy a 
definite place in the prospective enlargement. Turkey’s application for membership in 
1987 was rejected because the ‘time was not yet ripe’^ , but it is clear that within the 
enlargement process of 1990s, time has now come to harvest the past efforts of the last 
four decades.
Turkey’s efforts to become a member of the Union should be continuous 
because, it is ‘at the same time a very natural product of Turkey’s struggle for 
democracy’^  since the founding of the Republic in 1923. Thus, the EU membership 
should be the top priority for Turkish foreign policy and Turkey should catch up with 
the integration process of the EU as it increases its pace. As the Accession Partnership 
(of Turkey and EU) document is to be issued by November 2000, Turkey should 
increase its efforts towards affiliation with the acquis communautaire as well the 
institutions and the programmes of the EU. Yet it should be noted that the most 
important aspect of membership is the adaptation of the political culture that is 
embedded with the communitarian principles rather than the technical elements that 
predominate the pre-accession phases and the accession negotiations. According to 
Loukas Tsoukalis;
“The Community is something much more than the ‘acquis 
communautaire’. It also represents a political culture and a way of thinking *
 ^ Peter CofFev. Future o f  Europe. Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995, p.91.
* Hadi Uluengin. 22 July 2000. “Cumhuriyet ve AB”. Hürriyet.
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which, through a process of osmosis, may be transmitted to a new member
country.”^
Turkey’s accession to the EU will be an historic incident as it will indicate the 
origins of a ‘harmony of civilisations’ instead of a ‘clash of civilisations’ which was 
foreseen to characterise the post-Cold War international affairs by many scholars. With 
the defined criteria and strategy for European enlargement, the European Union is 
expected to start to accept first members between the years 2003-2006. Yet the efforts 
of the candidate countries to adhere to the Copenhagen criteria is countered by the ever­
growing nature and magnitude of the acquis. This may only protract the completion of 
the enlargement process, but it can not hinder the overall performance of the candidate 
countries. With an optimistic evaluation, the process will be completed in ten to fifteen 
years from now. Although enlargement is considered as a process which involves 
waves (groups) of countries according to the inauguration date of their accession 
negotiations, it should be noted that the evaluation of countries with regard to their 
ability to comply with the necessary criteria will be done on an individual basis. 
Therefore the possibility of rejection of a country is always existent. Although accession 
of some countries might not be accomplished after the end of the accession negotiations 
- as a result of rejection by the EU or by a referendum in the candidate countries as in 
the case of Norway - it is a fact that the next decade of the European Union shall be 
characterised by the accession of new members as the first results of the enlargement 
process launched in the 1990s will start to be achieved. *
Loukas Tsoukalis. 1981. The EC and its Mediterranean Enlargement. London; George Allen & Unwin, 
1991. Quoted in Christopher Preston. 1997. Enlargement and Integration in the European Union. London; 
Routledge. p.68.
* For example, Samuel Huntington determinedly presumes that Turkey will not become a member o f  the 
European Community. See; Samuel Huntington. “Clash o f  Civilizations?”. Foreign Affairs. Vol. 72 (3), 
1993, pp. 22-49, especially see pp. 42-43.
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a p p e n d ic e s
APPENDIX A
PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS
HELSINKI EUROPEAN COUNCIL
10 AND 11 DECEMBER 1999
(PART I. PREPARING FOR ENL ARGEMENT)
l. PREPARING FOR ENLARGEMENT 
The enlargement process
3. The European Council confirms the importance of the enlargement process 
launched in Luxembourg in December 1997 for the stability and prosperity for 
the entire European continent. An efficient and credible enlargement process
m. ust be sustained.
4, The European Council reaffirms the inclusive nature of the accession 
process, which now comprises 13 candidate States within a single framework. 
The candidate States are participating in the accession process on an equal 
footing. They must share the values and objectives of the European Union as 
set out in the Treaties. In this respect the European Council stresses the 
principle of peaceful settlem.ent of disputes in accordance ivith the United 
Nations Charter and urges candidate States to make ever}' effort to resolve any 
outstanding border disputes and other related issues. Failing this they should 
within a reasonable time bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice. 
The European Council ivill review the situation relating to any outstanding 
disputes, in particular concerning the repercussions on the accession process
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and in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of 
Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004. Moreover, the European Council 
recalls that compliance with the political criteria laid down at the Copenhagen 
European Council is a prerequisite for the opening of accession negotiations 
and that compliance with all the Copenhagen criteria is the basis for accession 
to the Union.
5. The Union has made a firm political commitment to make every effort to 
complete the Intergovernmental Conference on institutional reform by 
December 2000, to be followed by ratification. After ratification of the results 
of that Conference the Union should be in a position to welcome new Member 
States from the end of 2002 as soon as they have demonstrated their ability to 
assume the obligations of membership and once the negotiating process has 
been successfully completed.
6. The Commission has made a new detailed assessment of progress in the 
candidate States. This assessment shows progress towards fulfilling the 
accession criteria. At the same time, given that difficulties remain in certain 
sectors, candidate States are encouraged to continue and step up their efforts to 
comply with the accession criteria. It emerges that some candidates will not be 
in a position to meet all the Copenhagen criteria in the medium term. The 
Commission's intention is to report in early 2000 to the Council on progress by 
certain candidate States on fulfilling the Copenhagen economic criteria. The 
next regular progress reports will be presented in good time before the 
European Council in December 2000.
7. The European Council recalls the importance of high standards of nuclear
safety in Central and Eastern Europe. It calls on the Council to consider how to
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address the issue of nuclear safety in the framework of the enlargement process 
in accordance with the relevant Council conclusions.
8. The European Council notes with satisfaction the substantive work 
undertaken and progress which has been achieved in accession negotiations 
with Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia.
9. (a)The European Council welcomes the launch of the talks aiming at a 
comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem on 3 December in New York 
and expresses its strong support for the UN Secretary-General’s efforts to bring 
the process to a successful conclusion.
(b) The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate 
the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been 
reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on 
accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the 
Council will take account of all relevant factors.
10. Determined to lend a positive contribution to security and stability on the 
European continent and in the light of recent developments as well as the 
Commission's reports, the European Council has decided to convene bilateral 
intergovernmental conferences in February 2000 to begin negotiations with 
Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Malta on the conditions for 
their entry into the Union and the ensuing Treaty adjustments.
11. In the negotiations, each candidate State will be judged on its own merits.
This principle will apply both to opening of the various negotiating chapters
and to the conduct of the negotiations. In order to maintain momentum in the
negotiations, cumbersome procedures should be avoided. Candidate States
which have now been brought into the negotiating process will have the
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possibility to catch up within a reasonable period of time with those already in 
negotiations if they have made sufficient progress in their preparations. 
Progress in negotiations must go hand in hand with progress in incorporating 
the acquis into legislation and actually implementing and enforcing it.
12. The European Council welcomes recent positive developments in Turkey 
as noted in the Commission's progress report, as well as its intention to 
continue its reforms towards complying with the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey 
is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria 
as applied to the other candidate States. Building on the existing European 
strategy, Turkey, like other candidate States, will benefit from a pre-accession 
strategy to stimulate and support its reforms. This will include enhanced 
political dialogue, with emphasis on progressing towards fulfilling the political 
criteria for accession with particular reference to the issue of human rights, as 
well as on the issues referred to in paragraphs 4 and 9(a). Turkey will also have 
the opportunity to participate in Community programmes and agencies and in 
meetings between candidate States and the Union in the context of the 
accession process. An accession partnership will be drawn up on the basis of 
previous European Council conclusions while containing priorities on which 
accession preparations must concentrate in the light of the political and 
economic criteria and the obligations of a Member State, combined with a 
national programme for the adoption of the acquis. Appropriate monitoring 
mechanisms will be established. With a view to intensifying the harmonisation 
of Turkey's legislation and practice with the acquis, the Commission is invited 
to prepare a process of analytical examination of the acquis. The European
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Council asks the Commission to present a single framework for coordinating 
all sources of European Union financial assistance for pre-accession.
13. The future of the European Conference will be reviewed in the light of the 
evolving situation and the decisions on the accession process taken at Helsinki. 
The forthcoming French Presidency has announced its intention to convene a 
meeting of the conference in the second half of 2000.
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APPENDIX B
LUXEMBOURG EUROPEAN COUNCIL 
12 AND 13 DECEMBER 1997 
PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS
(INTRODUCTION, EUROPEAN UNION ENLARGEMENT, THE 
EVOLUTION OF UNION POLICIES: AGENDA 2000)
INTRODUCTION
The European Council meeting in Luxembourg on 12 and 13 December 1997 
marks a moment of historic significance for the future of the Union and of 
Europe as a whole. With the launch of the enlargement process we see the 
dawn of a new era, finally putting an end to the divisions of the past. Extending 
the European integration model to encompass the whole of the continent is a 
pledge of future stability and prosperity.
At the same time as launching the enlargement process, the European Council 
has embarked upon a comprehensive study of the development of the Union 
and its policies so that it can make a fitting response to the challenges coming 
up after the year 2000. The Union will thus have a clear and coherent vision 
with which to take on the next century and face up to enlargement.
The European Council adopted a Resolution on economic policy coordination 
which will complete preparations for the third stage of Economic and 
Monetary Union. It was also pleased to note that the arrangements for Union 
action on employment are now in place.
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The European Council began its proceedings by an exchange of views with Mr 
José María GIL-ROBLES, President of the European Parliament, on the main 
subjects for discussion.
A meeting was also held with the Heads of State and Government and the 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the associated countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe and Cyprus. The meeting was devoted to the launch of the overall 
process for enlargement of the Union.
EUROPEAN UNION ENLARGEMENT
1. The Luxembourg European Council has taken the decisions necessary to 
launch the overall enlargement process.
2. The task in the years ahead will be to prepare the applicant States for 
accession to the Umon and to see that the Union is properly prepared for 
enlargement. This enlargement is a comprehensive, inclusive and ongoing 
process, which will take place in stages; each of the applicant States will 
proceed at its own rate, depending on its degree of preparedness.
3. As a prerequisite for enlargement of the Union, the operation of the 
institutions must be strengthened and improved in keeping with the 
institutional provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty.
The European Conference
4. The European Council decided to set up a European Conference which will 
bring together the Member States of the European Union and the European 
States aspiring to accede to it and sharing its values and internal and external 
objectives.
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5. The members of the Conference must r hare a common commitment to 
peace, security and good neighbourliness, respect for other countries' 
sovereignty, the principles upon which the European Union is founded, the 
integrity and inviolability of external borders and the principles of international 
law and a commitment to the settlement of territorial disputes by peaceful 
means, in particular through the jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice in the Hague. Countries which endorse these principles and respect the 
right of any European country fulfilling the required criteria to accedeto the 
European Union and sharing the Union's commitment to building a Europe free 
of the divisions and difficulties of the past will be invited to take part in the 
Conference.
6. The States which accept these criteria and subscribe to the above principles 
will be invited to take part in the Conference. Initially, the EU offer will be 
addressed to Cyprus, the applicant States of Central and Eastern Europe and 
Turkey.
7. The European Conference will be a multilateral forum for political 
consultation, intended to address questions of general concern to the 
participants and to broaden and deepen their cooperation on foreign and 
security policy, justice and home affairs, and other areas of common concern, 
particularly economic matters and regional cooperation.
8. The Conference will be chaired by the State holding the Presidency of the 
Council of the European Union. At the Presidency's invitation. Heads of State 
and Government and the President of the Commission will meet at the 
Conference once a year, as will the Ministers for Foreign Affairs.
9. The first meeting of the Conference will be in London in March 1998.
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The process of accession and negotiation
10. The European Council has considered the current situation in each of the 
eleven applicant States on the basis of the Commission's opinions and the 
Presidency's report to the Council. In the light of its discussions, it has decided 
to launch an accession process comprising the ten Central and East European 
applicant States and Cyprus. This accession process will form part of the 
implementation of Article 0 of the Treaty on European Union. The European 
Council points out that all these States are destined to join the European Union 
on the basis of the same criteria and that they are participating in the accession 
process on an equal footing. This process, which will be evolutive and 
inclusive, will comprise the following elements,
a. The framework
11. The accession process will be launched on 30 March 1998 by a meeting of 
the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the fifteen Member States of the European 
Union, the ten Central and East European applicant States and Cyprus. A 
single framework for these applicant countries will be established.
12. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the fifteen members of the European 
Union will meet their opposite numbers from the ten Central and East 
European applicant States and Cyprus as the need arises. Technical ministerial 
meetings could also be envisaged, bearing in mind experience with the 
structured dialogue.
b. The enhanced pre-accession strategy
13. The enhanced pre-accession strategy is intended to enable all the applicant
States of Central and Eastern Europe eventually to become members of the
European Union and, to that end, to align themselves as far as possible on the
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Union acquis prior to accession. With the Europe Agreements, which remain 
the basis of the Union's relations with these States, the strategy centres on 
accession partnerships and increased pre-accession aid. It will be accompanied 
by an analytical study of the Union acquis for each applicant State taken 
individually.
L Accession partnerships
14. Accession partnership is a new instrument, the key feature of the enhanced 
pre-accession strategy; it will mobilize all forms of assistance to the applicant 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe within a single framework.
15. This single framework will cover in detail for each applicant the priorities 
to be observed in adopting the Union acquis and also the financial resources 
available for that purpose, in particular the PHARE programme. In that context 
financial assistance would be linked to the applicants' progress and, more 
specifically, to compliance with the programme for adoption of the acquis.
16. The Council will decide unanimously on the establishment of the 
partnerships as the key element in the pre-accession strategy. On that basis it 
will then decide, by a qualified majority and by 15 March 1998 at the latest, on 
the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives, sigm’ficant adjustments and 
conditions applicable to each individual partnership. When an element 
essential to the continuation of pre-accession assistance is missing in an 
applicant State, the Council will take appropriate measures by the same 
procedure.
a  Increased pre-accession aid
17. Pre-accession aid will be increased substantially; alongside the PHARE
programme, which will already have been refocused on accession priorities, it
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will, as from the year 2000, comprise aid for agriculture and a structural 
instrument which will give priority to measures similar to those of the 
Cohesion Fund. Financial support to the countries involved in the enlargement 
process will be based on the principle of equal treatment, independently of time 
of accession, with particular attention being paid to countries with the greatest 
need. The European Council welcomes in this connection the catch-up facility 
envisaged by the Commission.
18. Without prejudice to decisions on the financial perspective for 2000-2006, 
the PHARE programme will focus on accession by setting two priority aims: 
the reinforcement of administrative and judicial capacity (about 30% of the 
overall amount) and investments related to the adoption and application of the 
acquis (about 70%).
19. Some Community programmes (e.g. education, training and research) will 
be open to applicant States and this will enable them to familiarize themselves 
with the Union's policies and working methods. Such participation will have to 
be determined case-by-case, with each applicant State making a steadily 
increasing financial contribution of its own. PHARE will, if necessary, be able 
to continue part-financing the applicant States' national contributions. Such 
financing should remain at around «10% of the PHARE appropriation, not 
including participation in the research and development framework 
programme.
20. The applicant States should be allowed to take part, as observers and for 
the points which concern them, in the management committees responsible for 
monitoring the programmes to which they contribute financially, under specific
arrangements adapted to the case in question.
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21. The Community agencies in which applicant countries will be able to 
participate will be determined on a case-by-case basis.
22. A specific pre-accession strategy for Cyprus will be based on:
• participation in certain targeted projects, in particular to boost judicial 
and administrative capacity and projects in the field of justice and home 
affairs;
• participation in certain Community programmes and agencies (as in the 
approach followed for the other applicant States);
• use of technical assistance provided by TAIEX (Technical Assistance 
information Exchange Office).
c. Commission opinions and accession negotiations
23. The Commission's opinions on the applicant States constitute a sound 
overall analysis of each applicant State's situation in the light of the 
membership criteria set by the Copenhagen European Council. The prosf)ect of 
membership is a unique incentive to the applicants to speed up the 
implementation of policies which comply with the Union acquis. Incorporation 
of the acquis into legislation is necessary, but is not in itself sufficient; it will 
also be necessary to ensure that it is actually applied.
24. The European Council noted the link between the applicant States' ongoing 
efforts in that direction in sectoral policies, in particular the internal market and 
related policies, and the harmonious operation of Community policies after 
accession.
25. Compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria is a prerequisite for the 
opening of any accession negotiations. Economic criteria and the ability to
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fulfil the obligations arising from membership have been and must be assessed 
in a forward-looking, dynamic way.
26. The decision to enter into negotiations does not imply that they will be 
successfully concluded at the same time. Their conclusion and the subsequent 
accession of the different applicant States will depend on the extent to which 
each complies with the Copenhagen criteria and on the Union's ability to 
assimilate new members.
27. The European Council has decided to convene bilateral intergovernmental 
conferences in the spring of 1998 to begin negotiations with Cyprus, Hungary, 
Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia on the conditions for their 
entry into the Union and the ensuing Treaty adjustments. These negotiations 
will be based on the general negotiating framework acknowledged by the 
Council on 8 December 1997. At the same time as the above, the preparation 
of negotiations with Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria will be 
speeded up in particular through an analytical examination of the Union acquis. 
This preparation may also be discussed at ministerial-level bilateral meetings 
with the Member States of the Union.
28. The accession of Cyprus should benefit all communities and help to bring 
about civil peace and reconciliation. The accession negotiations will contribute 
positively to the search for a political solution to the Cyprus problem through 
the talks under the aegis of the United Nations which must continue with a 
view to creating a bi-community, bi-zonal federation. In this context, the 
European Council requests that the willingness of the Government of Cyprus to 
include representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community in the accession
negotiating delegation be acted upon. In order for this request to be acted upon,
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the necessary contacts will be undertaken by the Presidency and the
Commission.
d. Review procedure
29. From the end of 1998, the Commission will make regular reports to the 
Council, together with any necessary recommendations for opening bilateral 
intergovernmental conferences, reviewing the progress of each Central and 
East European applicant State towards accession in the light of the Copenhagen 
criteria, in particular the rate at which it is adopting the Union acquis. Prior to 
those reports, implementation of the accession partnerships and progress in 
adopting the acquis will be examined with each applicant State in the Europe 
Agreement bodies. The Commission's reports will serve as a basis for taking, 
in the Council context, the necessary decisions on the conduct of the accession 
negotiations or their extension to other applicants. In that context, the 
Commission will continue to follow the method adopted by Agenda 2000 in 
evaluating
applicant States' ability to meet the economic criteria and fulfil the obligations 
deriving from accession.
30. A dynamic approach should be maintained in assessing the progress made 
by applicant States in the regular reports which the Commission will submit to 
the Council.
A European strategy for Turkey
31. The Council confirms Turkey's eligibility for accession to the European
Union. Turkey will be judged on the basis of the same criteria as the other
applicant States. While the political and economic conditions allowing
accession negotiations to be envisaged are not satisfied, the European Council
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considers that it is nevertheless important for a strategy to be drawn up to 
prepare Turkey for accession by bringing it closer to the European Union in 
every field.
32. This strategy should consist in:
• development of the possibilities afforded by the Ankara Agreement;
• intensification of the Customs Union;
• implementation of financial cooperation;
• approximation of laws and adoption of the Union acquis.
• participation, to be decided case by case, in certain programmes and in 
certain agencies provided for in paragraphs 19 and 21.
33. The strategy will be reviewed by the Association Council in particular on 
the basis of Article 28 of the Association Agreement in the light of the 
Copenhagen criteria and the Council's position of 29 April 1997.
34. In addition, participation in the European Conference will enable the 
Member States of the European Union and Turkey to step up their dialogue and 
cooperation in areas of common interest.
35. The European Council recalls that strengthening Turkey's links with the
European Union also depends on that country's pursuit of the political and
economic reforms on which it has embarked, including the alignment of human
rights standards and practices on those in force in the European Union; respect
for and protection of minorities; the establishment of satisfactory and stable
relations between Greece and Turkey; the settlement of disputes, in particirlar
by legal process, including the International Court of Justice; and support for
negotiations under the aegis of the UN on a political settlement in Cyprus on
the basis of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.
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36. The European Council endorses the guidelines that emerged from the 
General Affairs Council of 24 November 1997 on future relations between the 
Union and Turkey and asks the Commission to submit suitable proposals.
THE EVOLUTION OF UNION POLICIES: AGENDA 2000
37. The European Council welcomed the Commission communication on 
Agenda 2000 concerning the development of the Union's policies and the 
future financial framework. It confirmed the need to ensure in advance of 
enlargement that the Union is in a position to cope with it under the best 
conditions by making the adjustments deemed necessary to its policies and 
their financing, bearing in mind that it is essential to set a financial framework 
for the Union's policies. The imperative of budgetary discipline and efficient 
expenditure must prevail at Union level just as it prevails at Union level just as 
it prevails at the level of the Member States.
38. The European Council considers that the Commission proposals contained 
in Agenda 2000 are an appropriate working basis for further negotiations for an 
agreement on the Union's policies and the financial framework. It invites the 
Commission to submit its proposals on all of these questions as soon as 
possible in the light of the initial discussions and these guidelines. The 
European Council takes note of the Commission's intention to submit its report 
on the functioning of the system of own resources by autumn 1998 at the latest.
39. It is important for reasons of transparency to make a clear distinction in the 
presentation and implementation of the future financial framework between 
expenditure relating to the Union as currently constituted and that reserved for 
the future acceding countries as pre-accession or accession aid.
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APPENDIX C
1999 REGULAR REPORT 
FROM THE COMMISSION 
ON TURKEY'S PROGRESS 
TOWARDS ACCESSION 
(C. CONCLUSION)
Recent developments confirm that, although the basic features of a democratic 
system exist in Turkey, it still does not meet the Copenhagen political criteria. There 
are serious shortcomings in terms of human rights and protection of minorities. Torture 
is not systematic but is still widespread and freedom of expression is regularly restricted 
by the authorities. The National Security Council continues to play a major role in 
political life. Although there have been some improvements in terais of the 
independence of the judiciary the emergency courts system remains in place. In recent 
months there have been some more encouraging signs of démocratisation. The 
government and Parliament have worked to adopt some keys laws regulating political 
life, the justice system and protection of human rights. It is too early to assess the 
impact of these measures but these efforts should be pursued and extended to all 
citizens, including those of Kurdish origin. The Commission hopes that the positive 
impact of these measures will not be undone by the carrying out of the death sentence 
passed on Mr Abdullah Ôcalan.
Turkey has many of the characteristics of a market economy. It should be able to 
cope, albeit with difficulties, with competitive pressure and market forces within the 
Union, provided sustainable macroeconomic stability is attained and there is further 
progress towards the implementation of legal and structural reform programmes.
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Turkey has continued its consolidation policy and economic imbalances have been 
reduced. The public deficit and inflation have been reduced, the latter through a change in 
wage and price indexation. Pension reform has been approved by parliament. The 
efficiency of revenue collection procedures has been improved. The constitution has been 
changed to permit international arbitration. This should facilitate privatisation of the 
electricity sector and investment in infrastructure and remove an important impediment 
for foreign direct investments.
Priority should be given to reduce inflationaiy pressures and fiscal deficits in order 
to reduce real interest rates and high financing needs of the public sector, which are 
crowding out private sector investment. In view of the financing needs for the repair of 
earthquake damage, special attention should be paid to the overall fiscal discipline and to 
the swaft implementation of further structural reforms. Privatisation needs to be continued 
and the promotion of SMEs has to be enhanced. The uneven distribution of income and 
the huge regional disparities impede sound economic development. Attention should be 
paid to education as an element of an overall socio-economic development strategy.
Turkey continues to make most progress in alignment in the areas covered by the 
Customs Union and, to a lesser extent, in areas covered by the European strategy. In 
general terms the situation with regard to free movement of goods is satisfactory and 
Turkey has reached a high level of adoption of European standards even if it has still not 
adopted a fi’amework law. Despite the high degree of alignment in the customs area there 
is still a need for a new customs code. The Customs Union was further developed in the 
last year through the establishment of a common system of outward processing for
textiles. There is a need for early progress in the area of copy right law. Although there
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has been no recent progress in the area of capital movements the general situation is good 
and the recent adoption of a new Banking act has brought further alignment.
In competition there has been progress in the area of anti-trust although the Commission 
remains concerned about the operation of the TEKEL monopoly. Turkey has notified its 
state aid schemes to the Commission and these are under examination. Agriculture is still 
characterised by high levels of support and protection and there has been no progress in 
legislative alignment since the last Report.
The administrative capacity to apply the acquis in the context of the Customs Union 
remains very satisfactory. However, Turkey needs to further modernise its administrative 
structures and to increase staff training.
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